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Jukka Keränen, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2005
 
The nature of mathematical theorizing underwent a dramatic transformation in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries. Mathematicians are prone to describe this transformation by saying that 
mathematics became more ‘conceptual’ and that, consequently, we have come to enjoy more and 
better ‘understanding’ in mathematics. The purpose of my dissertation is to introduce a 
constellation of philosophical notions that allows us to analyze the epistemic significance of 
these changes. In order to arrive at such a constellation, I conduct a case study in which I 
compare two approaches to the solvability of polynomial equations by radicals, one 
characteristic of 19th century mathematics, another characteristic of 20th century mathematics. I 
use the pre-philosophically visible differences between the two approaches to motivate a new 
epistemological notion I call cognitive control. To have cognitive control over an epistemic 
process such as reading or writing a proof is to have epistemic guidance for the process in virtue 
of having an epistemic scaffolding. To have epistemic guidance at a given juncture in a process is 
to have a constellation of cognitive resources that allows one to represent the different possible 
ways of pursuing the process further; to have an epistemic scaffolding for a process is to have a 
suitably organized representation of the epistemically possible facts in the range of facts one has 
chosen to examine. I apply the notion of cognitive control to two proofs of the fact that there is 
no general formula for a solution by radicals for polynomial equations of degree 5, again one 
characteristic of 19th century mathematics, another characteristic of 20th century mathematics. I 
argue that we enjoy much better cognitive control over the process of reading the 20th century 
proof than we do over the process of reading the 19th century proof. This suggests that the 
epistemic significance of the said changes in the nature of mathematical theorizing consists, at 
least in part, in the circumstance that the conceptual resources of 20th century mathematics allow 
us to enjoy more and better cognitive control over the epistemic processes in mathematical 
research and learning. 
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PREFACE 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
It is widely recognized that the nature of mathematical theorizing changed dramatically in the 
latter half of the 19th century.1 Mathematicians are prone to describe this change by saying that 
mathematics became more “conceptual” and that, as a consequence, there was a dramatic 
increase in the epistemic power of mathematical theories. It is widely recognized, indeed, that 
mathematics in the 20th century was far more successful as a science than in the previous 
centuries. It is not at all obvious, however, in what this success consists—it is not at all obvious, 
that is, how we should characterize the epistemic significance of the theoretical accomplishments 
of 20th century mathematics. It is clear, I take it, that merely pointing to the fact that we have 
acquired more mathematical knowledge would not be adequate. 
                                                 
1 See Gray, “The nineteenth-century revolution in mathematical ontology”; Stein, “Logos, Logic, 
and Logistiké: Some Philosophical Remarks on Nineteenth-Century Transformation of 
Mathematics”; and Mac Lane, “Structure in Mathematics”. For example, Stein writes: 
“Mathematics underwent, in the nineteenth century, a transformation so profound that it is not 
too much to call it a second birth of the subject—its first birth having occurred among the 
ancient Greeks...” (p. 238). 
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One attractive suggestion would be that the principal epistemic significance of the pivotal 
accomplishments of 20th century mathematics is that they have made it possible to understand 
many ranges of mathematical facts better and, indeed, to understand ranges of mathematical 
facts we were not able to understand before at all. Thus, the thought would be that the scientific 
success of mathematics in the 20th century consists, at least in part, in the circumstance that we 
have acquired more and better understanding in mathematics. This suggestion is attractive 
because it is natural to think that one of the aims of any science, empirical or not, just is to help 
us understand various ranges of facts; indeed, mathematicians have long maintained that coming 
to understand mathematical facts is one of the central aims of mathematics.2 We do not currently 
have a philosophical analysis of what it is to understand mathematical facts, however.3 Thus, we 
are not in a position to properly evaluate this attractive suggestion. 
                                                 
2 See, for example, G.F. Gauss, Disquisitiones Arithmeticae; Mac Lane, “Structure in 
Mathematics”; Thurston, “On Proof and Progress in Mathematics”. For example, Thurston, one 
of the pre-eminent geometers of the latter part of the 20th century, writes: “what we are doing [in 
mathematics] is finding ways for people to understand and think about mathematics.” (p. 162) 
3 There is to my knowledge not a single paper devoted specifically to understanding in 
mathematics, though there has been some recent work on explanation in mathematics. See 
Mancosu’s “Mathematical explanation: problems and prospects” for an exhaustive overview of 
the existing literature. There is likewise very little work devoted specifically to understanding in 
general. See Cooper, “The Epistemology of Understanding” and Österman, “Is there a General 
Sense of Understanding?” The latter contains an essentially complete list of references on the 
literature concerning understanding. 
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In order to formulate a hypothesis about what it is to understand mathematical facts, I 
conducted a number of mathematical case studies. In each one, I compared two theoretical 
approaches aimed at solving the same mathematical problem: one characteristic of 19th century 
mathematics, another characteristic of 20th century mathematics. I made sure to pick cases in 
which both approaches can solve the problem and yet, the consensus among mathematicians 
would be that the 20th century approach is epistemically superior to the 19th century one. The 
most suggestive among my case studies turned out to be one in which I examined the shift from 
Abel’s 1826 approach to the solvability of polynomial equations by radicals to Artin’s 1940 
approach, a development that is widely considered to be pivotal in the evolution of modern 
mathematics. 
Thus, by comparing the two approaches in each case, I was hoping to identify sets of 
epistemic resources—concepts, methods of acquiring knowledge, and bits of knowledge—the 
significance of which could plausibly be that they allow us to understand some range of 
mathematical facts. At the same time, I remained open to the possibility that the significance of 
the sets of resources I considered might be something different altogether. I was led to conclude 
that while many of the resources characteristic of 20th century mathematics do in fact allow us to 
understand some range of mathematical facts better than do the corresponding 19th century 
resources, this is typically not the fundamental difference between them. As I will argue in this 
essay, typically the fundamental difference is that the 20th century resources allow us to attain 
better cognitive control over our mathematical epistemic processes such as proving theorems and 
solving problems: they make it possible for us to attain a higher grade of a certain kind of 
rational mastery over what we do in mathematics, one I chose to call “cognitive control.” 
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The idea is this. In our mathematical epistemic projects, we are constantly being placed in 
particular situations in which we need to reach some particular epistemic aim: to find a solution 
to a computation problem, to prove a theorem, to describe some objects. Let us consider the 
following question: How do we succeed in reaching such an aim when the epistemic resources 
we have at the outset of our epistemic process are insufficient for reaching it? The platitudinous 
answer is that we need to acquire new bits of knowledge or new concepts. My case studies 
convinced me that there is also a non-platitudinous answer: blind luck and genius aside, we need 
to acquire a particular kind of configuration of epistemic resources, one the having of which 
amounts to having cognitive control over the process of pursuing our aim; for it is in virtue of 
having cognitive control that we can bring reason to bear on the epistemic challenges we face in 
our projects. Since the characterization of cognitive control will be rather complicated, I will not 
attempt even to sketch it here. Suffice it to say that cognitive control over an epistemic process 
will turn out to be a particular kind of configuration of knowledge, representational abilities, and 
abilities to manipulate conceptually constituted representations in a way that allows us to pursue 
the aims of our processes in a rationally orchestrated manner. 
My purpose in this essay is to present a tentative characterization of cognitive control and 
employ that characterization to analyze the pre-philosophically felt differences in the epistemic 
power of the approaches of Abel and Artin. I will argue that the theoretical resources of Artin’s 
approach allow us to maintain much better cognitive control over the process of proving the 
central result common to the two approaches. I hope to show that the notion of cognitive control 
allows us to provide a nuanced and illuminating analysis of the various ways in which Artin’s 
approach is epistemically superior to Abel’s. 
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My analysis will show that the differences in the quality of cognitive control the two 
approaches afford us are due to the fact that Artin’s approach is organized by representations that 
involve much richer sets of concepts than those that organize Abel’s approach. Foremost among 
these concepts are the concepts of various kinds of algebraic structures such as group, subgroup, 
quotient group and field extension, and the concepts of various kinds of morphisms between such 
structures. Thus, I will argue that the ability to construct and manipulate conceptually constituted 
representations is one of the most important sources of cognitive control in mathematics. 
I want to emphasize that my characterization of cognitive control is intended to describe 
an epistemically significant pattern in our mathematical cognitive activity. In particular, I want 
to guard against the impression that the argumentative structure of my analysis is circular. Even 
though the components my characterization are motivated by considering the mathematically 
specific features of the two proofs, I think that once they are in place, they will be seen to 
constitute a coherent epistemological notion intelligible on its own right. Further, this notion can 
readily be seen to apply to mathematical epistemic processes that are not intrinsically associated 
with the case study: after articulating each of the components of my characterization, I will show 
that it applies to a variety of mathematical situations unrelated to and, indeed, decidedly different 
from the ones found in the epistemic processes of Abel and Artin. 
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In further work, I intend to strengthen the motivation for my characterization of cognitive 
control in three ways. First, I will apply that characterization to other contrastive case studies. 
This work is well underway, and the results are promising. The conclusion, one recommended 
already by the analysis of Abel and Artin, will be that the basic epistemic significance of many 
of the conceptual resources characteristic of 20th century mathematics is that they make it 
possible to acquire excellent cognitive control over wide ranges of mathematical epistemic 
processes. Second, I will argue that to understand a range of mathematical facts amounts to 
having cognitive control over the processes of proving those facts. This analysis will have the 
philosophically interesting feature that it is equally compatible with nominalism and realism 
about the ontology of mathematics. 
Third, I will show that my characterization of cognitive control can be applied to analyze 
epistemic processes in empirical science and, indeed, epistemic processes in our epistemic 
activity quite generally. Thus, ultimately I hope to argue that to understand a range of empirical 
facts can be analyzed in terms of having cognitive control over the processes of coming to know 
those facts. The structure of the theory in the empirical case will be more complicated because 
there we need to account also for the intuition that understanding a range of empirical facts 
involves, somehow or other, knowing how those facts were produced by the causal-nomological 
structure of the world. Thus, the thought is that understanding in mathematics is a particular kind 
of configuration in our epistemic life, and that while understanding in empirical cognition is also 
a configuration of that kind, it is one acquired in virtue of knowing some range of facts that can 
only be characterized by appealing to metaphysical notions like causation or law of nature. 
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2.0  SOLVABILITY OF POLYNOMIAL EQUATIONS 
In this chapter, we will compile the mathematical database for the analysis to be undertaken in 
Chapter 3. I will discuss two markedly different approaches to the solvability of polynomial 
equations by radicals. In particular, I will examine two proofs of a crucial result in this area, the 
fact that the general polynomial equation p5(x) = 0 of degree 5 is not solvable by radicals. 
2.1 BACKGROUND 
Polynomial equations and their solutions have always been among the foremost objects of 
interest in mathematics. Indeed, until the early 19th century, almost all of mathematics aside from 
geometry consisted of the study of polynomial equations, and they remain the lifeblood of areas 
such as abstract algebra, geometry, and number theory. 
The intellectual context for my case study is furnished by two fundamental facts. 
Fundamental Theorem of Algebra  Let 
 
p(x) = xn + a1 xn – 1 + ... + an – 1 x + an
 
be any polynomial with coefficients a1, ..., an in the rational numbers Q. Then  
the polynomial equation p(x) = 0 has n solutions in the complex numbers C. 
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The first proof of this theorem now considered rigorous was given by Gauss in his 1799 
doctoral dissertation.4 There is the complication that sometimes the solutions may not be distinct, 
but this wrinkle will not concern us here. 
The second fundamental fact is that there exists a general formula for a solution by 
radicals for polynomial equations of degrees 2, 3, and 4 each. For example, let p(x) = x2 + bx + c 
be any polynomial of degree 2 with rational coefficients b and c, and consider the equation 
 
x2 + bx + c = 0. 
 
We know that the two solutions of this equation, call them x1 and x2, can be expressed in terms of 
the coefficients of p(x) by using the familiar formulae: 
 
x1 = (−b + (b2 – 4c)1/2)/2, x2 = (−b – (b2 – 4c)1/2)/2. 
 
                                                 
4 The history of attempted proofs of the Fundamental Theorem of Algebra is complex, and it is 
difficult to say who really has the priority here. Suffice it to say that there had been earlier proofs 
which, if transposed into conceptually mature modern settings appropriate to their respective 
approaches, would be very nearly correct, and that even Gauss’ 1799 proof would have to be 
amended slightly to count as fully rigorous. Gauss distinguishes himself here by the fact that he 
went on to give three more proofs of the Fundamental Theorem and his second proof, one of 
two he gave in 1816, is certainly correct even by modern standards. See Ebbinghaus et al, 
Numbers, pp. 97-109. 
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Notice that the formulae for x1 and x2 above only involve the field operations (addition, 
subtraction, multiplication and division) and the operation of extracting the square root, applied 
to the coefficients of the polynomial. An expression of the form A1/n is called a radical of degree 
n and hence, it is customary to describe our second fundamental fact by saying that there exists a 
general formula for a solution by radicals for polynomial equations of degrees 2, 3, and 4. 
Given these two fundamental facts, it is natural to ask whether there exists a general 
formula for a solution by radicals for polynomial equations of degree n, 
 
p(x) = xn + a1 xn–1  + ... + an = 0, 
 
when n > 4; that is, whether, for a given degree n > 4, there exists a family of expressions β1, ..., 
βn, where each βi involves only the coefficients of p(x), the field operations and the operation of 
extracting roots (possibly of degree greater than 2), such that 
 
βin + a1 βin–1  + ... + an = 0, 
 
for each i = 1, ..., n. This question can be naturally phrased by considering the general 
polynomial equation of degree n: 
 
pn(x) = xn + a1 xn – 1 + an – 1 x + an = 0 
  
where the coefficients are considered independent variables with values in Q. It is easy to see 
that there exists a general solution formula for equations of degree n if and only if the general 
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equation of degree n is solvable by radicals. For when we treat the coefficients of the general 
equation as independent variables, we are in effect assuming that there are no nontrivial 
arithmetic relations between those coefficients. Hence, on the one hand, a general solution 
formula will, as such, express the solution of the general equation. On the other hand, a solution 
of the general equation will specialize to express the solutions of any particular polynomial 
equation upon substituting numerical values for the variables that are the coefficients of the 
general equation. 
That there exists a general formula for a solution by radicals for polynomial equations of 
degrees 2, 3 and 4 each was known by the mid 16th century.5 The 18th century saw a sequence of 
attempts to find such a general formula for equations of degree 5, but none succeeded. While it 
was known that there are particular kinds of equations of degrees 5 and greater that have a 
solution by radicals, gradually the feeling began to emerge that there may be no general formula 
for degrees greater than 4.6 Thus, the basic challenge for the algebraists of the early 19th century 
was to either find such a formula or else, show that none exists. Should it turn out that there is no 
general formula for a solution by radicals for equations of degree 5, it would be an easy 
consequence that no such formula exists for any of the degrees greater than 5, either. 
                                                 
5 The formula for equations of degree 2 was discovered by Arab mathematicians around 900 CE. 
The formula for equations of degree 3 was discovered by del Ferro in the early 16th century, and 
independently by Tartaglia (by 1535); the formula was published by Cardan in his monumental 
Ars Magna (1545). Ars Magna also contains the formula for equations of degree 4 discovered by 
Ferrari around 1540. See, for example, Fenrick, Introduction to the Galois Correspondence, p. v. 
6 See, for example, Kiernan, p. 44. 
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2.2 UNSOLVABILITY OF THE QUINTIC 
 
Here, then, is the fact that will occupy us for the rest of this essay: there is no general formula 
for a solution by radicals for polynomial equations of degree 5; again, this is equivalent with the 
fact that the general polynomial equation p5(x) = 0 of degree 5 is not solvable by radicals. I will 
adopt the phrase standard in mathematical parlance and say that the quintic is unsolvable. 
The first proof of the unsolvability the quintic now considered complete was given by the 
Norwegian Niels Henrik Abel. He recorded a highly condensed version of his argument in a self-
published pamphlet in 1824; a fuller version appeared two years later in the inaugural volume of 
Journal für die reine und angewandte Mathematik.7 Abel’s proof was considered very difficult 
by his contemporaries, and there was no consensus as to whether it was correct until Hamilton 
carefully reconstructed it in his reports to the Royal Irish Academy in 1839 and 1841—ten years 
after Abel’s death from poverty.8
Ivo Radloff has recently rearticulated the 1826 version of Abel’s proof in modern terms; 
this should be considered a valuable scholarly achievement. As Radloff makes clear, Abel’s 
proof is in fact correct and conclusive, save only for a couple of minor amendments that make 
explicit certain assumptions Abel’s approach requires. Much of my exposition of Abel’s proof 
                                                 
7 See Kiernan, p. 67. 
8 Hamilton, “On the Argument of Abel” (1839) and “Investigations Respecting Equations of the 
Fifth Degree” (1841).  
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will depend on Radloff’s rearticulation, even if in a highly processed form; see Ivo Radloff, 
“Abels Unmöglichkeitsbeweis im Spiegel der modernen Galoistheorie” (1998). 
The reason Abel’s approach to solvability is not better known is that only a few years 
after its publication, it was almost completely superseded by a radically different approach, one 
that was to transform the science of mathematics. This is the approach due to Evariste Galois, 
after whom the modern approach to solvability, Galois Theory, is named. Galois’ ideas about the 
solvability of polynomial equations come to us mainly from unpublished manuscripts and a letter 
he wrote to a notable French mathematician Auguste Chevalier the night before his death in a 
duel in 1832.9 If Abel’s proof was considered difficult, Galois’ was considered downright 
obscure—or, more to the point, not considered at all for a decade and a half. In the fullness of 
time, however, his ideas were recovered from the manuscripts he left behind, and after being 
refined and clarified by a number of mathematicians in the latter part of the 19th century, they 
have became part of the bedrock of modern mathematics. In its modern formulation, Galois 
Theory is considered one of the most beautiful pieces of mathematics known to us.10
                                                 
9 See, for example, Kiernan, p. 78. Galois published three papers during his lifetime, all in 1830. 
While the latter two do not have a direct bearing on the issue of solvability by radicals, the first 
one deals with the solvability of equations of the form xm – 1. These results would find their 
proper place in Galois’ general theory which he never managed to publish. He submitted a paper 
that contained an exposition of the said general theory to the Academy of France three times; the 
first two submissions were lost, and the third one was rejected in 1831. See Kiernan, pp. 74-6. 
10 For a mathematically conscientious account of Galois’ original approach, see Radloff, 
“Évariste Galois: Principles and Applications.” 
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It would not be possible here to do justice to all the various ways in which Galois’ ideas 
have influenced the evolution of mathematics. To single out just one of the many pivotal themes 
Galois introduced, he was the first mathematician to study properties of arithmetic objects like 
polynomial equations by studying the internal organization of algebraic structures associated 
with them. In particular, Galois may be regarded as the progenitor of the concept group or, at any 
rate, the concept group of permutations of an algebraic system.11 This concept and its cognates 
are part of the foundation of modern mathematics. A critical and strikingly modern aspect of 
Galois’ approach is that he made a decisive shift away from considering properties and relations 
of individual permutations, and focused on properties and relations of groups of permutations. 
His approach is strikingly modern also in that he was careful to emphasize that his proof of the 
unsolvability of the quintic was but one application of his general theoretical machinery.12 
Finally, Galois was a vocal advocate of the pregnant idea that mathematical theories should seek 
to identify the “essential properties” of the objects under consideration and the arguments should 
proceed by reasoning “directly” about those properties, rather than by carrying out heavy 
symbolic computations.13 We will return to these ideas time and again in this essay. 
                                                 
11 For the purposes of this essay, I will take it that Galois did in fact have the mathematical 
concept group in play in his work. It would be a matter of considerable subtlety to make a 
philosophically informed judgment as to whether this is what we should want to say, however. 
Certainly Galois ‘recognized’ many group-theoretic features of the system of permutations of the 
roots of a polynomial, but at least some of them, arguably, not quite ‘directly’ or at any rate, not 
in their full generality. See, for example, Radloff, “Évariste Galois: Principles and Applications.” 
12 See Kiernan, p. 42 and pp. 72-9. 
13 See especially Kiernan, p. 92 and Gray, p. 236. 
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I will in my case study contrast Abel’s approach to solvability by radicals with what I 
will call “Artin’s approach.” This is just the standard, conceptually mature modern form of the 
approach initiated by Galois. While a number of mathematicians made critical contributions to 
this approach in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, its definitive articulation was given by 
Artin in his famous 1942 monograph Galois Theory.14 Thus, “Artin’s approach” is a misnomer, 
but a harmless one, given that the details of the actual historical evolution of this approach are 
irrelevant for my purposes. Since I want to bring out the contrast between the two approaches as 
clearly as possible, I will focus on the most fully developed form of the approach first initiated 
by Galois, and that form was given to us by Artin. 
There is a significant difference in the scope of applicability of the approaches of Abel 
and Artin we should note from the start. The resources of Abel’s approach are sufficient for 
showing that the quintic is unsolvable, but it gets no grip at all on the solvability of special 
polynomial equations, ones with actual numerical coefficients. The resources of Artin’s 
approach, in contrast, yield a general theory of solvability by radicals that applies uniformly to 
special as well as general polynomial equations. It is for this reason that Artin’s approach can, 
while Abel’s can not, be applied in a uniform way to address a wide range of well-known 
classical problems, including certain famous geometric construction problems such as the 
trisection of an arbitrary angle, the duplication of an arbitrary cube, and the constructibility of the 
regular polygons.15 For it turns out that these problems can be translated into problems about the 
solvability or not of various special polynomials. For example, Galois Theory yields a complete 
                                                 
14 Emil Artin, Galois Theory (Notre Dame Mathematical Lectures, Number 2. Notre Dame: 
Notre Dame University Press). 
15 See, for example, Fenrick, pp. 163f. 
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classification of the natural numbers n for which a regular polygon with n sides is constructible. 
While the resources of Abel’s approach (or, at any rate, pre-Galois Theoretic resources) do allow 
us to address some of these problems, it is clear from the outset that Artin’s approach has greater 
epistemic power in the sense that it allows us to prove more. Here, however, I am not interested 
in this aspect of the situation: I only want to compare the character of the proofs of the 
unsolvability of the quintic under the two approaches. For it is in this way we can bring into 
focus the differences as well as the similarities in just how the two approaches function 
epistemically. 
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2.3 ARTIN’S APPROACH 
Let p(x) be any polynomial, general or special. Artin shows that the equation p(x) = 0 is solvable 
by radicals if and only if the so-called Galois group of p(x) has the property of being a solvable 
group. He can then easily show that the general equation p5(x) = 0 of degree 5 is not solvable by 
radicals because the Galois group of p5(x) is not solvable.16
Synopsis 
Given a polynomial p(x), we can naturally associate with it two algebraic structures called the 
ground field F and the splitting field E; F is the smallest field that contains the coefficients of 
p(x), and E is the smallest field that contains F and all the roots of p(x), that is, all the solutions 
of the equation p(x) = 0. The definition of field can be found in Appendix A; for example, the 
rational numbers Q are a field that is contained in the field of real numbers R, and R is in turn 
contained in the field of complex numbers C. All the fields we will consider contain Q and are 
contained in C; as such, they are infinite structures with enormously rich internal organization. 
If a field K2 contains another field K1, we say that K2 is a field extension of K1, denoted 
K2/K1. If a third field K is contained in K2 and contains K1, we say that K is an intermediate field 
of the extension K2/K1. 
                                                 
16 Virtually any modern textbook on abstract algebra has an account of the basic components of 
Galois Theory. I have used Grillet, Algebra as my primary reference. 
 16 
It is easy to show that a polynomial equation p(x) = 0 is solvable by radicals if and only if 
the splitting field E of p(x) is contained in an extension field L of the ground field F that has a 
certain structural property called being a radical extension. This is a property of the system of 
intermediate fields of L/F. Under certain assumptions, the fact that E/F is contained in a radical 
extension implies that E/F is itself a radical extension, though this is not in general true and not 
essential to the theory. 
The epistemically critical component of Artin’s approach is to associate with the splitting 
field extension E/F another algebraic structure, the Galois group G(E/F) of p(x). Galois groups 
are particular kinds of groups; the definition of group can again be found in Appendix A. For 
example, the integers Z are an infinite group, while the Galois groups in our case study will be 
finite groups and, crucially, will have much simpler internal organization than the field 
extensions with which they are associated. 
If a group G contains another group H, we say that H is a subgroup of G. The centerpiece 
of Artin’s approach is the so-called Main Theorem of Galois Theory that establishes a bijective 
correspondence between the intermediate fields of the splitting field extension E/F and the 
subgroups of the Galois group G(E/F) for any polynomial p(x). In particular, this correspondence 
is set up in such a way that E/F has the property of being contained in a radical extension if and 
only if G(E/F) has a certain property called being a solvable group. Being a solvable group is a 
property of the system of subgroups of the group G(E/F) just as being a radical extension is a 
property of the system of intermediate fields of the extension L/F. 
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Since the groups that occur as Galois groups in our case study are finite and have much 
simpler internal organization than the corresponding field extensions, the task of determining 
whether a given polynomial equation p(x) = 0 is solvable by radicals now becomes much more 
manageable. 
In particular, it is quite easy to determine what the Galois group of the general equation 
p5(x) = 0 of degree 5 is, and easy to show that this group is not solvable. Thus, the proof that the 
quintic is unsolvable is an easy application of Artin’s approach or, if you prefer, an easy 
application of Galois Theory. 
It is worth emphasizing that the proof of the unsolvability of the quintic is just one in a 
vast range of applications of Galois Theory. Many areas of modern mathematics are organized 
by the technique of associating with a field extension K2/K1 its Galois group G and using the 
group-theoretic properties of G to study the field-theoretic properties of K2/K1. What makes this 
technique so useful is the dual circumstance that all kinds of mathematical concerns give rise to 
field extensions, and that groups lend themselves to be studied in all kinds of theoretically 
powerful ways. Thus, the Main Theorem of Galois Theory plays a constitutive role in the 
organization of areas such as abstract algebra, number theory, geometry, topology and 
mathematical physics. It is a good thing. 
 
2.3.1 Artin’s Proof of the Unsolvability of the Quintic 
This subsection contains a detailed account of the proof of the unsolvability of the quintic under 
Artin’s approach. Its principal function is to serve as the first part of the database for my 
philosophical analysis and it can be skipped without a serious loss of continuity. 
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Stage 1 Our aim at this stage is to formulate a criterion for solvability by radicals. Let Q 
be the field of rational numbers and let A be an algebraic closure of Q; this is by definition a 
field that contains all the roots of all polynomials with coefficients in Q. The field A is contained 
in the field of complex numbers C and is algebraically closed: every polynomial with 
coefficients in A has all its roots in A. All the other fields considered in the theory will be 
contained in A and will in turn contain Q. 
Let K1 be an intermediate field of A/Q, and consider a polynomial p(x) in K1[x], that is, a 
polynomial whose coefficients are in K1.17 It is easy to show that A is also the algebraic closure 
of K1 and hence, A contains all the roots of p(x). 
Much as an integer can be factored into a product of prime numbers in the ring of 
integers Z, the polynomial p(x) can be factored into a product of linear factors in the ring A[x]: if 
x1, ..., xn are the roots of p(x), then 
 
p(x) = c(x – x1)(x – x2) ... (x – xn) = cxn + ca1xn – 1 + ... + can, 
 
where the coefficients ai are the so-called elementary symmetric functions of the roots: for 
example, a1 = –  (x1 + ... + xn), an = (x1 × ... × xn), while the other ai’s are sums of products with 
fewer than n factors. We may assume for convenience that the leading coefficient c = 1 as this 
will not affect the roots. Note that the factors (x – xi) need not be distinct. 
                                                 
17 This is the ring of all polynomials with coefficients in the field K1; see Appendix A. 
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Given a field K1 contained in A, some of the roots xi may not lie in K1, in which case p(x) 
will not factor all the way down to factors of the form (x – xi) in the ring K1[x], but will have 
factors of degree greater than one. If K1 contains none of the roots, then p(x) has no non-trivial 
factors in K1[x] and we say that p(x) is irreducible over K1. 
One of the fundamental facts about a field extension K2/K1 is that K2 is a vector space 
over K1 and as such, has a basis {b1, b2, ...} over K1 so that any element of K2 can be written in 
the form a1b1 + a2b2 + ... with the bi in K2 and the ai in K1. We will focus on extensions that are 
finite in the sense that any basis of K2 over K1 is finite. In this case, there exists an element c of 
K2 such that {1, c, c2, ..., cn – 1} is a basis for K2 over K1; in particular, any element of K2 can be 
written as a polynomial a1cn – 1 + ... an – 1c + an for some ai in K1. Such c is called a primitive 
element of K2 over K1, and the extension K2/K1 is called simple; we write K2 = K1(c). This 
notation is extended inductively so that K1(c1, ..., cn) = K1(c1)(c2)...(cn). Note that the elements in 
the parentheses do not constitute a basis for K2 over K1, but rather a set of generators; in general 
a basis would include powers of these elements. 
Any finite extension K2/K1 has the important property of being algebraic: each e in K2 
satisfies a polynomial equation p(x) = 0 with p(x) in K1[x]. It is not hard to show that, in 
particular, for each e in K2 there is a unique polynomial me(x) in K1[x] irreducible over K1 
whose leading coefficient is 1 and me(e) = 0; it is called the minimal polynomial of e over K1 and 
plays a central role in Artin’s approach. 
A field extension K2/K1 is called a simple radical extension if there exists an element r in 
K2 such that (1) K2 = K1(r), and (2) the m-th power rm of r is in K1 for some positive integer m 
(even though r itself is not in K1). This means that each element in K2 is of the form a1rm – 1 + 
a2rm – 2 + ... + am – 1 with the ai in K1. We say that r is an m-th order radical over K1. 
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A field extension K2/K1 is called a radical extension if it can be ‘built up’ from simple 
radical extensions: there exist elements r1, ..., rn in K2 and positive integers m(1), ..., m(n) such 
that (1) K2 = K1(r1, ..., rn), and (2) r1m(1) is in K1 and rim(i) is in K1(r1, ..., ri – 1) for i = 2, ..., n. Thus, 
there is in K2 a sequence of simple radical extensions 
 
K1 ⊂ K1(r1) ⊂ K1(r1)(r2) ⊂ ... ⊂ K1(r1)(r2)…(rn) = K2; 
 
I will call such a sequence a radical sequence from K1 up to K2. 
Given a polynomial p(x) of degree n in F[x], the splitting field E of p(x) over F is the 
smallest field that contains F and all the n roots of p(x); thus, F ⊆ E ⊆ A and p(x) splits into 
linear factors in E[x]; indeed, E is just the field F(x1, ..., xn) generated by the roots of p(x) in A. 
We can now formulate a criterion for solvability by radicals: 
 
A polynomial equation p(x) = 0 with p(x) in F[x] is solvable by radicals if and 
only if the splitting field E of p(x) is contained in a radical extension L of F. 
 
While this is little more than a rearticulation in field-theoretic terms of what it means to be 
solvable by radicals, it turns out to be crucially important to Artin’s approach. Indeed, we will 
see how conceptual rearticulation of an arithmetic property, while in and of itself almost trivial, 
can open up an algebraically organized theoretical approach that is extremely powerful. 
I will now outline a proof of this criterion. The next two paragraphs may be skipped 
without loss of continuity. 
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On the one hand, suppose the splitting field E of p(x) is contained in a radical extension L 
of F. We then have a tower of simple radical extensions F = F0 ⊂ F1 ⊂ ... ⊂ Fn = L, with E ⊆ L, 
and so each element in E, including the solutions of p(x) = 0, can be expressed in the form 
 
a1rm(n) – 1 + a2rm(n) – 2 + ... + am(n) – 1  (*) 
 
where a1, ..., am – 1 are in Fn – 1 and r is an m(n)-th order radical over Fn – 1. Since rm(n) is in Fn – 1, 
each term in (*) can be written as 
ai(rm(n))(m(n) – i)/m(n), 
 
which is a radical over Fn – 2. This process can be repeated, so that each element in E, including 
the solutions of p(x) = 0, can be expressed as nested radicals over F. This is what it means to be 
solvable by radicals. 
On the other hand, suppose that p(x) = 0 is solvable by radicals. Each element of the 
splitting field E of p(x) can be expressed in terms of the roots of p(x), since E is by definition 
generated over F by those roots. But since p(x) = 0 is solvable by radicals, the roots of p(x) can 
be expressed as nested radicals over F. Thus, these radicals generate a radical extension L of F 
that contains E. 
 
Stage 2 The overall aim now is to determine whether the splitting field extension E/F of 
the general polynomial p5(x) of degree 5 is contained in a radical extension. So we need some 
way of testing a field extension for this property. 
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We now come to the key insight in Artin’s proof. Given a field extension K2/K1, we can 
associate with K2/K1 the Galois group G(K2/K1) of K1-automorphisms of K2; this is the group of 
all field automorphisms ρ of K2 that leave K1 fixed pointwise in the sense that ρ(x) = x for all x 
in K1; the group operation is just the composition of mappings. The idea now is to set up a 
correspondence between the intermediate fields of K2/K1 and the subgroups of G(K2/K1) in such 
a way that the property of being a radical extension of the system of intermediate fields of K2/K1 
is reflected by some highly tractable property of the system of subgroups of G(K2/K1). 
This is exactly what Artin achieves. It turns out, first, that for any extension K2/K1 with a 
property called being normal, there is a bijective correspondence between the intermediate fields 
of K2/K1 and the subgroups of G(K2/K1). There are many different ways of characterizing this 
property; the ones most directly relevant to the issue of solvability by radicals are that (a) an 
extension K2/K1 is normal if and only if K2 is the splitting field of some polynomial in K1[x]; and 
(b) given any element t of K2, all the roots of the minimal polynomial mt(x) of t over K1 are 
contained in K2; that is, K2 contains all the roots of mt(x) in the algebraic closure of K1. 
Being normal is a mathematically ‘natural’ property of extensions, one that allows us to 
execute arguments we would intuitively think should go through; indeed, as (b) suggests, it may 
be thought of as a kind of K1-relative completeness property of K2. 
The said bijective correspondence is now set up as follows. Let K2/K1 be a normal 
extension. On the one hand, given an intermediate field K of K2/K1, we associate with K the 
Galois group G(K2/K); it is immediate from the definitions that this group is a subgroup of the 
Galois group G(K2/K1). On the other hand, given a subgroup H of G(K2/K1), we associate with H 
its fixed field K2H in K2. This is the set of all elements of K2 that are fixed pointwise by all the 
K1-automorphisms in H. It is again immediate from the definitions that this set is in fact an 
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intermediate field of the extension K2/K1. The heart of the proof of the Main Theorem of Galois 
Theory consists of showing that these mappings are mutually inverse, so that each one is one-to-
one and onto. 
Thus, we can finally state the striking 
 
Main Theorem of Galois theory Let K2/K1 be a normal extension. 
(i) If K is an intermediate field of K2/K1, then K is the fixed field of G(K2/K);  
in particular, K2/K is a normal extension. 
(ii) If H is a subgroup of G(K2/K1), then H is the Galois group G(K2/K2H); 
in particular, K2/K2H is a normal extension. 
(iii) The maps K → G(K2/K) and H → K2H are mutually inverse inclusion-
reversing bijections between the lattice of intermediate fields of the extension K2/K1 and  
the lattice of subgroups of its Galois group G(K2/K1); that is, we have 
 
K2 ↔ G(K2/K2) = {1} 
∪     ∩ 
K    ↔ G(K2/K) 
∪     ∩ 
K1     ↔ G(K2/K1). 
 
(iv) K/K1 is normal if and only if G(K2/K) is a normal subgroup of G(K2/K1) and 
if so, G(K/K1) ≈ G(K2/K1)/G(K2/K). 
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I will now briefly discuss three lemmas that constitute the heart of the proof of the Main 
Theorem. This subsection may be skipped without a loss of continuity. 
 
Lemma 1 Let K2/K1 be a normal extension. Then K1 is the fixed field of G(K2/K1). 
 
It is clear from the definitions that K1 is contained in the fixed field of G(K2/K1); this lemma says 
that if K2/K1 is a normal extension, then the fixed field of G(K2/K1) is no larger than K1 itself. 
Thus, the map H → K2/K2H is the inverse of K → G(K2/K). 
 
Lemma 2 (Artin)  Let E be a field, G a finite group of automorphisms of E.  
Then E/EH is a normal extension and G(E/EG) = G. 
 
It is clear from the definitions that the group G is contained in G(E/EG); this lemma says that 
E/EG is indeed normal, and that G(E/EG) is no larger than G itself. Thus, the map K → G(K2/K) 
is the inverse of H → K2/K2H. One could regard this lemma as the core of Galois Theory. 
One of the nice things about the property of being normal is that it is inherited by 
extensions contained in a normal extension: 
 
Lemma 3  Let K2/K1 be a normal extension and let K be an intermediate field  
of K2/K1. Then K2/K is a normal extension also. 
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This lemma is required to apply Lemma 1 to the intermediate fields of a given normal extension 
K2/K1 in the proof of the Main Theorem. The thing to note here is that the ‘bottom’ extension 
K/K1 need not be normal even if the ambient extension K2/K1 is. Part (iv) of the Main Theorem 
addresses this issue: the extension K/K1 is normal if and only if the Galois group G(K2/K) is a 
‘normal’ subgroup of G(K2/K1). 
We now have two basic components in play. On the one hand, we know that a 
polynomial equation p(x) = 0 is solvable by radicals if and only if the splitting field E of p(x) is 
contained in a radical extension L of F, and we know the Main Theorem: for any normal 
extension K2/K1, there is a bijective correspondence between the intermediate fields of K2/K1 and 
the subgroups of G(K2/K1). Thus, there are three basic challenges. First, in the situation where E 
is the splitting field of a polynomial contained in a radical extension L of F, we need to make 
sure that we have enough normal extensions in play to apply the Main Theorem; second, given 
the Main Theorem, we need to determine what property of the system of subgroups of G(L/F) 
corresponds to the property of there being a radical sequence in L/F. Finally, the natural aim is to 
show that the group G(E/F) has this property also. As I noted in the foregoing synopsis, the result 
turns out to be that a polynomial equation p(x) = 0 is solvable by radicals if and only if the 
Galois group G(E/F) of the splitting field extension E/F of p(x) has the structural property of 
being a solvable group. I will not give a complete proof this result here, but I will indicate how 
the foregoing three challenges are met. There are four main steps. 
(1) Suppose L/F is a radical extension and, as such, contains a radical sequence. Since a 
radical sequence consists of simple radical extensions, the first thing to examine is a simple 
radical extension F(r)/F. There are two questions here: is the extension F(r)/F normal, and what 
does the group G(F(r)/F) look like? As to the first, suppose that r is an m-th order radical over F, 
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so that rm is in F. Then F(r)/F is a normal extension provided that F contains a primitive m-th 
root of unity. Thus, in order to apply the Main Theorem, we will need to adjoin such m-th root 
to the field of coefficients of p(x), and so the proof will involve considering intermediate 
extensions of L/F other than F(r)/F itself. Second, when this condition is satisfied, we find that 
G(F(r)/F) is a finite abelian group: one such that for any s and t in G, s + t = t + s.18
(2) The most obvious thing one would hope to do now is to apply the foregoing result to 
the simple radical extensions that constitute a radical sequence in L/F. In particular, in view of 
part (iv) of the Main Theorem, we would hope to show that G(F(r)/F) ≈ G(L/F)/G(L/F(r)). In 
order to do this, however, we need to make sure that the extension L/F is itself normal. Now this 
is not in general true, but it turns out that we can always replace L with a field N that is a finite 
radical extension of F and is normal over F. Finally, we will see that if G(N/F) has the property 
of being a solvable group, then so do G(L/F) and G(E/F). Thus, we may assume without loss of 
generality that G(L/F) is normal. 
(3) The upshot of these considerations is that if L/F is a normal radical extension, the 
Galois group G(L/F) contains a sequence of subgroups 
 
{1} = H1 ⊂ … ⊂ Hk = G(L/F), 
 
where Hi – 1 is normal subgroup of Hi and the quotient group Hi /Hi – 1 is abelian; a sequence of 
this form is called a normal series with abelian quotients, and a group that contains one is, again, 
                                                 
18 In fact even more is true: in the situation under consideration, F(r)/F is a cyclic group, the 
simplest kind of abelian group, but we will not need this feature in our analysis. 
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called solvable. Thus, our first result is that if L/F is a radical extension, then the Galois group 
G(L/F) is solvable. 
The proof of this result is somewhat delicate, and I will not reproduce it here. Again, 
there are two principal complications: first, we would need to consider intermediate extensions 
of L/F that result from adjoining to F the requisite roots of unity; second, we would need to show 
that L/F may be assumed to be a normal extension. Indeed, we will see in our discussion of 
Abel’s approach that, in order for his proof to go through, we must take him to be assuming that 
the requisite roots of unity are already contained in the ground field F. With this assumption in 
force, a stronger result is available: not only is E contained in a radical extension of F, E/F is 
itself a radical extension. 
(4) Once it is established that G(L/F) is a solvable group, it is easy to show, first, that 
G(L/E) is a solvable group also. For it is immediate from the definitions that G(L/E) is a 
subgroup of G(L/F) and an easy group-theoretic fact that any subgroup of a solvable group is 
solvable. It is then easy to show that G(E/F) itself is solvable, as desired. For first, the splitting 
field extension E/F is normal (see above), and so by part (iv) of the Main Theorem, we have 
G(E/F) ≈ G(L/F)/G(L/E); but it is another easy group-theoretic fact that a quotient group of any 
solvable group by a normal subgroup is solvable. 
The converse is also true: if G(E/F) is a solvable group, then E is contained in a radical 
extension of F. Thus, we have the following criterion for solvability by radicals: 
 
A polynomial equation p(x) = 0 is solvable by radicals if and only if the Galois 
group G(E/F) of the splitting field extension E/F of p(x) is a solvable group. 
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I will not address the converse result here, however, since it is the first one that matters for our 
purposes: in order to show that a polynomial equation p(x) = 0 is not solvable by radicals, it 
suffices to show that the Galois group G(E/F) of the splitting field extension E/F is not a solvable 
group. 
 
Stage 3 The aim now is to compute the Galois group of the general polynomial p5(x) of 
degree 5 and show that this group is not solvable. 
Let a1, ..., a5 be five independent variables with values in Q; then the general polynomial 
of degree 5 is 
 
p5(x) = x5 + a1 x4 + a2 x3 + a3 x2 + a4 x + a5, 
 
again assuming without loss of generality that the leading coefficient is 1. Suppose now that x1, 
..., x5 are the five roots of p5(x); these are essentially just formal symbols, subject only to the 
condition that the five symmetric functions in them equal the five coefficients. For by definition 
of root, we must have p5(x) = (x – x1) ... (x – x5) and by multiplying out the product on the right, 
we would see that the coefficients are the five elementary symmetric functions of the roots. 
Thus, the splitting field E of p5(x) is just the field of rational functions Q(x1, ..., x5), and the 
ground field F is Q(a1, …, a5). 
So now we only need to determine the Galois group of the extension E/F, but this task 
turns out to be trivial. For first, since there are no non-trivial arithmetic relations between the 
roots of p5(x), any permutation of the roots extends by linearity to a mapping on E, one that is 
easily shown to be an automorphism of E. Second, since the coefficients are symmetric functions 
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of the roots, any such automorphism leaves them all fixed. Hence, the Galois group G(E/F) is 
(isomorphic to) the full symmetric group S5, the group of all permutations on five letters. 
We are now almost done: we only need to determine whether S5 is a solvable group. But 
simple group-theoretic considerations show that any normal series in S5 must begin with the 
unique normal subgroup of index 2, the alternating group A5. However, since A5 is a non-abelian 
simple group (a group that has no proper normal subgroups), the only possible normal series in 
A5 would be {1} ⊂ A5, and the quotient A5/{1} = A5 is not abelian. 
Thus, we now know that there is no normal series with abelian quotients in S5 and hence, 
S5 is not a solvable group. By the criterion for solvability noted above, this implies that p5(x) = 0 
is not solvable by radicals. 
It follows at once that the general polynomial equation of any degree n with n > 5 is not 
solvable by radicals. For, suppose that we had a solution formula φ, only involving the 
coefficients a1, ..., an, of 
 
pn(x) = xn + a1 xn – 1 + ... + an – 1 x + an = 0. 
 
We could then put a6 = 0, ..., an = 0, and the formula φ would specialize to give a solution by 
radicals in terms of a1, ..., a5 of 
 
pn(x) = xn + a1 xn – 1 + ... + an – 5 xn – 5 = 0. 
 
But, dividing this expression by xn – 5, we obtain the general equation of degree 5, and clearly φ 
would then yield the solutions of that equation, a contradiction. 
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2.4 ABEL’S APPROACH 
The most immediately obvious difference between the approaches of Abel and Artin is that 
where Artin’s proof turns on first associating with the polynomial its splitting field and with the 
splitting field its Galois group, Abel directly examines the possible formulae for a solution by 
radicals for the general equation p5(x) = 0 of degree 5 and shows that no such formula in fact 
exists. This has the consequence that Abel’s proof is much more computational than Artin’s. In 
what follows, however, I won’t actually be interested in this particular contrast between the two 
proofs, for reasons I will explain in Chapter 3. Accordingly, I will not in my exposition give a 
detailed account of the computations on which Abel’s proof finally depends. 19
Synopsis 
Just as the first part of Artin’s proof, we can view the first part of Abel’s proof as identifying a 
criterion for solvability by radicals. Let pn(x) = 0 be the general polynomial equation of degree n. 
By carrying out symbolic computations, Abel obtains a canonical expression for the general form 
any solution by radicals would have to have. He exploits this canonical expression to show that 
any term in such a solution would have to be expressible as a rational function in the n roots of 
pn(x); for Abel, a rational function is a quotient of two polynomials. In particular, he shows that 
                                                 
19 Again, I will be using Radloff [1998] as the primary source for my exposition of Abel’s proof. 
I will include a translation of Radloff’s paper as Appendix B. A brief account of Abel’s proof 
can also be found in Kiernan, pp. 67-72. An annotated translation of Abel’s 1824 paper can be 
found in Appendix A and the first part of the 1826 paper in Appendix B of Pesic, Abel’s Proof. 
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the radicals in a solution by radicals would have to be so expressible. Thus, the overall aim of the 
proof becomes to show that not enough such radicals exist for a solution by radicals to exist in 
the case n = 5. 
In the second part of his proof, Abel focuses on the case of the general equation p5(x) = 0 
of degree 5. Now the key point is that the roots of the general equation may be regarded as 
independent variables. Accordingly, Abel’s principal theoretical device is to reason about the 
number of values a rational function in five independent variables can take under the 
permutations of those variables. A value of a rational function φ under the permutation ρ is 
simply the particular formal expression that results from applying ρ to the variables in φ; two 
values of φ are distinct if they are different as formal expressions, except that A + B is 
considered to be the same expression as B + A and likewise for AB and BA. The crucial idea in 
Abel’s proof is what I will call the Combinatorial Principle: if φ is a rational function that is 
also a radical over the ground field F of p5(x), then the number of distinct values  φ has under the 
permutations of the roots is the same as the number of values φ has as a radical over F. The latter 
number is the degree of the minimal polynomial of φ over F; for most purposes, this is just the 
order over F of the radical. Thus, for example, a square root has two values as a radical; a cube 
root has three, and so on. 
Thus, Abel’s strategy in the second part of his proof is to identify constraints on the 
number of possible values a rational function in five independent variables can take, and thereby 
use the Combinatorial Principle to constrain the range of possible orders the radicals in a 
solution by radicals can have. It is determined that the only (prime) orders that could in principle 
occur are 2 and 5. Thus, at the end of the second part, Abel goes on to obtain explicit expressions 
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for rational functions that have 2 values and for functions that have 5 values; these expressions 
are required to rule out certain possibilities in the final part of the proof. 
The third part of Abel’s proof is a reductio. By using the results he has obtained in the 
second part, he enumerates the possible orders a radical in a solution formula could have, and 
shows that not enough of those possibilities are realized for there to be a solution by radicals for 
p5(x). He first shows that in order to appear in such a solution, any radical over the ground field 
F would have to have order 2. He then shows that there are no such radicals at all over the field 
generated by such an order 2 radical. Both steps involve ruling out possible orders of radicals by 
showing that any radical of a given order would have a different number of values as a radical 
than it has as a rational function of the roots, violating the Combinatorial Principle. 
 I take this occasion to point out that, contrary to most popular accounts, it is not 
compulsory or even very natural to view Abel’s proof as a one long reductio. The first part of 
Abel’s proof amounts to identifying a criterion for solvability by radicals for general equations, 
one that is satisfied for equations of degrees 2, 3 and 4; no reductio here. The second part of the 
proof is an assemblage of results which, in modern terms, can be understood as being about the 
structure of the splitting field extension E/F of the general polynomial p5(x) of degree 5. These 
results do not in any way depend on the assumption that p5(x) = 0 is solvable by radicals; thus, 
no reductio here, either. It is only the third part that involves a number of ‘local’ reductios, but 
the epistemic yield even of the third part as a whole is a positive result about which radicals there 
are over the ground field F of p5(x). I will revisit this theme in Chapter 4. 
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2.4.1 Abel’s Proof of the Unsolvability of the Quintic 
As with my detailed account of Artin’s proof of the unsolvability, this subsection can be skipped 
without a serious loss of continuity. 
 
Stage 1 The overall aim of the first part of Abel’s proof is to identify a criterion for 
solvability by radicals for the general equation pn(x) = 0 for any degree n. Since Abel anticipates 
that the equation p5(x) = 0 of degree 5 is not solvable by radicals, his specific aim is to identify 
some highly testable consequence of being solvable by radicals. 
In the modern approach to solvability, we took the coefficients a1, ..., an of the general 
polynomial equation of degree n, 
 
pn(x) = xn + a1 xn – 1 + a2 xn – 2 + ... + an = 0, 
 
to be independent variables over Q; in Abel’s approach one takes the n solutions x1, ..., xn of 
pn(x) = 0 to be independent variables, and defines the coefficients a1, ..., an to be the n elementary 
symmetric functions in the x1, ..., xn (see above). The significance of treating the solutions as 
independent variables will become clear presently. This approach is not substantially different 
from the modern one, however: we still take E = Q(x1, ..., xn) as the splitting field of pn(x) and F 
= Q(a1, ..., an) as the ground field. 
By carrying out intricate but elementary algebraic manipulations, Abel obtains the 
following fundamental 
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Theorem 1 Any solution by radicals of pn(x) = 0 can be put in the form 
 
y = q0 + q1r1/p + q2r(2/p) + … + qp – 1 r(p – 1/p),  (*) 
 
where p is some prime number, and q0, ..., qp – 1, r are functions of the same form as y, 
and so on, until we come to rational functions of the coefficients a1, ..., an. 
 
Again, a rational function for Abel is any function of the form p1(x)/p2(x), where the pi(x) are 
polynomials. Thus, any solution of pn(x) by radicals can be put in a form that contains multiply 
nested radicals, but after a finite number of nestings, we come to expressions that are rational 
functions of the coefficients of pn(x). Abel further shows that, by making suitable substitutions, 
one can take q1 = 1. 
For example, for the general quadratic equation p2(x) = x2 + bx + c, we have p = 2 and 
 
y = b/2 + (1/2)(b2 – 4c)1/2, 
 
so that q0 = b/2, q1 = 1/2, r = b2 – 4c. Since the square root of a real number R has two values, the 
positive and the negative, we obtain the two familiar solution formulae. 
It is not known from the outset what the primes p in a solution by radicals would have to 
be for a given pn(x). Some basic constraints may be noted, however. First, there is the very fact 
that the order of the radicals involved can be taken to be prime: since (r1/m)1/n  = r1/mn, any non-
prime order radical could be factored into nested radicals of prime order. 
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Second, in proving Theorem 2 (below), Abel shows that the order p of any radical in the 
solution formula must be less than or equal to n, the order of the equation itself; we see this 
instantiated in the case of the formulae for n = 2, 3, and 4. 
Finally, and this is really the key idea of the entire proof, in certain circumstances that 
arise naturally in considering solvability by radicals, the order p of the radical r is also the 
number of distinct values of r as a radical. In order to explain what this means, note, first, that 
the notion radical is relative to a field: r is an m-th order radical over K if r is not in K but there 
is some (least) natural number m such that rm is in K; for example, the square root of 2 is a 2nd 
order radical over Q because √2 is not in Q, but (√2)2 = 2 is in Q. Second, this means that an m-
th order radical r over K is a solution of the polynomial equation 
 
xm – A = 0 
 
for some A in K; the minimal polynomial mr(x) of r over K divides this polynomial and hence, 
has degree less than or equal to m. The solutions of mr(x) = 0 are called the values of r as a 
radical over K; given the definition of minimal polynomial, these solutions are distinct. In the 
situation with which we are concerned, m = p is a prime, xp – A = 0 itself is the minimal 
polynomial of r over K, and has p distinct solutions r, αr, α2r, ..., αp – 1r, where α is a primitive 
p-th root of unity, namely, a solution in C of xp – 1 = 0. 
Thus, assuming now that the ground field F contains all the requisite roots of unity, the 
order of the radical r over F is precisely the number of distinct values of that radical. It is natural 
to expect that this might put some constraints on which p can occur as orders of the radicals in 
the solution formula for pn(x). Indeed, what Abel ends up showing is that in the case of p5(x), 
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there are not enough primes p for which the required radicals have the right number of values 
and, hence, not enough primes p for which such radicals exist. 
MODERN Let K(r) / K a simple radical extension of degree p, with Q contained in K. Abel 
shows, in effect, that any element v in K(r) can be written in the form 
 
v = q0 + q1 r + … + qp – 1 r p – 1      (1) 
 
for some q0, …, qp – 1 in F. Moreover, for v in K(r) – K, one can take q1 = 1, so that we can write 
any such v in the form 
 
v = q0 + r + … + qp – 1 rp – 1    (2) 
 
Now let E = Q(x1, ..., xn) be the splitting field of pn(x), and let F = Q(a1, …, an), where the ai are 
the elementary symmetric functions in the xi. We saw in our discussion of Artin that pn(x) = 0 is 
solvable by radicals if and only if E is contained in some radical extension L of F. Thus, under 
the assumption that pn(x) is solvable by radicals, there is a tower of extensions F = K0 ⊂ K1 ⊂ ... 
⊂ Kn = L with E ⊂ L and each Ki / Ki – 1 a simple radical extension. Hence, any v in E – Kn – 1 can 
be written in the form (2), where the coefficients q are in Kn – 1 and r is a p-th order radical over 
Kn – 1 for some prime p. Thus, what Abel shows is, in effect, that we can repeat this process for 
the coefficients and the radicals alike, and by rearranging the terms as necessary, will ultimately 
arrive at an expression of the form (2) where the coefficients q are in F = Q(a1, ..., an), and the 
innermost radicals will be radicals over F. Thus, they will all be rational functions of the 
coefficients of pn(x), as required. 
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Abel’s general expression for a solution by radicals makes it clear that an equation is 
solvable by radicals only if there are enough primes p for which the required p-th order radicals 
exist, and as we noted, this can happen only if there are enough primes for which these radicals 
have a suitable number of values. Thus, it is clear that if the issue of solvability of p5(x) can be 
settled by examining the structure of the foregoing general expression for a solution, then it can 
be settled by examining the structure of the radicals that would have to appear in such a solution. 
In particular, the other features of the expression in Theorem 1 can from here on out be more or 
less ignored. Hence, what one would like now is a more inferentially engageable representation 
of the required radicals. Again, given the paucity of Abel’s conceptual resources, the only natural 
device for pursuing this aim is to carry out symbolic manipulations. 
Thus, we now come to the result that provides orientation for the rest of Abel’s proof: he 
manages to give a more explicit representation of the individual terms in any solution by radicals 
and, crucially, a more explicit representation of the radicals therein: 
 
Theorem 2  If the general polynomial equation pn(x) = 0 is solvable by radicals, then 
any solution by radicals can be put in such a form that all the terms in it are 
 rational functions of the roots of pn(x). 
 
Note carefully: rational functions of the roots, not of the coefficients. 
Abel’s proof of Theorem 2 starts from the fact that if 
 
y1 = q0 + r + … + qp – 1 r p – 1  
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is an expression for a solution by radicals of pn(x) = 0 of the form recorded in Theorem 1, and if 
α is a primitive p-th root of unity, then 
 
y2 = q0 + αr + α2 q2 r2 + … + αp – 1 qp – 1 r p – 1, 
...     (3) 
yp = q0 + αp – 1 r + αp – 2 q2 r2 + … + αqp – 1 r p – 1. 
 
are also expressions for solutions by radicals of pn(x) = 0. It is easy to show that these solutions 
would be distinct and hence, p cannot exceed the degree n of the equation, in view of the 
Fundamental Theorem of Algebra: a polynomial equation of degree n has exactly n solutions 
in its splitting field. 
Now comes the crucial step. By employing the elementary fact about roots of unity that 
 
αp – 1 + αp – 2 + ... + α + 1 = 0, 
 
Abel solves the system of equations (3) for each term qν rν, ν = 0, ..., p – 1, to obtain  
 
qν rν = (1/p)(y1 + α–ν y2 + α–2ν y3 + ... + α–(p – 1)ν yp), 
 
where q1 = 1 as before. In particular, for v = 1, we have the crucial expression 
 
r = (1/p)(y1 + αp – 1y2 + … + αyp),  
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where α is a primitive p-th root of unity and the y1, ..., yp are distinct roots of pn(x). This is the 
heart of Abel’s approach: any radical that appears in a solution by radicals would have to be a 
rational function of the roots of pn(x). 
By way of clarification, p is the order of the “outermost” radical in the expression for the 
solution; for example, in the formula for the general equation of degree 2, p = 2. More generally, 
there would be multiply nested radicals and so we would have a sequence of radicals of orders 
p1, ..., pk. Thus, the foregoing expressions should not be taken to imply that pn(x) has p roots. 
MODERN The modern formulation changes the point of view fairly dramatically: 
 
Theorem 2  Let p(x) be a polynomial with ground field F and splitting field E. 
If E is contained in a radical extension L of F, then E itself is a radical  
extension of F, provided that F contains enough primitive roots of unity. 
 
We already commented on this result in our discussion of Artin’s approach. 
Abel’s proof of Theorem 2 involves establishing the crucial 
 
Lemma  If v is in K(r) – K, the minimal polynomial mv(x) of v over K has p distinct roots  
y1, …, yp, and 
 
r = (1/p)(y1 + αp – 1y2 + … + αyp),  
 
where α is a primitive p-th root of unity, r is a solution of xp – A, and r not in K. 
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That the solutions are distinct follows from the irreducibility of xp – A in view of the following 
 
Proposition 1          Given a field K, either all the roots of xp – A are contained in K,  
or else none of them are. That is, either xp – A splits into linear factors in K[x],  
or else it is irreducible over K. 
 
This proposition is not explicitly stated by Abel, but he does employ it implicitly in his proof of 
what we have called Theorem 2. Again, Proposition 1 requires the assumption that the field K 
contains enough primitive p-th roots of unity 1, α, α2, ..., αp – 1. The point is that if r is a solution 
of xp – A = 0, then αr, α2r, ..., αp – 1r are the other solutions in C of xp – A. Thus, the fact that r is 
in K entails that the other solutions are in K only if these primitive p-th roots belong to K. Thus, 
we have here a lapse of rigor in Abel, but in the context of Abel’s project, one may assume 
without loss of generality that K contains the required roots of unity, as we have done. For if p(x) 
is solvable by radicals over some field K, then it is certainly solvable by radicals over a field 
extension of K obtained by adjoining the requisite roots of unity to K; contrapositively, if p(x) is 
not solvable over the latter field, it is not solvable over K, either. 
The proof of Theorem 2 is the most difficult part of Abel’s proof; relying on intricate 
symbolic computations, it occupies most of the first half of his 1824 paper. At the end of the 
section addressed to it, Abel remarks that “[Theorem 2] being established, it is not hard to 
complete the demonstration” of the unsolvability of the general equation of degree 5.20 Indeed, it 
is clear that Abel has now managed to extract a highly testable consequence of solvability by 
radicals, one that he could reasonably hope to show leads to a contradiction. 
                                                 
20 See Pesic, p. 162. 
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Stage 2 We now know that the radicals that would have to appear in the solution formula 
can be expressed as rational functions of the five roots of p5(x). Clearly the aim now is to exploit 
this fact to show that not enough such radicals exist. 
A crucial bit of Abel’s mathematical background now comes into play; the following 
result used to be known as Lagrange’s theorem: 
 
Theorem 3  The number of distinct values a rational function f(x1, ..., xn) in n independent 
variables can take under the permutations of those variables divides the factorial n! of n, 
namely the product n! = n × (n – 1) × ... × 2 × 1. 
 
MODERN A rational function v of the roots is just an element of the splitting field E of p5(x); 
this is immediate from the definitions. Thus, let v be in E – F and let E(v) be the splitting field of 
the minimal polynomial of v over F. It is again immediate from the definitions that the distinct 
values of a rational function v in E are actually just the distinct images of v under the action on E 
of the Galois group G(E/F), the so-called conjugates of v in E. By the Main Theorem of Galois 
Theory, the number of conjugates of v is equal to the index of G(E/E(v)) in G(E/F). But, by the 
group-theoretic result now known as Lagrange’s Theorem, the cardinality of any subgroup H of 
any group G divides the cardinality of G and so the index #G/#H also divides #G. Hence, the 
index of G(E/E(v)) divides the cardinality of G(E/F), but the latter group is isomorphic to the 
group of all permutations of n letters, the symmetric group Sn, whose cardinality is n!. 
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Theorem 3 may seem like a fairly weak result, and indeed it is as far as Abel’s final aim 
is concerned. Nevertheless, it provides a crucial clue as to how one might go about constraining 
the range of radicals that could appear in a solution by radicals. 
On the one hand, by Theorem 2, Abel knows that these radicals can be expressed as 
rational functions in five independent variables, namely the roots of p5(x), and here we have a 
result that puts a constraint on the number of values such an expression can take under the 
permutations of the roots. On the other hand, as we explained above, Abel knows that a radical 
will take some number of distinct values as a radical. This, then, is the crucial point: Abel 
realizes that these two numbers must be equal. We may state this as the following 
 
Combinatorial Principle Let r in E be a radical over F, expressed as a rational  
function r = f(x1, ..., xn) of the n roots of pn(x); then f(x1, ..., xn) has exactly as many  
distinct values as a rational function under the permutations of x1, ..., xn as r has  
as a radical over F in the sense explained above. 
 
MODERN Again, if E/F is any field extension, the conjugates over F of any e in E are the 
elements in the orbit of e under the action of G(E/F), the group of E-automorphisms of F. Thus, 
what is going on here is simply that we have two different ways of representing the conjugates of 
an element r in E when r happens to be a radical over F. 
On the one hand, if r is in E – F and is a radical over F, that is, a solution of xp – A = 0 
with A in F, then xp – A is its minimal polynomial over F, and the p distinct roots of this 
polynomial, r, αr, α2 r, ..., αp – 1r are the values of r as a radical. It is a basic fact in the modern 
theory of fields that these solutions are precisely the conjugates of r over F. On the other hand, 
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since E = Q(x1, ..., xn) is the splitting field of pn(x), any element in E is a rational function of the 
roots. Finally, since each F-automorphism of E is obtained from some permutation ρ of the roots 
by extending ρ to all of E by linearity, the conjugates of e = f(x1, ..., xn) are obtained by 
permuting the x1, ..., xn among themselves. 
 
Thus, Theorem 3 and the Combinatorial Principle dictate the overall path for the rest 
of Stage 2 of Abel’s proof: he will try to identify as many constraints as possible on the numbers 
of values a rational function in 5 independent variables can take, thereby constraining the range 
of orders of radicals that could appear in a solution by radicals for p5(x) = 0. 
Abel does not state the Combinatorial Principle in his 1824 paper.21 A charitable way 
of looking at this would be that Abel is implicitly regarding the permutations of the roots as F-
automorphisms of the splitting field E and, as such, it is ‘clear’ that the two ways of counting the 
conjugates must yield the same answer. In his 1826 paper, however, Abel states the following 
result in which he recognizes that the values of a rational function v in E under the permutations 
of the roots are the solutions of the minimal polynomial of v over F, thereby making the 
connection between the two ways of representing the orbit of an element in E. 
 
                                                 
21 In his careful reconstruction of Abel’s proof in the late 1830s, William Hamilton, the inventor 
of the quaternions, states the Principle in the form we have stated it here and, indeed, takes great 
pains to emphasize its importance. 
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Theorem 7   If v = f(x1, ..., xn) has m distinct values under the permutations of the x1, ..., xn,  
there exists an equation mv(x) = 0 of degree m that has these values as solutions and  
whose coefficients are symmetric functions in x1, ..., xn; moreover, no equation of this  
form but with degree less than m has any of these values as solution.22
 
MODERN Let v be in E = Q(x1, ..., xn). Theorem 7 says that if such v has m field conjugates 
in E, there exists a polynomial mv(x) of degree m with coefficients in F =  Q(a1, ..., an) whose 
roots are precisely those field conjugates of v, and that no polynomial of degree less than m with 
coefficients in F has any of these conjugates as a solution; in other words, mv(x) is irreducible 
over F and, indeed, it is just the minimal polynomial of v over F. Finally, recall that the values of 
r as radical over F are just the solutions of the minimal polynomial of r over F. Thus, Theorem 7 
makes the crucial connection between the two ways of representing the orbit of r. In particular, 
by Lemma, a p-th order radical r over F has precisely p values as a radical. This amounts to the 
Combinatorial Principle. In modern terms, this is essentially a fact about the structure of the 
extension E/F, and in view of the Main Theorem of Galois Theory, indirectly a fact about the 
subgroup structure of the symmetric group S5. Note that while Abel presents Theorem 7 at the 
end of Section III of his 1826 paper, its proof does not require any of the earlier theorems, and so 
it could just as well have been stated and proved at the very beginning of the paper. 
 
                                                 
22 See Satz 7 in Radloff [1998], p. 138. 
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Abel now needs to find further constraints on the number of values a rational function 
f(x1, ..., x5) in five independent variables can take under the permutations of those variables. As it 
turns out, the tradition of attacks on the solvability of the general equation of degree 5 had made 
available to Abel just the sort of result needed at this stage: the following Theorem 4 restricts 
the range of possible values a rational function can take. Abel gets this result from an 1815 paper 
of Cauchy’s, in which he notes that it is a generalization of a result due to Ruffini from 1804. 
 
Theorem 4 (Ruffini)  For n greater than 4, a rational function f(x1, ..., xn) cannot take  
3 or 4 distinct values under the permutations of the variables x1, ..., xn. 
 
MODERN This theorem can be understood as stating a fact about the structure of the 
splitting field extensions E/F of general polynomials pn(x) for degrees greater than 4: no element 
in E can have exactly 3 or exactly 4 field conjugates. This puts considerable constraints on the 
system of intermediate fields in these extensions and is, of course, a part of the ‘reason’ why 
there is no radical sequence in any such extension for n greater than 4. 
 
The following pieces of terminology will come in handy. If a polynomial in n variables is 
invariant under all the permutations in Sn, it is called symmetric; if a polynomial is invariant 
under (at least) all the permutations in the alternating group An, it is called alternating. Again, 
any v in E = Q(x1, ..., xn) can be viewed as a polynomial with coefficients in F = Q(a1, ..., an). 
Thus, specializing now to the case n = 5, we can restate Theorem 4 as follows: 
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Theorem 4 Any v in E with fewer than 5 conjugates is either alternating or symmetric. 
 
For recall that the conjugates of v in E are precisely the elements in the orbit of v under the action 
of the Galois group G(E/F) which, in our situation, is S5. Thus, a symmetric v is an element of F; 
an alternating v is an element of some extension of F of degree 2. 
MODERN This means that any intermediate field of the splitting field extension E/F of p5(x) 
that has a prime degree over F must have degree 2 or 5. This is a strong constraint, and certainly 
suggests that there might not be a radical sequence in E/F. 
 
In sum: by Lagrange’s Theorem, the number of values of f(x1, ..., x5) divides 5!. If this 
number is a prime (or 1), the possibilities are 1, 2, 3, and 5, and by Ruffini’s Theorem, the 
possibilities are actually just 1, 2, and 5. Finally, Abel knows that if r is a p-th order radical over 
F, the number of values of r as a radical over F is p and hence, in view of the Combinatorial 
Principle, any prime order radical over F that could appear in a solution by radicals must have 
order p = 2 or p = 5. 
Note, however, that one might have to consider prime order radicals r over fields that are 
extensions of F = Q(a1, ..., a5); this is clear from the general expression in Theorem 1, and in 
fact already from the known solution formulae for equations of degrees 3 and 4. It is still true, of 
course, that the order p must be less than or equal to 5. However, such an element r need not be a 
radical over the field F at all: there need be no m such that rm = A for some A in F. Nevertheless, 
we can still consider the minimal polynomial mr(x) of r over F, although mr(x) need not have the 
form xp – A and, indeed, may have more than 5 solutions. Thus, Ruffini’s Theorem need not 
apply to all the possibilities one has to consider. However, the general principle that the number 
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of solutions of mr(x) must equal the number of values of r under the permutations of the roots of 
p5(x) still applies. Some of the crucial contradictions in Stage 3 will be violations of this general 
form of the Combinatorial Principle. 
The most obvious aim now is to find a more inferentially engageable representation of 
the rational functions with 2 or 5 distinct values. We have, first, the following 
 
Theorem 5 A rational function f(x1, ..., x5) in E with exactly two distinct values under  
the permutations of the variables x1, ..., x5 is of the form p + ρq, where p and q  
are symmetric functions in x1, ..., x5, and ρ2 is the discriminant of p5(x). 
 
MODERN Since E = Q(x1, ..., x5) and F = Q(a1, ..., a5), where the ai are symmetric functions 
of the xi, any element of F can be expressed in terms of symmetric functions of the x1, ..., x5 and 
so we can restate Theorem 5 as follows: 
 
Theorem 5   Each v in E that has fewer than five distinct conjugates is contained in  
the field F(ρ), where ρ2 is the discriminant of pn(x). 
 
By Theorem 4, any v in E with fewer than 5 distinct conjugates must have either 1 or 2. If v has 
1 conjugate—itself—it is symmetric and belongs to the fixed field of G(E/F), namely F. If v has 
2 distinct conjugates, it is alternating and its minimum polynomial over F has degree 2, so its 
splitting field E(v) over F is a normal extension of F of degree 2. Hence, by the Main Theorem 
of Galois Theory, the field F must be the fixed field of some subgroup of G(E/K) of index 2; but 
A5 is the only such subgroup. Hence, there is in fact only one normal extension K of F of degree 
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2, so that any v with just two distinct conjugates belongs to this field. Finally, one verifies 
directly that ρ is alternating but not symmetric, and hence, this field K is generated by ρ over F. 
 
Theorem 6 A rational function f(x1, ..., x5) in E with exactly five distinct values under  
 the permutations of the variables x1, ..., x5 is of the form 
 
r0 + r1 x + r2 x2 + r3 x3 + r4 x4, 
 
 where r0, ..., r4 are symmetric functions of x1, ..., x5 and x is one of the x1, ..., x5. 
 
MODERN In its modern formulation, this theorem and its proof are much clearer. 
 
Theorem 6  If v in E has exactly 5 distinct conjugates, F(v) = F(xμ) for some root xμ of p5(x). 
 
The isotropy groups ℑ1, ..., ℑ5 in G(E/F) ≈ S5 of the elements x1, ..., x5 are the only subgroups of 
S5 of index 5. By the Main Theorem of Galois Theory, the associated 5 fields F(x1), ..., F(x5) 
are the only extension fields of F of degree 5. Since the splitting field F(v) of v has degree 5 over 
F, it must be one of the fields F(xj), j = 1, ..., 5. I will consider this result in detail in Chapter 4. 
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Stage 3 We are now ready to prove that the general polynomial equation p5(x) = 0 of 
degree 5 is not solvable by radicals. Starting at F, Abel shows that the only simple radical 
extension of F is of degree 2, generated by the quantity ρ in Theorem 5; this is Proposition 2. 
He then shows that there is no simple radical extension of F(ρ) at all; this is Proposition 3. Thus, 
since F(ρ) is certainly not all of E, the field E is not a radical extension of F. 
 
Proposition 2      If r is a p-th order radical over F, then p = 2 and F(r) = F(ρ). 
 
As always, r is a solution of xp – A with A in F. By Proposition 1, xp – A is irreducible over F 
since r is not in F, and in particular, it is the minimal polynomial of r over F with p distinct 
solutions. By the Combinatorial Principle (or by Theorem 7), p is the number of values of r as 
a rational function of the roots. Hence, by Theorem 3, p divides 5!, so it is 2, 3, or 5. But by 
Theorem 4, the option p = 3 is ruled out, so p = 2 or p = 5. 
Suppose first that r in E has 5 distinct conjugates. By Theorem 6, F(r) = F(x1). Thus, x1 
is in F(r) – F. By the Lemma following Theorem 2, the minimal polynomial of x1 over F has 5 
distinct solutions and we can write: 
 
r = 1/5(x1 + α4 x2 + α3 x3 + α2 x2 + α x5).  
 
since these five solutions are just the five roots of p5(x). But it is clear from this representation 
that the right-hand side takes 120 values under the permutations of the roots. Yet, the left-hand 
side takes by assumption 5 distinct values. But this is a violation of the Combinatorial 
Principle, a contradiction. 
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In case p = 2, we have r = p + ρq by Theorem 5, with alternating ρ. 
 
Proposition 3  There is no proper radical extension of F(ρ) contained in E. 
 
Suppose that L(r) ≠ L = F[ρ] is a radical extension, so that r is a solution of 
 
xp – A ∈ L[x]  (*) 
 
with p a prime. Then r is not in L, and by Proposition 1, (*) is irreducible over L. On the other 
hand, A is not in F, for otherwise by Proposition 2 we would have L(r) = F(r) = L. Hence, A is 
alternating but not symmetric. In order to apply the results established thus far, Abel now needs 
to determine the minimal polynomial of r over F. It turns out that r has 2p conjugates in E, and 
this allows one to rule out each of p = 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. In each case, one can show that a 
contradiction arises either with Theorem 4 or the Combinatorial Principle. 
 
Thus, we have finally arrived at 
 
Theorem 8     The general polynomial equation of degree 5 is not solvable by radicals. 
 
Proof If the general equation p5(x) = 0 of degree 5 is solvable by radicals over F, then it is 
certainly solvable by radicals also over the extension of F obtained by adjoining all the roots of 
unity to F. Hence, we can suppose that F contains all the roots of unity. With this wrinkle out of 
the way, we can now apply all the results established thus far. 
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If p5(x) = 0 is solvable by radicals over F, its splitting field E is contained in a radical 
extension of F and hence, by Theorem 2, E is itself a radical extension of F. So there would have 
to exist a tower of simple radical extensions 
 
F = F0 ⊂ F1 ⊂ ... ⊂ Fη–1 ⊂ Fη = E. 
 
But we have just seen that no such tower of simple radical extensions exists. 
More pedantically, p5(x) is irreducible over F by Theorem 7, so that F ≠ E, and hence η 
≠ 0. By Proposition 2, the first simple extension F1 = F[ρ]. Since each element of F[ρ] has two 
conjugates, E ≠ F1, and so η > 1. But, by Proposition 3, E contains no proper radical extension 
of F[ρ] and hence, p5(x) = 0 is not solvable by radicals. 
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3.0  COGNITIVE CONTROL 
In this chapter, I will attempt to characterize the differences in the epistemic power of the two 
approaches to solvability by radicals. I will introduce a configuration of notions that allows us to 
articulate those differences in a systematic way and, as I hope to show, to analyze the nature and 
source of those differences. My central notion will be, of course, cognitive control, but in order 
to introduce this notion, some preparation is required. 
3.1 EPISTEMIC RESOURCES AND EPISTEMIC PROCESSES 
Our systematic epistemic life can be thought of as having two notionally distinct aspects: the 
epistemic resources an agent has at a given time on the one hand, and the epistemic processes 
she may engage in with those resources on the other. The epistemic resources are the ambient 
framework of capacities that allow one to pursue various epistemic goals, and the processes are 
sequences of exercising those capacities in order to pursue some specific epistemic goal. Thus, 
an epistemic process is individuated by the actual cognitive operations that constitute it and by 
its overall aim. 
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The epistemic resources of an agent include the concepts she has mastered, her methods 
of acquiring knowledge, and whatever bits of knowledge she actually has. For example, Abel’s 
epistemic resources would include the concepts permutation and radical, the algorithmic 
methods for computing the solutions for equations of degrees 2, 3, and 4, and knowing the 
Fundamental Theorem of Algebra; his main epistemic process under consideration here would 
be the search for a proof of the unsolvability of the general equation of degree 5. 
I should emphasize that the set of resources relevant to pursuing one’s goal will typically 
grow in the process of pursuing that very goal. Indeed, the process of searching for a proof will 
always involve the acquisition of many new bits of knowledge—the many propositions one 
proves in the course of proving the result one wants. But the more momentous proofs will 
typically involve the acquisition of epistemic resources that turn out to be relevant to pursuing a 
variety of epistemic processes, not just the one in the course of which they are acquired. The 
invention of a new concept is probably the most typical advancement of this kind. For example, 
in searching for a criterion for solvability by radicals, Galois (in effect) invents the concept 
group, a concept that turns out to be critically important not only to his particular epistemic 
process, but to much of modern mathematics. 
The distinction between epistemic resources and epistemic processes provides the general 
framework within which I will articulate the notion of cognitive control: I will take it that 
cognitive control is an epistemic standing enjoyed over an epistemic process in virtue of having 
a suitable configuration of epistemic resources. Thus, the principal aim of this essay is to give a 
general characterization of the standing I am calling “cognitive control” and to identify some of 
the most typical kinds of configurations of resources in virtue of which one enjoys this standing 
over mathematical epistemic processes. 
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The general idea of occupying an epistemic standing over a process is modeled on the 
idea that a cognitive agent can be said to ‘occupy’ various ‘epistemic standings’ with respect to a 
question. For example, given the question Is p the case?, here are some of the different standings 
one might occupy: to understand a sentence s that represents p; to have evidence that p; to have 
a method of finding out whether p; to have an unjustified but true belief that p; and, indeed, to 
know that p.23 Thus, to say that an agent occupies a particular epistemic standing S with respect 
to a question Q is to say that she has some particular kind of configuration of epistemic resources 
S relevant to answering Q and she knows that this is so; to occupy an epistemic standing is, in 
part, to know that one has certain resources relevant to the question. Similarly, to say that an 
agent occupies an epistemic standing S over a process is to say that she has some particular set 
of epistemic resources S that are relevant to pursuing that process and she knows that this is so. 
In view of what I just noted, one’s epistemic standing over a process will typically change over 
the course of pursuing that process. The thought about cognitive control, then, is that it is the 
kind of epistemic standing that is occupied more or less from the outset of the process, if at all. 
Thus, my aim is to identify a particular kind of configuration of epistemic resources the having 
of which amounts to occupying the standing I am calling “cognitive control.” 
I distinguish two basic types of epistemic processes pertinent to our case study: searching 
for a proof and reading a proof. In order to render our philosophical grammar uniform, I will say 
                                                 
23 By way of clarification, I am taking it that an agent can occupy many different epistemic 
standings with respect to a question or an epistemic process at a given time. Usually, however, 
the ‘stronger’ standings tend to absorb the ‘weaker’ ones. For example, to know that p would 
absorb to have justification for believing that p, and so on. 
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that each kind of a process is aimed at answering some specific question such as, for example, 
“Is the quintic solvable by radicals?” or, perhaps, “Why is the quintic not solvable by radicals?” 
It is clear, I take it, that we need to distinguish the process of searching for a proof from 
the process of reading a proof: the epistemic standings occupied by a mathematician at the 
various stages of searching for a proof will typically be quite different from those occupied by a 
mathematician at the various stages of reading that proof once completed. A proof, once 
completed and ‘properly laid out,’ might allow a mathematician reading it to maintain good 
cognitive ‘grip’ at each stage, even if the one who discovered that proof did not have very good 
grip at the various stages of searching for it. In this paper I will only consider completed proofs 
and examine the standings a competent mathematician equipped with a standard background 
appropriate to that proof will enjoy at the various stages of reading it. I want to stress, however, 
that ultimately the notion of cognitive control is meant to provide an analysis also of the kind of 
cognitive standings that enable working mathematicians to prove new results. 
This is the plan. I will motivate my characterization of cognitive control by identifying a 
sequence of important differences in the epistemic standing we enjoy at the various stages of 
reading the proofs of Abel and Artin. Once the characterization is complete, I will turn around 
and apply it to the two proofs in greater detail; this will be the centerpiece of the essay. I will 
conclude that with the epistemic resources of modern algebra in hand, we enjoy much better 
cognitive control over the process of reading Artin’s proof than we do over the process of 
reading Abel’s proof with the resources that were available at his time. It would certainly be 
interesting to analyze the differences in the character of cognitive control Abel and Artin enjoyed 
at the various stages of searching for their respective proofs, but addressing this issue adequately 
is just as certainly beyond the scope of this brief treatment. 
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3.2 BASIC EPISTEMIC CHALLENGES 
Cognitive control is meant to be an epistemic standing that allows us to negotiate the epistemic 
challenges we face in the course of mathematical research in a way that is, so to speak, rationally 
orchestrated. In view of our case study, I propose to get the notion of cognitive control off the 
ground by considering the following idealized reconstruction of those challenges. 
Knowing a target range  We need to be able to identify at least one terrain of facts we 
know we can profitably examine in order to answer the question driving our epistemic process; I 
will call any such terrain of facts a target range for the process. The basic epistemic significance 
of having identified what one knows is a target range is that doing so creates a more or less 
determinate space of epistemic options for the rest of the process: a more or less determinate 
range of things one might do in order to address the question. Abel and Galois both know that the 
question as to whether the polynomial equation p5(x) = 0 is solvable by radicals can be answered 
by examining the relations of the roots of p5(x), and this determines the overall direction of their 
respective projects. As much, I suppose, is obvious. However— 
Representing the target range  —One might know a target range and yet not be able to 
represent it or any one of the individual facts in it in a way that allows one to address the 
question one is trying to answer. Thus, the second fundamental challenge in an epistemic process 
is to find a useful representation of one’s target range in a situation in which one does not yet 
know many, or any, of the individual facts in it. In particular, one wants a representation that 
allows one to determine the general location of facts directly relevant to addressing the question. 
I will call a representation of a target range as a whole an organizing representation provided it 
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affords a way of constructing a structured representation of the epistemically possible individual 
facts in that range—facts that, for all one knows, may belong to the target range; I will call a 
representation of the latter kind an epistemic scaffolding. The basic epistemic significance of 
being able to construct an organizing representation and an epistemic scaffolding is that these 
representations will organize and delimit the space of epistemic options for the process; I will 
describe this contribution by saying that they provide aim and location guidance. 
I will argue that, strictly speaking, Abel does not manage to construct an organizing 
representation or a scaffolding for his epistemic process as a whole. Artin, in contrast, can use 
the Galois group of the splitting field of p5(x) as his organizing representation; the range of 
epistemically possible sequences of subgroups emerges as one of his principal epistemic 
scaffoldings. For Abel and Artin alike, locating the facts directly relevant to solvability by 
radicals amounts to finding a criterion for solvability by radicals they can actually employ to 
determine whether the general equation of degree 5 is solvable by radicals. I will again argue 
that, strictly speaking, Abel does not manage to do this but, to be charitable, we may think of 
Theorem 2 as showing that p(x) = 0 is solvable by radicals if and only if the splitting field 
extension of p(x) is a radical extension. Artin, in contrast, employs the Main Theorem of Galois 
Theory to locate the facts directly relevant to solvability by radicals in the organization of the 
system of subgroups of the Galois group. Thus, he succeeds in finding a criterion that is much 
more readily employed: p(x) = 0 is solvable by radicals if and only if the Galois group G(E/F) of 
the splitting field extension of p(x) is a solvable group. 
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 Extracting Facts  Mirroring the distinction between the foregoing two challenges, one 
might be able to locate facts that are directly relevant to answering the question driving one’s 
epistemic process without being able to represent them in a way that would allow one to actually 
answer that question. I will call the challenge of discovering and, crucially, articulating facts 
directly relevant in a way that allows one to employ them in answering one’s question extracting 
them from the target area. The basic epistemic significance of being able to extract facts directly 
relevant to answering one’s question is, of course, that this just is what finally puts one in a 
position to answer it. 
Our ability to extract facts will depend on two kinds of factors. On the one hand, it will 
depend on how precisely we are able to locate those facts. On the other hand, it will depend on 
the extent to which we are able to manipulate our representations of the target range effectively. 
I will identify some of the devices for and modes of manipulating representations characteristic 
of the two approaches, and show how one might begin to analyze the epistemically significant 
differences between them. 
For Abel and Artin, extracting facts directly relevant amounts to determining whether 
their respective criterion for solvability is satisfied for p5(x). Again, it is not clear to what extent 
Abel can be considered to extract features directly relevant to solvability. In contrast, it is clear 
that Artin does manage to do so: he shows with that the Galois group S5 of p5(x) does not contain 
a normal series with abelian quotients. 
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3.3 CHARACTERIZATION OF COGNITIVE CONTROL 
In view of the foregoing three fundamental challenges, I propose that we consider the epistemic 
standing characterized by the following configuration of epistemic resources. 
 
An agent enjoys cognitive control over an epistemic process aimed at answering  
a question Q to the extent to which 
(1) she has identified a target range of facts for her process; that is, a set of facts 
such that, given her overall epistemic resources, knowing those facts makes it possible to 
correctly infer a direct answer to Q; 
(2) she has adopted an organizing representation for her epistemic process; that 
is, one that represents the target range as a whole and, along with her overall epistemic 
resources, allows her to erect an epistemic scaffolding for examining that range; 
(3) her epistemic scaffolding, along with her overall epistemic resources, provides 
her epistemic guidance for examining the target range; and, 
(4) given the epistemic guidance provided by her scaffolding and her overall 
epistemic resources, she is able to locate and extract features of the target range that are 
directly relevant to answering Q by using her devices for manipulating representations. 
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Comments 
(1) To erect an epistemic scaffolding is to set up a structured representation of the space 
of epistemically possible facts in the target range one has adopted; as such, a scaffolding is a way 
of representing what one does not yet know about the target range. A scaffolding is structured in 
the sense that it consist of a determinate range of determinate locations each one of which 
contains a range of mutually exclusive epistemically possible facts. Thus, discovering that one of 
the epistemically possible facts in a given location actually obtains allows one to rule out the 
others; I will say that a scaffolding is inferentially responsive. We will see that there are also 
other ways in which a scaffolding can be inferentially responsive. 
(2) A proper epistemic scaffolding provides the agent epistemic guidance in the sense of 
providing clues as to what the rational way to proceed is at each stage in the process. There are 
three types of epistemic guidance: aim guidance provides clues as to which piece of knowledge 
one should pursue at a given stage; location guidance provides clues as to where in the target 
range the facts relevant to pursuing a given particular aim are likely to be; and, manipulation 
guidance provides clues as to which devices for manipulating representations one should employ 
in exploring those locations. 
Synopsis 
An agent has cognitive control over an epistemic process aimed at answering a question Q to the 
extent to which she has identified a target range for her process and adopted an “organizing” 
representation of that range as a whole, a representation that erects an epistemic scaffolding; and 
further, to the extent to which the scaffolding provides her guidance for examining the target 
range and, in virtue of enjoying that guidance, she is able to locate and extract features of the 
target range that are directly relevant to answering Q. 
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We can characterize the organization of the components of cognitive control as follows: 
 
 
WITH HER OVERALL EPISTEMIC RESOURCES 
 (2.B) THAT ERECTS AN EPISTEMIC SCAFFOLDING FOR THE PROCESS 
(2.A) ADOPTED AN ORGANIZING REPRESENTATION OF THAT RANGE 
(1) THE AGENT HAS IDENTIFIED A TARGET RANGE OF FACTS AND 
(3) THAT PROVIDES AIM AND LOCATION GUIDANCE 
(4) WITH WHICH SHE CAN LOCATE AND EXTRACT THE FEATURES 
DIRECTLY RELEVANT TO THE QUESTION 
SO AS TO FINALLY ANSWER THE QUESTION DRIVING THE PROCESS
 
An arrow from one box to another indicates that, when one enjoys cognitive control, the 
epistemic accomplishment described in the latter box is achieved, at least in part, in virtue of the 
epistemic resources or accomplishments described in the first box; see below. 
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The overall idea is that to have cognitive control over an epistemic process is to have a 
configuration of epistemic resources that makes it possible to negotiate the major epistemic 
challenges along the way to answering the question in an ‘organized’ and ‘systematic’ way. 
Indeed, while I do not want to place too much emphasis on this, it would be natural to put the 
intuition as follows: when one has cognitive control over an epistemic process, one is in control 
of what one is doing throughout that process—cognitive control is a kind of epistemic self-
mastery. If gathering justifications is the activity of rationality that looks back in our epistemic 
processes, to ensure that the requirements of reason have been met, then acquiring cognitive 
control is the activity that looks forward. 
I want to emphasize two aspects of what is involved in having cognitive control. On the 
one hand, when one has cognitive control, one is able to approach the question, so to speak, from 
top-down: one’s epistemic resources make it possible to start the epistemic process with 
something like a panoptic overview of the situation and gradually home in on the particular 
features thereof that allow one to answer the question. This idea finds its implementation in the 
cumulative sequence of requirements in my characterization: the organizing representation is an 
overview of the target range as a whole; the epistemic scaffolding is a structured overview of 
what is and is not known about the target range at the outset of the process; aim and location 
guidance allow one to start homing in on the appropriate areas of the target range; to have 
located and extracted features directly relevant to answering the question just is to have homed in 
on those features. 
On the other hand, when one has cognitive control, one is able to approach the question, 
so to speak, in an organized manner. First, in virtue of having an organizing representation of the 
target range, one has a well-defined scaffolding of facts into which one can plug further facts as 
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they are discovered. Second, and perhaps most importantly, one’s epistemic resources provide 
one guidance at each stage in the process. I will try to spell out the notion of guidance in great 
detail in what follows. For now, the idea is that to have guidance at a given stage in one’s 
epistemic process is to have a clear idea of the range of potentially productive ways of 
proceeding at that stage, and at least some idea of the relative merits of the various ways of 
proceeding. Finally, in order to count as having guidance, of course one needs to be able to select 
and try out the various alternative ways of proceeding. I should emphasize that none of this is to 
require that one has from the start a definite course of investigation laid out; the idea is rather 
that to have cognitive control is, in part, to have the ability to navigate the space of possible ways 
of proceeding as one moves from one local challenge in the process to the next: there is no stage 
in the process where one is ‘lost’—one has a firm idea of “what needs to be done next” and at 
least a general idea of “how one might do it.” 
I want further to emphasize that the components of my characterization are meant to 
mark out a cumulative sequence of epistemic accomplishments where each one is built on the 
ones preceding it and, at least to some extent, is produced by the ones preceding it. Thus, the 
organizing representation is the kernel for erecting an epistemic scaffolding; the scaffolding is 
the principal epistemic structure that provides aim and location guidance; the actual locating and 
extracting is accomplished, at least in part, in virtue of having aim, location and manipulation 
guidance from one’s scaffolding. When one has cognitive control over a process, one is able to 
make the process hang together. 
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The note of caution here is that of course one’s overall epistemic resources tend to make 
contributions to each component of cognitive control in a way that is not filtered directly through 
the components preceding it in the characterization. It will be clear, for example, that we often 
bring established methods or bits of knowledge to bear on our investigation in a way that is not 
‘intrinsically’ or ‘organically’ structured by the epistemic scaffolding. Similarly, it will be clear 
that aim guidance is often enjoyed simply in virtue of being able to think rationally about what 
one might do at a given juncture in the process. In order for them to count as contributions to 
cognitive control, these activities need to take place within the overall context provided by the 
organizing representation and epistemic scaffolding, but they do not need to be rigidly structured 
by those representations. 
Finally, even though the components of cognitive control are obviously heterogeneous 
among themselves, I want to recommend that they constitute a unitary configuration of epistemic 
resources with respect to the epistemic process and, as such, they are mutually complementary 
components of a particular kind of epistemic standing. I see three basic ways of motivating this 
idea. First, when an agent has cognitive control over a process, she is able to negotiate the 
foregoing three epistemic challenges in a fully rational manner. As such, it should be at least 
plausible that having cognitive control is a unitary kind of epistemic standing with respect to the 
process as a whole. Second, our case study will make it visible that if any one of the components 
is missing, there is a clear sense in which the agent’s epistemic standing is different from what it 
would be in the presence of that component. That is, one’s epistemic standing would be not just 
weaker, but have a different character in the sense in which, for example, having a true but 
unjustified belief that p has a character different from knowing that p. Finally, as I just stressed, 
the four components of cognitive control are meant to constitute a cumulative sequence. So it is 
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possible to have many or even all of the resources required by the individual components of my 
characterization and yet, not occupy the epistemic standing I am calling having cognitive control. 
In order to keep my analysis focused on its intended target, I want to mark out the general 
type of epistemic accomplishments to which having cognitive control is meant to belong by 
distinguishing it from two other types of accomplishments often considered in philosophy of 
mathematics. First, the epistemic accomplishment that in most minds (including mine) stands out 
as the fundamental one is that an epistemic process has provided justification for some 
mathematical claim. The overwhelming majority of philosophical inquiry focused on epistemic 
processes in mathematics has sought to identify just what such justification consists in and how 
such justification is possible. Second, in the past few decades, some philosophical attention has 
been paid to the accomplishment that an epistemic process has provided an explanation for some 
mathematical claim. There is now a handful of papers addressed to the issue of what might make 
a proof explanatory, but nothing by way of a serious contender for a theory exists at this time.24 
Finally, some philosophers and many philosophically minded mathematicians have intermittently 
but persistently urged that there are objective differences in what one might call the efficiency of 
mathematical epistemic processes. One of the principal intuitions here is that proofs that rely on 
heavy symbolic computations tend to be less efficient than proofs that operate mostly in terms of 
reasoning about the content of concepts; the contrast between the proofs of Abel and Artin would 
qualify as an eminent example of this contrast. 
Among these three broad types of epistemic accomplishments—justification, explanation 
and efficiency—the analytical target of the notion cognitive control is meant to belong squarely 
                                                 
24 The first modern paper examining this topic was Steiner’s “Mathematical Explanation.” See 
also Mancosu, “Mathematical explanation: problems and prospects”. 
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with explanation or, more to the point, with understanding. While I cannot present any extended 
arguments to this effect here, I think it is clear that cognitive control picks out just the kind of 
epistemic mastery that is often informally described as understanding a proof or understanding 
how to go about proving a result. In further work I will argue that this is indeed so and, 
moreover, that we can analyze understanding mathematical facts as having cognitive control 
over various kinds of epistemic processes targeted at those facts. Thus, I hope to show that 
understanding in mathematics is a particular form of cognitive control. 
In contrast, that the notion cognitive control is not addressed to issues of justification will 
be quite clear; what I want to emphasize here is that it is not addressed to issues of efficiency 
either. There will be junctures throughout this essay where what I am calling “cognitive control” 
could easily get conflated with a certain kind of efficiency of reasoning. This preamble is meant 
to guard against such conflations. Certainly I think that there is a factual connection between 
cognitive control and efficiency: when we enjoy control over an epistemic process, we tend to be 
able to pursue our aim efficiently and sometimes, perhaps, vice versa; yet, I mean cognitive 
control to be an epistemic standing conceptually independent from having achieved efficiency in 
one’s mathematical reasoning. 
Cognitive control as characterized here is an epistemic standing occupied by individual 
cognitive agents. However, as one would expect, ultimately the object of analytical interest is not 
the features of cognitive control enjoyed by this or that individual mathematician, but rather the 
features of cognitive control made available to be acquired by various sets of concepts, methods, 
and bits of knowledge, once mastered. One important aspect of this is that a set of epistemic 
resources might make cognitive control available over a more or less wide and a more or less 
diverse range of epistemic processes. Though I cannot argue for this here, my case studies 
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strongly suggest that the resources characteristic of 20th century mathematics tend to make 
cognitive control available over vast and vastly diverse ranges of epistemic processes, while the 
resources characteristic of 19th century mathematics typically do not. Galois theory is a case in 
point: the concepts and results of Galois theory have found deep and diverse applications in 
many areas of modern mathematics; Abel’s resources have had no such impact. 
Indeed, the notion of cognitive control is meant to capture the following widely felt 
intuition about the nature of progress in mathematics: the truly significant advances tend to be 
characterized by the fact that they transform problems that were ‘hard’ into ones that are ‘easy’ 
or, at any rate, considerably ‘easier.’ Now one might think that this is a merely psychological 
issue. But what I am hoping to show is that there is an objective difference in epistemic character 
between ‘hard’ and ‘easy’ questions: a question is rendered easier when new epistemic resources 
make it possible to attain better cognitive control over some process of answering that question. 
An extreme way in which a hard question can become easy is that we find an algorithmic 
procedure for answering it. Typically, however, the advance is not this radical: it is a matter of 
introducing concepts, methods, and bits of knowledge which, once mastered, allow a competent 
mathematician to enjoy non-algorithmic control over a process of pursuing an answer to the 
question. Mastering the new concepts, methods and bits of knowledge may often be hard in the 
psychological sense, and success is not guaranteed even once they are mastered. 
An epistemic process of any substantial complexity, such as searching for or reading the 
proofs of Abel and Artin, can be thought of as consisting of a number of more or less 
autonomous, modular subprocesses. For example, in the course of his proof of the unsolvability, 
both Abel and Artin establish a number of results that are largely independent of one another. 
The processes of establishing those results have their own epistemic aims, organizing 
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representations, scaffoldings, and manipulational challenges. The process of proving a 
substantial subsidiary result may in turn split up into further subprocesses, and so on. 
It would now be natural to suppose that cognitive control over a long epistemic process 
should be analyzed in terms of cognitive control over its subprocesses. As we will see, however, 
this is just one of two analytically complementary points of view. For mathematicians routinely 
seek to organize long proofs so as to mark out a sequence of ‘main results’ which, if taken as 
given, afford one good cognitive control over the ‘overall structure’ of the proof, even if there are 
subproofs over which one’s control may be rather poor. That is, mathematicians seek to organize 
proofs in a way that creates a highly controllable superstructure in which less controllable ‘local’ 
components are treated as black boxes. We will see that this idea dovetails nicely with the widely 
felt intuition that the point of breaking long proofs into lemmas and propositions is to make the 
proof as a whole understandable. I will explore this issue in more detail in Section 3.5. 
There is one final prefatory remark I need to make about the notion of cognitive control. 
The two principal types of mathematical epistemic processes to which the notion is meant to 
apply are searching for a proof of a putative theorem and reading a proof of an established 
theorem. Now, cognitive control is enjoyed over particular epistemic processes, and epistemic 
processes are individuated, in part, by their aims. Thus, in order to make sure that the notion is 
structurally fit to apply to processes of searching for and reading proofs, I need to be very 
explicit about the way I am thinking about the aims of such processes. For the purposes of my 
analysis, it strikes me as innocuous to take it as follows: the aim of a process of searching for a 
proof is to find a way to justify the putative theorem; the aim of a process of reading a proof is to 
learn one way to justify the theorem already established. This brings out the obvious analogy 
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between the two types of processes; what concerns me here, however, are the disanalogies that 
could be a source of some perplexity. Thus, two remarks. 
First, to have cognitive control over the process of searching for a proof is to maintain a 
clear view of “what needs to be done next” and “how one might do it”—this is to have epistemic 
guidance in virtue of having an epistemic scaffolding. And this, I think, should seem fine. The 
potential source of perplexity is that when one is reading a proof, one is told what needs to be 
done next, and shown at least one way of doing it. Thus, it might seem that the notion of 
cognitive control does not get a grip on a process in which one is following what is from the start 
known to be, in effect, a complete set of instructions. 
Perhaps the most direct way to clarify this issue is to point out that mathematicians 
routinely speak of reading a proof without understanding it. This kind of reading is typically 
characterized by being able to ‘check’ each individual inferential move in the proof and yet, not 
having any ‘sense’ for the proof as a whole: why the proof is structured the way it actually is; 
why it involves the particular representational choices it does; why it takes the particular 
inferential path it does; and so on. So my thought is that when one has cognitive control over the 
process of reading a proof, one is precisely not in this kind of predicament. At each stage, the 
reader has a structured representation of the epistemically possible facts in the target range and, 
in virtue of her overall epistemic resources, knows what the range of potentially productive ways 
of proceeding looks like. Clearly one may fail to occupy a cognitive standing of this kind even if 
one knows from the start that the proof is a complete and correct set of instructions for justifying 
the theorem. Indeed, to speak of having cognitive control over the process of reading a proof is 
one way of capturing of the intuitive idea of understanding a proof. 
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So as to provide just a little bit more perspective: a proof may provide its reader more or 
less help in maintaining cognitive control. A proof provides a lot of help if it clearly articulates 
the hierarchy of its internal aims, clearly identifies its target range, clearly sets up an organizing 
representation and scaffolding and, perhaps crucially, clearly indicates the main choice points 
and alternative available inferential routes; a proof that does the opposite provides little help. It is 
one of the permanent professional frustrations of mathematicians that they are forced to contend 
with proofs that provide very little help in maintaining cognitive control.25
 
                                                 
25 The note of caution to be sounded here is that no matter how much help a proof provides, of 
course an agent may still fail to maintain cognitive control in the course of reading that proof 
because her background of epistemic resources is not rich enough—no proof can provide all the 
epistemic tools for maintaining control over the process of reading it. 
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3.4 FACTS, CONCEPTS, REPRESENTATIONS AND NOMINALISM 
Before we can go on to discuss the four components of cognitive control, I shall have to say a 
few words about the metaphysical underpinnings of my project. The purpose of this section is 
not in any way to argue for the superiority of the conceptions I will adopt, but merely to make 
my commitments explicit. 
(a) Facts 
I will take the notion of fact as an unanalyzed primitive of my theory; informally, a fact is a 
feature of the world, a particular way the world is. While most of the facts we will have the 
occasion to consider are of the form the object x has the property φ, where the object can be a 
universal as well as a particular, I will also countenance logically compound facts such as 
conditional and conjunctive facts. In particular, in my analysis of Abel’s proof, I will take it that 
he deals with many conditional facts of the form If the general polynomial equation p5(x) = 0 of 
degree five is solvable by radicals, then... For Stage 3 of Abel’s proof is a reductio, and in my 
metaphysical framework it would be difficult to make sense of reductios without countenancing 
conditional facts. Finally, we will of course have to consider many facts that would be naturally 
articulated with quantified sentences. I want to emphasize, however, that my analysis will make 
no appeal to any distinction between ‘general’ and ‘particular’ facts, if one there be. 
So far, I hope, so good. There is however one potentially controversial stipulation I shall 
have to make about facts, mathematical facts in particular: the individuation of facts is 
conceptually fine-grained. 
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One of the fundamental aims of this essay is to provide resources for articulating 
differences in epistemic standing we occupy at the various stages of reading the proofs of Abel 
and Artin. We will see time and again that if we adopted a sufficiently unexacting individuation 
of facts, Abel and Artin could be said to be investigating the same range of facts and many of 
their central results articulate the same fact as some set of results in the other proof. This is the 
kind of attitude many philosophically innocent mathematicians would be prone to adopt. Such an 
attitude, however, would ill serve the purposes of our analysis: it would rob us of the ability to 
articulate the subtle and yet, crucial differences in epistemic standing. 
Accordingly, I will adopt a conception of facts that goes hand in hand with fine-grained 
content of the Fregean kind. The idea is that contents can be as finitely individuated as our 
concepts allow, and I am simply stipulating that facts are as finely individuated as contents. One 
way to motivate this stipulation comes from the following conception of contents: the content of 
a conceptually articulated statement or a thought is a proposition and propositions are facts. 
Thus, clearly we want facts to be at least as fine-grained as our concepts allow us to articulate. 
This conception of contents has the virtue that it makes it intelligible how language and thought 
can impinge directly on the world; as such, it is a form of direct realism. A metaphysical picture 
of this shape may be described by saying that as the totality of all facts, the world is conceptually 
structured. This conception of contents and the attendant metaphysical picture is adopted, inter 
alia, by John McDowell in his Mind and World. 
The fine-grained conception of facts and contents allows us to distinguish the sets of facts 
Abel and Artin adopt as the target ranges for their respective approaches. While both of them are 
in some sense examining facts about arithmetic relations of the roots of p5(x), we can say that, 
properly speaking, Abel is examining facts about the effect of permutations on rational 
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expressions of the roots, Artin facts about the organization of the system of intermediate fields of 
the splitting field extension of p5(x). And this is only the beginning: the fine-grained conception 
will later on allow us to capture the crucial idea that a mathematician can know all the ‘ground-
level’ facts in a target range and yet, not know any ‘high-level’ facts that capture patterns in the 
target range directly relevant to answering the question driving the epistemic process; I will take 
up this theme in Section 3.6.5. 
(b) Mathematical Concepts 
I will be working with the following conception of mathematical concepts: 
 
A mathematical concept is a certain kind of constellation of norms 
that governs the propriety of producing symbolic artifacts. 
 
The phrase “certain kind” is a place-holder for the various conditions on just what sort of 
components and internal structure a ‘properly constituted’ mathematical concept would have to 
have; clearly making these conditions explicit cannot be attempted here. 
The phrase “constellation of norms that govern the propriety of producing” signals that I 
conceive concepts as denizens of the normative domain. A norm is something that dictates what 
it is correct to do in a particular kind of situation. The phrase “symbolic artifact” refers to things 
like numerals and mathematical symbols quite generally, as well as to mathematical sentences 
constructed by producing combinations thereof. 
Mathematical concepts are often keyed to specific symbolic artifact types in the sense that 
the norms that constitute a concept govern the propriety of producing tokens of that type as well 
as the propriety of responding to tokens of that type by producing tokens of other artifact types. 
 74 
Thus, I think that our mathematical concepts are interconnected in complicated ways and, 
indeed, much of the time it may be somewhat artificial to think of the totality of our 
mathematical norms as neatly demarcated into disjoint concepts. For example, who’s to say 
where the concept addition ends and the concept multiplication begins? After all, there are many 
norms the two concepts clearly share, such as the ones pertaining to distributivity of 
multiplication over addition. The likely idea here is that at least many mathematical concepts are 
individuated by some core constellation of norms, one that has around it a halo of norms that 
may or may not be thought of as belonging to that concept, perhaps depending on the context in 
which the issue is raised. 
It is clear that as sets of norms, mathematical concepts are very complex, and it would be 
very difficult to display one explicitly. There are two types of examples that may be used to fix 
our intuitions, however. First, concepts of logical operations such as conjunction may be thought 
of as individuated by the introduction and elimination rules for the corresponding connective, the 
connective being a symbolic artifact type. Second, axiomatically defined concepts such as group 
in the modern theory of abstract groups may be thought of as individuated by the norms that are 
encoded in the definition of “group”. Yet, there is a sense in which such explicit articulations are 
at best ‘summaries’ of the total set of norms that constitute these concepts. 
In order to have (“grasp,” “possess”) a mathematical concept one needs to have mastered 
the norms that individuate that concept. But there is more. I take it that an agent who knows 
more general facts about the correct ways of producing tokens of the symbolic artifact type to 
which the concept is keyed has a richer concept than someone who knows fewer. A bit more 
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bluntly, it seems vacuous to say that an agent has the concept group if the only way she can 
apply that concept is by unpacking the axiomatic definition.26
(c) Representations in Pure Mathematics 
The principal epistemic significance of concepts is that they make it possible for us to construct 
representations. The idea is that a conceptually constituted representation is a constellation of 
symbolic artifacts which, in virtue of being intentionally produced in a way that respects the 
norms that individuate certain concepts, picks out some aspect of the world. That is, it is the 
norms that endow them with representational content, in virtue of what we do in our conceptual 
practice. Whether there are representations that are not conceptually constituted will not concern 
me here; for all the representations we employ in the intellectual practice of pure mathematics 
are conceptually constituted. 
We will have the occasion to consider three basic types of representations in pure 
mathematics: ones of facts, ones of objects and ones of properties. The sentence The Galois 
group G(E/F) of the splitting field extension E/F of the polynomial p5(x) is not solvable is a 
representation of a fact. The phrase the splitting field extension E/F is a representation of an 
object. The phrase (being) solvable is a representation of a property. 
                                                 
26 More generally, the point is that it is not sufficient that one knows the circumstances of correct 
application of a concept; in order to count as having a concept, one also needs to know (at least 
some of) the consequences of correct application of that concept. 
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(d) Nominalism 
My considered view about the ontology of mathematics is nominalism: there are no non-physical 
objects of any kind and, as such, there are no mathematical objects or properties. For the 
purposes of this essay, however, I will in effect pretend that realism in ontology is true; that 
singular terms in true mathematical sentences denote non-physical objects. However, I will be 
conscientious to formulate my proposals in such a way that they can be eventually reinterpreted 
without assuming realism in ontology. This will be a task for another essay. 
In view of my nominalism, ultimately I want to do away with mathematical facts 
altogether and recast my analysis of cognitive control in terms of conceptually articulated 
mathematical contents without any commitment as to the specific metaphysical nature of those 
contents. Thus, the only aspect of the metaphysical picture canvassed under (a) that is 
indispensable to my account is that we have contents that are sufficiently fine-grained. 
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3.5 THREE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS 
I have already noted that long proofs can typically be viewed as consisting of several modular 
subproofs. I will now develop this idea just a little bit further since I will need it in structuring 
my analyses of the proofs of Abel and Artin. 
Taking my cue from the way in which mathematicians organize their proofs, I will 
distinguish three levels on which we might analyze cognitive control enjoyed in the epistemic 
process of reading a proof: global, semi-local and local.27 These levels will be demarcated by 
two factors: the way in which the proof breaks down into subproofs, and the degree of 
granularity on which we consider the proof. 
Hierarchy of Epistemic Processes 
It is a thoroughly familiar idea that mathematical proofs and, indeed, epistemic processes more 
generally, tend to have a hierarchy of aims: there is the aim of the process as a whole; a few ‘top-
level’ subsidiary aims which, if reached, would allow us to reach the aim of the process as a 
whole; perhaps a few more ‘medium-level’ subsidiary aims under the top-level ones; and so on, 
until we come to ‘local’ aims that are reached by individual inferential moves taken to be 
justificationally primitive in the context of that proof—the ‘ground level’ of the proof. Such 
moves may be, for example, computations carried out according to some specific set of rules, or 
                                                 
27 For some quasi-philosophical reflections on the sort of organization I have in mind here, see 
Uri Leon, “Structuring Mathematical Proofs”. 
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simply logically valid inferences from bits of knowledge already in one’s set of epistemic 
resources at that stage in the proof. 
It is a central part of my analytical set-up that epistemic processes are individuated, in 
part, by their aims. Thus, corresponding to the hierarchy of its aims, a mathematical epistemic 
process will typically have a hierarchy of nested subprocesses. For example, the process of 
writing a proof has the aim of justifying the theorem; this aim is reached by justifying a number 
of subsidiary results, and the aim of justifying each such result will demarcate an epistemic 
subprocess. The process of reading a proof has the aim of learning one way to justify the 
theorem; this aim is reached by learning one way to justify a number of subsidiary results, and 
the aim of learning one way to justify each such result will demarcate an epistemic subprocess. 
Since this way of speaking would become cumbersome very quickly, I will from now on speak 
of the proof and its various subproofs, ignoring the reference to the actual epistemic process of 
writing or reading the proof. 
For example, a given epistemic process might consist of three disjoint global processes 
L1, L2, and L3, where each one of them consists of some number of disjoint semi-local 
subprocesses M1,1, M1,2, ..., and finally, each semi-local process consists of some number of 
disjoint local subprocesses S1,1,1, S1,1,2, ... . At any one level of scale, an admissible 
decomposition to subprocesses must be such that the processes at that level are disjoint and 
jointly exhaust the global process P. 
Thus, we can in principle distinguish as many individual epistemic processes as there are 
individual epistemic aims. For the purposes of our analysis, this would be too detailed a view, for 
just about every inferential step could be considered its own process and at this level, we would 
not be able to discern meaningful differences in the character of cognitive control. In order for 
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such differences to emerge, we will need to pull back from the level of individual inferences. The 
smallest subproofs we would typically want to consider tend to be proofs of what 
mathematicians would consider subsidiary lemmas in a long proof, usually consisting of at least 
a dozen or so individual inferences. 
Granularity 
When considering the character of cognitive control we have over a substantial epistemic 
process, we could of course consider the control we have over each of its subprocesses and so 
on, until we come to individual inferential moves. There is, however, a very natural alternative 
way of considering such a process whereby we consider the subprocesses immediately under it 
as given in the sense that we regard the results obtained in them as part of our set of epistemic 
resources. This point of view is natural in a number of ways. On the one hand, by the time we 
actually justify the result at given level, the results from the ones below it will have been justified 
and hence, they have indeed become part of our set of epistemic resources. On the other hand, 
when mathematicians present an outline or an overview of a long proof, this is just what they do: 
they map out major, ‘large-scale’ results and indicate how the aim of the proof overall can be 
reached with those results in hand. In so doing, they are treating the results of the subprocesses 
as given in the sense I am proposing—if you will, as ‘black boxes’. In providing further 
‘explanations’ of the proof, they will typically focus on one of the subsidiary processes, again 
treating it in the manner they first treated the global process; and so on. 
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Now the significance of this for my analysis is that it is possible to come out as having 
good cognitive control over a process at a given level without having good control over some, or 
even any, of the subprocesses below it. This flexibility of point of view will help us better 
identify and appreciate the differences in the character of control Abel and Artin enjoy over their 
respective processes. 
Naturally all of this still allows that we can, if we so desire, adopt a completely local 
point of view wherein the character of control over an epistemic process is taken to be simply the 
sum total of control enjoyed over the smallest theoretically meaningful subprocesses. This point 
of view alone would not give us a very illuminating account of the nature of epistemic 
accomplishment in mathematics, however. The organization of proofs into hierarchies of aims 
and nested subproofs is a central feature of mathematical practice, one that is often regarded as 
epistemically important in informal analyses of their trade by working mathematicians. For 
example, Thurston clearly regards the ability to present proofs at different levels of granularity as 
an aspect of understanding.28 As such, we should do our best to keep this feature in view in our 
philosophical analysis. 
 
 
                                                 
28 See Thurston, p. 164. See also Van Bendegem, “Non-Formal Properties of Real Mathematical 
Proofs.” Van Bendegem writes: “If a proof has a simple proof-outline, then the quality of that 
proof is considered to be high by mathematicians. Conversely, if the proof has a highly 
complicated proof-outline, then the quality of the resulting proof is low” (p. 254). 
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3.6 COMPONENTS OF COGNITIVE CONTROL 
I will now give a general discussion of the four components of my characterization of cognitive 
control. In Chapter 4, I will examine the various ways in which these components are or are not 
present in the proofs of Abel and Artin. 
3.6.1 Identifying a Target Range 
Abel and Artin can be thought of as trying to answer the same question: Is the general 
polynomial equation p5(x) = 0 of degree 5 solvable by radicals? They both anticipate the 
negative answer, and know that this would imply that no general polynomial equation of degree 
greater than 5 is solvable by radicals. Yet, the two appear to be investigating very different 
terrains of facts in order to prove the same result. Abel is investigating facts about the effect of 
permutations of the roots of p5(x) on rational expressions of the roots; Artin is investigating the 
organization of the splitting field extension E/F of p5(x) and the organization of the Galois group 
G(E/F) of this extension. 
There is a strong intuition to the effect that an epistemically significant difference exists 
between the ways in which the two investigations begin: one feels that Artin has a clearer view 
of which range of facts his investigation is targeted at than Abel does—he has ‘identified’ his 
target range more sharply; one further feels that Artin has more of an initial justification for 
thinking that his target range will yield an answer to the question, whereas Abel has no assurance 
ab initio that this is so. For it is clear that the facts about the organization of the system of 
intermediate fields are sufficient to settle the issue of solvability either way. In contrast, for all 
Abel knows at the beginning of his proof, there might not be enough constraints on the number 
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of values rational expressions of the roots of p5(x) can take under the permutations of those roots 
to rule out the existence of a solution by radicals. Thus, the range of facts Abel has chosen to 
examine is not known to be sufficient to settle the issue of solvability of p5(x) = 0. 
There are two conceptually independent issues I need to address here: first, I need to say 
what a target range is and, second, I need to say what it is to identify a target range. From the 
point of view of my analysis, it is important to keep these two issues separate and, further, to 
keep the issue of what it is to identify a target range separate from what it is to represent a target 
range in a way that affords scaffolding and guidance. For as we will see, these issues must be 
kept separate if we are to identify and analyze the central differences in epistemic standing 
between Abel and Artin. 
(a) Target Range 
A set of facts is a target range for an epistemic process aimed at answering a question Q relative 
to a set of epistemic resources R provided that knowing those facts makes it possible to correctly 
infer a correct direct answer to Q, given the resources in R. I stipulate that no set of facts is a 
target range relative to a set of resources R if R contains a direct answer to Q. For once a direct 
answer α to Q is known, any set of facts Γ can be used to infer that answer: Γ and α, hence α. 
The choice of terminology is meant to reflect the idea that a target range is a set of facts 
on which the investigation may be fruitfully targeted. When the agent has chosen to examine 
some range of facts that is in fact a target range in this sense, we may speak of the target range 
for her process. 
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Comments 
(1) I want to emphasize that target range is an epistemic notion: a set of facts is a target 
range for an epistemic process provided that knowing those facts makes it possible to infer a 
direct answer to the question at which the process is aimed. In mathematical epistemic processes, 
this will typically amount to there being a sequence of logically valid inferences from sentences 
articulating those facts to a direct answer. Accordingly, I allow that a set of facts S can become a 
target range when some fact is discovered such that, with that new fact in hand, it is possible to 
correctly infer an answer to the question from the facts in the set S; the new fact may or may not 
belong to the set S itself. 
(2) I want further to emphasize that target range is a normative notion: a set of facts is a 
target range for an epistemic process provided that knowing those facts makes it possible to 
correctly infer a correct answer to the question at which the process is aimed. Thus, whether or 
not a set of facts is a target range will depend on what the norms of the ambient conceptual 
setting are, centrally including the norms governing the proprieties of logical and non-logical 
inference. Accordingly, I allow that a set of facts can become a target range when the norms of 
the practice are expanded in such a way that, with the new norms in hand, it is possible to 
correctly infer an answer to the question from the facts in that set. 
(3) I most especially want to emphasize that target range is not a metaphysical or 
ontological notion. What is more, I do not think there is a set of general metaphysical or 
ontological criteria that would guarantee that a set of facts is a target range for a given epistemic 
process. 
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In particular, I want to steer well clear of the prima facie attractive idea our case study 
might suggest—namely, that a target range for a mathematical epistemic process is always a set 
of facts about some single object or a ‘coherent’ system of objects. For I want to formulate the 
notion of cognitive control in such a way that having cognitive control over an epistemic process 
does not place any a priori metaphysical requirements on the set of facts one must investigate. 
More bluntly, I do not want having cognitive control to require that the process is targeted at the 
‘metaphysically right’ set of facts, facts that ‘metaphysically govern’ the answer to the question 
driving the process, whatever that might mean. Rather, I want the notion of cognitive control to 
capture an organizational configuration in our epistemic life that is conceptually independent of 
whether or not we have pointed our gaze at the ‘metaphysically right’ bit of the world. Of course 
this still allows ample room for the possibility that having cognitive control tends to in fact 
require that we have focused on the ‘right’ bit of the world. In particular, this allows ample room 
for the possibility that facts about relational structures tend in fact to be ‘appropriate’ target 
ranges at least in some areas of mathematics. Again, certainly our case study suggests something 
of this general shape. But what I want to urge is that the epistemically crucial differences 
between target ranges are not to be analyzed in metaphysical or ontological term, but rather in 
terms of the character of the organizing representations and scaffoldings that become available 
when we take some suitable relational structure as our target. 
I have two motivations for adopting this anti-metaphysical approach. On the one hand, as 
I indicated in the previous section, I am a nominalist about mathematical objects. Thus, I want to 
develop the notion of cognitive control in such a way that having control over a mathematical 
epistemic process does not presuppose that one has discovered the ‘metaphysically right’ 
mathematical objects, relations or properties. 
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On the other hand, I believe and will argue in another essay that understanding in 
empirical cognition has two conceptually independent aspects: in order to understand a range of 
physical phenomena, we need to have a description of a system of objects and their relations that 
produce those phenomena, be it causally or otherwise; however, in order for such a description 
to yield understanding, it also needs to engender a certain kind of epistemic standing with respect 
to that range of phenomena—one I believe is characterized by my definition of cognitive control. 
I will argue that many different kinds of descriptions can serve to engender understanding: 
describing individual causes of an event, describing a causal mechanism that produces a range of 
events or, indeed, furnishing a theory that unifies our picture of the world can all engender 
understanding provided that they engender cognitive control. Thus, I will hope to advocate a 
spirit of tolerance and diversity about accounts of understanding and explanation in empirical 
thought. 
My anti-metaphysical approach to cognitive control creates room for a somewhat more 
radical suggestion: which set of facts is regarded as the ‘metaphysically right’ one may in some 
situations depend, at least in part, on the character of cognitive control the various candidates 
afford us. For example, in another essay I will explore the idea that in singular causal 
explanations, the ‘explanatory’ causes among the causal history of an event are typically the 
ones that afford us cognitive control over that history as a whole. 
(4) As is by now clear, I allow that there are typically more than one target range for an 
epistemic process. Given my anti-metaphysical approach, however, the possibility of more than 
one target range does not matter much in my analysis of cognitive control. In my analysis of 
understanding, however, I will argue that certain varieties of understanding require that one has 
targeted the epistemic process on a range of facts with a specific metaphysical status—such as, 
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for example, a stable causal mechanism that as a matter of fact produces the phenomena to be 
understood. 
(5) I do not require that one needs to know all the facts in a target range in order to infer 
an answer to the question driving one’s epistemic process; in the situation typical in 
mathematics, knowing some subset of the facts chosen as the target range will suffice. Certainly 
we could define minimal target range in the obvious fashion, but it turns out that this notion 
would not have much analytical traction in our case study. For what we will see is that the agent 
typically starts out by identifying some mathematically natural, non-minimal target range and the 
epistemic challenge is precisely to home in on some particular locations in that range. 
(6) The fine-grained conception of facts and contents allows us to distinguish the sets of 
facts Abel and Artin adopt as the target ranges for their respective approaches. While both of 
them are in some sense examining facts about arithmetic relations of the roots of p5(x), we can 
say that, properly speaking, Abel is examining facts about the effect of permutations on rational 
functions of the roots, while Artin is examining facts about the organization of the system of 
intermediate fields of the splitting field extension of p5(x). And this is only the beginning: the 
fine-grained conception will later on allow us to capture the crucial idea that a mathematician 
can know all the “ground-level” facts in a target range and yet, not know the “large-scale” 
patterns in those facts that are directly relevant to answering the question driving the epistemic 
process. 
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(b) Identifying a Target Range 
An agent has identified a target range for her epistemic process provided that she has a referring 
expression that picks out a determinate set of facts and she knows, or has substantial justification 
for believing, that the set of facts picked out by that expression is a target range for her process in 
the sense above. 
In order to avoid an obvious trivialization, we must further require that a referring 
expression cannot be used to identify a target range if its meaning depends essentially on some 
expression denoting the aim of the epistemic process in question. Thus, one cannot identify a 
target range just by saying: whichever range of facts would allow me to infer a correct answer to 
my question. 
For example, it is quite clear that Artin has identified a target range in this sense: given 
his epistemic resources, he knows that the facts about the organization of system of intermediate 
fields of the splitting field extension will allow one to settle the issue of solvability either way. 
The verdict is much less clear in Abel’s case. For he does not know any general facts that would 
show at the outset of his project that there are enough constraints on the range of possible values 
of rational expressions of the roots to rule out the possibility of there being a solution by radicals. 
Comments 
We will see in our discussion of Abel that being able to identify a target range at the outset of an 
epistemic process is by no means a trivial accomplishment, and that it is certainly possible to 
reach an answer to the question driving the process without having done so. The requirement that 
in order to count as having cognitive control one must have identified a target range is meant to 
capture part of the intuition that one way in which a cognitive agent may fail to have ‘control’ 
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over her epistemic process is that she is merely ‘groping around in the dark.’ Without having 
identified a target range, one’s epistemic process is blind. 
3.6.2 Organizing Representation and Epistemic Scaffolding 
Recall the second component of our characterization of cognitive control: 
The agent has adopted an organizing representation for her epistemic process; that is, 
one that represents the target range as a whole and, along with her overall epistemic resources, 
allows her to erect an epistemic scaffolding for examining that range. 
One of the most striking differences between the proofs of Abel and Artin is that Artin’s 
proof overall is firmly organized around the representation the splitting field extension E/F of the 
polynomial p(x). At Stage 3, it becomes organized around the representation Galois group of the 
extension E/F; thus, the focus of the project gets tighter while remaining within the structure 
provided by the initial representation. Further, these representations are representations of two 
target ranges of facts as a whole. In contrast, no representation plays this kind of role in Abel’s 
proof. There are two representations that come close: the general expression for the form a 
solution by radicals would have to have, and the representation of the structure the radicals in 
such a solution would have to have. There are two epistemically crucial differences between the 
two sets of representations, however. First, while Artin’s representations are representations of 
his target ranges of facts, Abel’s are representations of certain isolated features one possible 
target range (the arithmetic relations of the roots) would have if p5(x) = 0 were solvable by 
radicals. Thus, they play a fundamentally different epistemic role in his proof, namely the role 
played by Artin’s criterion for solvability. Second, while Artin’s representations provide firm 
structure and guidance for his proof as a whole, in Abel’s case the verdict is much less clear. 
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3.6.3 Organizing Representation 
An organizing representation is a conceptually constituted representation of the target range as 
a whole, a representation that allows the agent to erect an epistemic scaffolding for the process. 
Once the agent has chosen a target range of facts for her process and adopted a particular 
organizing representation of that range, we may speak of the organizing representation. 
The idea is that the organizing representation provides an overview of the terrain of facts 
one is setting out to investigate and, in so doing, orients the epistemic process as a whole by 
allowing one to erect the kind of representation I am calling an “epistemic scaffolding.” Thus, in 
order to count as having cognitive control over one’s process, it is not enough that one has a 
target range in view somehow or other: the process must be oriented and informed in an organic 
way by a suitable representation of a deliberately chosen target range as a whole. 
Comments 
Since the notion organizing representation depends on the notions scaffolding and guidance, the 
significance of having an organizing representation won’t be fully in view until I have explained 
the latter two notions; still, a few prefatory remarks can be made. 
(1) We can isolate the epistemic significance of having an organizing representation by 
noting that cognitive control involves three distinct, broadly representational accomplishments: 
the agent has identified a target range, she has adopted an organizing representation of that 
range, and she has erected an epistemic scaffolding. 
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There are two points I want to make about organizing representations in the context of 
this three-way distinction. First, an organizing representation need not to be a representation of 
any of the individual facts in the target range. The epistemic role of providing representations of 
individual facts in or about the target range is in my analysis played by the epistemic scaffolding. 
Second, having an organizing representation is independent of having identified a target 
range. On the one hand, the agent can have identified a target range without having an organizing 
representation for the process; for example, the referring expression she uses to identify the 
target range might fail to provide scaffolding and guidance. On the other hand, having an 
organizing representation need not amount to having identified a target range simply because the 
agent might not know, or even have much justification for believing, that the facts in the range 
she has chosen to investigate are sufficient for inferring an answer to the question driving her 
epistemic process. For example, she might discover that she has been examining what is in fact a 
target range only towards the end of her epistemic process; I suppose that this is not altogether 
too uncommon. 
(2) As with having identified a target range, it is certainly possible to engage in an 
epistemic process and complete it successfully without an organizing representation. 
I should emphasize that a representation of a target range of facts can count as an 
organizing representation only if it is available more or less at the outset of the process; for only 
in this case can it actually provide scaffolding and guidance for the process. This guards against 
the following attempt to trivialize the notion: if an agent has correctly inferred a correct answer 
to the question driving her epistemic process, she must have had a representation of some set of 
facts that counts as a target range—the individual sentences that allowed her to infer the answer. 
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(3) The requirement that in order to have cognitive control one must have adopted an 
organizing representation is meant to capture part of the same intuition as the requirement that 
one must have identified a target range: one way in which an agent may fail to have ‘control’ 
over her epistemic process is that she is merely ‘groping around in the dark.’ 
(4) I have defined an organizing representation to be a representation of a target range of 
facts. Yet, there are many situations in which it is more natural to regard a representation of an 
object or a system of objects as the organizing representation. 
For example, the representation one would most naturally consider to be the organizing 
representations for Stage 1 of Artin’s proof is the splitting field extension E/F of p5(x). This is 
just a definite description that picks out certain algebraic structure and, as such, it is a 
representation of a system of objects. However, it is employed in a context in which it is known 
that the objects in this system stand in determinate arithmetic relations to one another. Indeed, 
the set of facts about the relations of the elements in the splitting field contains all the facts about 
the arithmetic relations of the roots of p5(x) to the coefficients, and this is just the range of facts 
we would naturally consider the target range for Artin’s Stage 1. Hence, there seems to be no 
harm in regarding the splitting field extension E/F of p5(x) to be a representation of Artin’s target 
range in the sense in which an organizing representation is required to be a representation—for 
again, it need not be a representation of any of the individual facts in the target range. 
For another example, consider the representation that organizes much of Abel’s proof, his 
general expression for the radicals in a solution by radicals as rational functions of the roots of 
the polynomial. While this representation is ‘embedded’ in a fact, namely 
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Any radical in a solution by radicals must have the form 
 
r = (1/p)(y1 + αp – 1y2 + … + αyp) 
 
for some prime p, 
 
it does not do its job of organizing the proof just in virtue of being so embedded. More to the 
point, this representation in a sense ‘shows’ in its structure as a symbolic artifact what one might 
expect to be able to do with it; I will revisit this idea in Chapter 4. 
For one final example, in Euclidean geometry, the paradigmatic epistemic process is 
aimed at solving some geometric construction problem. In such a process, the diagram that sets 
up the problem is certainly part of the organizing representation and, again, not in any obvious 
sense a propositionally articulated representation of a fact or a set of facts—even if it could no 
doubt be translated into one. 
Thus, while admitting to a slight “abuse of notation,” I will regard representations of 
objects and systems of objects as candidates for being organizing representations. In fact, we will 
see that having an organizing representation of this kind can be a positive epistemic boon: an 
ontologically organized representation of a range of facts tends to lend itself to various kinds of 
representational manipulations that are epistemically powerful; this will be one of the central 
themes of Chapter 4. 
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3.6.4 Epistemic Scaffolding 
Let us consider the following question: What is the epistemic significance of knowing 
mathematical facts at the outset of a process aimed at proving a putative theorem? One might 
think that the only correct answer is: the facts one knows at the outset will or will not allow one 
to deduce a statement of the theorem. Thus, one might think that the only epistemic significance 
of knowledge in this context is that one may or may not be able to justify a further claim to 
knowledge. What I hope to argue in this essay is that bits of mathematical knowledge an agent 
has at the outset of an epistemic process have at least two other important, and importantly 
different types of epistemic significances: they may or may not allow the agent to erect an 
epistemic scaffolding, and they may or may not  provide her epistemic guidance. 
In this section, I will discuss the notion of epistemic scaffolding; in the next one, I will 
consider locating and extracting facts directly relevant to answering the question driving the 
process; I will conclude this chapter by discussing what is perhaps the most important 
component of cognitive control, epistemic guidance. I shall have to take guidance and locating 
and extracting, components (3) and (4) in my characterization of cognitive control, in the reverse 
order: guidance is in the first instance guidance for pursuing these two aims, and so it is not 
possible to properly explain these components in the order in which they naturally appear in the 
characterization. 
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Epistemic Scaffolding 
At the outset of an epistemic process, the agent will typically know some fairly limited set of 
facts that belong to the target range, and perhaps a few ‘high-level’ facts about the target range. 
For example, an undergraduate student reading Artin’s proof of the unsolvability of the quintic 
might know that the splitting field extension E/F of the general polynomial p5(x) of degree 5 is 
generated by the roots of p5(x), but she would not know many of the particular facts about its 
structure; she might know some general field-theoretic facts about the organization of the 
extension E/F—that is, high-level facts about the target range. I think that something structurally 
similar would typically be true of a professional mathematician at the outset of a research 
program in an area with which she is not particularly familiar. 
The notion of cognitive control is intended to identify a particular kind of configuration 
of epistemic resources that allows us to bring reason to bear on our epistemic process in a 
situation in which we do not yet know many of the individual facts in our target range. In order 
to bring reason to bear on our process in such a predicament, it is critical that we have available 
to us a representation of our target range that has at least some degree of surveyable structure. 
Without such a representation, all we have available to us is a chaos of unknown facts; to erect 
an epistemic scaffolding is to open up a cosmos of facts we can proceed to explore in a rationally 
orchestrated manner. Indeed, the notion of epistemic scaffolding may be thought of as capturing 
the familiar intuition that one way in which a cognitive agent may be lost in an epistemic process 
is that she does not even know what she doesn’t know: a scaffolding is a structured representation 
of what one does not yet know. Thus, I recommend, one of the principal epistemic significances 
of knowing general facts about a target range at the out set of an epistemic process is that they 
are the kinds of facts that typically allow us to erect an epistemic scaffolding. 
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I want to emphasize, then, that having erected an epistemic scaffolding is the pivotal 
component of cognitive control: the contributions of having identified a target range and having 
adopted an organizing representation flow into the scaffolding, while the epistemic guidance for 
the process flows from the scaffolding. Having a scaffolding is the critical nexus for the other 
components of cognitive control. 
Definition 
Let T be the target range an agent has chosen for her epistemic process. She has an epistemic 
scaffolding for her process to the extent to which her organizing representation along with her 
overall epistemic resources affords her a representation of T as a logical space of epistemically 
possible facts in the following sense: 
 
she has constructed, or can construct at will, a conceptually constituted representation of  
her target range as a set of properly individuated locations L such that 
(a) she can pick out each location in that set; 
(b) each location covers a determinate stretch of her target range; 
(c) she knows that each location contains a determinate range of epistemically 
possible facts {α}; that is, she knows that the facts covered by that location have one of 
the facts {α} as a consequence; 
(d) each fact α contained in a given location rules out the others in that location 
if it in fact obtains; and, 
(e) the facts contained in the various locations exhaust the space of epistemically 
possible facts about T that are directly relevant to inferring an answer to the question 
driving the process. 
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Synopsis 
To erect an epistemic scaffolding is to carve up the target range into cleanly demarcated, 
mutually distinguishable locations such that the facts in each location have as a consequence one 
among a determinate range of mutually exclusive, epistemically possible facts; and the totality of 
the latter facts is known to contain the ones directly relevant to answering the question one is 
trying to answer. 
 
It is visible, I hope, that having an epistemic scaffolding constitutes a component of one 
possible answer to the question I used to motivate the notion of cognitive control: having erected 
a scaffolding is just the sort of representational accomplishment that facilitates reaching our 
epistemic aim when the resources we have initially are insufficient for actually reaching that aim. 
A scaffolding is a representation of our target range as consisting of a determinate range of 
locations one needs to examine in order to discover the facts that will eventually allow one to 
infer an answer to the question driving the process. I will say that to locate an answer is to know 
the location or locations one needs to examine in order to infer that answer, and to collapse a 
location is to find out which fact in the range of epistemically possible facts in it actually obtains. 
When one is equipped with a scaffolding, one’s epistemic process will typically consist 
of examining a number of locations by employing whatever epistemic resources one has, and 
gradually producing a representation of some stretch of the target range—a representation, that 
is, of the actual facts rather than just ranges of epistemic possibilities. As I noted above, target 
ranges in mathematics tend to be much larger than the set of facts actually required to infer an 
answer to the question driving the process. It is therefore usually not necessary to collapse all the 
locations in one’s scaffolding in order to be in a position to infer an answer to one’s question. 
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Let us start with a simple illustration. 
(1) Maps 
Suppose you are looking for El Dorado, the fabled City of Gold. While you do not know the 
exact location where the City is supposed to be hidden, through years of hard work, you have 
managed to determine that, if it exists at all, it would have to be located within a certain 500-
square mile area covered by a dense jungle. In order to discover El Dorado or determine that it 
does not exist, you know that this is the area you need to explore; the set of all facts about the 
items in this stretch of terrain is your target range. Thus, you start out your epistemic process by 
conducting aerial survey of the area, generating what is an essentially accurate, albeit not very 
detailed map of the jungle. This map displays a number of rivers, a large lake, some mountains 
jutting out of the jungle, and so on. You can now divide up the terrain to be explored into 
determinate regions: the area between the rivers; the shores of the lake; the foothills of the 
mountains; and so on. These regions demarcate the locations in your (rather crude) epistemic 
scaffolding: each one covers a stretch of the target range and contains a determinate range of 
epistemically possible facts: El Dorado is located here and it is not. Given the size of the region 
to be explored, and given the difficulty of the terrain, it is not practicable to explore all of it in 
one go. But now given your scaffolding and your background of epistemic resources pertaining 
to your quest, you can plan out a number of expeditions. For example, some ancient bit of lore 
gives you a reason to believe that the City is located not too far from a body of water; so you 
might start out by exploring the shores of the lake. Another bit of lore gives you a reason to 
believe that there is a mountain to the west of the City; so you might explore the area between 
the rivers and east of the mountains in your map; and so on. This is epistemic guidance provided 
by your scaffolding. Of course there is still a indefinite number of epistemic challenges in your 
way: exploring the various particular locations is hard and dangerous work; some of them you 
 98 
may be able to explore from a boat; others might require cutting a path into the jungle; and so on. 
But the point is that your scaffolding allows you to map out the overall range of possible courses 
of action which, if carried out successfully, would eventually allow you to reach your epistemic 
aim: to determine the location of the fabled City of Gold. 
Let us now turn to more serious examples. 
(2) Artin’s Epistemic Scaffolding for Stage 3 
Artin’s target range at the beginning of Stage 3 of his proof is the range of combinatorial facts 
about the relations of (sets of) elements in the Galois group G(E/F), where E/F is, again, the 
splitting field extension of the general polynomial p5(x) of degree 5. I will focus on this target 
range because it allows us to appreciate the epistemic power of what Artin achieves in Stage 2 
and, indeed, appreciate how much more powerful his standing has become from what it was at 
the end of Stage 1. 
Let us suppose that we do not at this stage know any of the particular facts about the 
relations of elements in G(E/F); this is a natural supposition at the beginning of Stage 3, since 
the aim of Stage 3.1 is to determine which group G(E/F) actually is. We will suppose, however, 
that we know many of the basic general facts about finite groups.29 Recall now that the aim of 
Stage 3 is to show that G(E/F) is not a solvable group—that is, to show that there is no normal 
series with abelian quotients in this group. Hence, with the foregoing resources in place, one very 
natural way to look at the situation this: we have an epistemic scaffolding in which the locations 
are sequences of embedded subgroups of the form {1} = G1 ⊂ G2 ⊂ ... ⊂ Gh = G(E/F). Our 
logical space has a good bit of structure: 
                                                 
29 These may be regarded as ‘high-level’ facts about our target range (see Section 3.6.5(b)). 
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(1) Since G(E/F) is a finite group, we know from the get-go that any sequence of 
embedded subgroups in G(E/F) has a finite length, and that there is only a finite number of such 
sequences. Further, it is easy to see that G(E/F) is in fact isomorphic to the symmetric group S5 
on five letters without even determining what the group-theoretic structure of G(E/F) ≈ S5 is. 
Thus, before we even work out the subgroups of S5, we know that the space of locations in our 
scaffolding is finite and fully determinate. Once we do work out these subgroups, we acquire 
excellent resources for explicitly identifying the various possible normal sequences in G(E/F) in 
terms of the various permutations that generate the groups in them. Thus, any sequence of 
subgroups can be picked out with the sets of generators {S1, …, Sh} for the individual groups in 
it. This does require, of course, that we have in fact worked out what the subgroups of S5 are; an 
epistemic scaffolding does not come for free. 
(2) Each location covers some as of yet unknown stretch of facts about the relations of 
elements in G(E/F) and contains two epistemically possible facts: the sequence is a normal 
sequence or it is not. That is, each group in the sequence is a normal subgroup of the one in 
which it is contained or it is not. 
Further, as a location in our scaffolding, we can think of any normal sequence as 
‘containing’ a range of ‘smaller’ locations: given any two consecutive groups Gj and Gj+1 in a 
normal sequence, we can think of {Gj , Gj+1} as demarcating a location on its own right, one that 
contains two epistemically possible facts: the quotient group Gj+1/Gj is abelian or it is not. 
It is clear that in both cases the range of epistemically possible facts in each location is 
fully determinate, and that the epistemically possible facts in each location are mutually 
exclusive, as required by parts (3) and (4) of my definition, respectively. 
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Finally, and this is really the main point, this scaffolding contains a location for every 
epistemically possible fact that is relevant to the question of solvability of the group G(E/F). 
Now of course there are all sorts of epistemically possible facts about the structure of G(E/F) that 
are not packaged into one of our locations. The point is precisely that we can organize the range 
of epistemically relevant, as of yet unknown facts in this highly regimented fashion. 
In order fully to appreciate just how powerful this mode of organizing the logical space 
is, we should keep in mind that the fact as to whether a subgroup A is normal in B, and the fact 
as to whether the quotient group B/A is abelian, depend in complicated ways on the mutual 
relations of the elements in each one, as well as on the relations of those elements to the elements 
of the other one; these are the facts covered by the various locations. So to have this much 
structure in play at the outset of Stage 3 is really quite remarkable: we can organize our logical 
space so as to ‘package’ and ‘store away’ vast amounts of mathematical data we do not yet have. 
Finally, this packaging leaves out in the open precisely those features of the situation that are 
directly relevant to the solvability by radicals of the polynomial. With this scaffolding in place, 
we can go to work. 
It deserves to be emphasized out that while our epistemic standing at the end of Stage 1 
of Artin’s proof is in structurally similar to the one at the beginning of Stage 3, in many ways it 
is significantly weaker. Recall that Artin’s initial criterion for solvability is that a polynomial 
equation p(x) = 0 is solvable by radicals if and only if the splitting field E of p(x) is contained in 
a radical extension L of F. Thus, one might think that we can view sequences of intermediate 
fields in E/F as locations in much the same way we have viewed sequences of subgroups of 
G(E/F) as locations; the epistemically possible facts in each one would be the sequence is a 
radical sequence or it is not. But this would fail to incorporate most of the epistemically relevant, 
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epistemically possible facts in the target range: for the extension E/F need not itself be a radical 
extension even if it is contained in one. The closest we can get to the sort of scaffolding we have 
at the beginning of Stage 3 is to take the scaffolding just sketched and add a parameter ‘L’ for 
the possible finite extensions of E. Clearly this explodes the range of epistemically possible facts 
under consideration. In particular, there is no hope of being able to pick out all the epistemically 
possible finite extensions of E explicitly the way my definition requires. 
This gives us a way of appreciating just how difficult it would be to attack the issue of 
solvability by directly considering the organization of the splitting field extension E/F and, 
concomitantly, just how remarkable the epistemic contribution of Artin’s Stage 2 really is. 
(3) Character Table for a Finite Group G 
The following sequence of results in the theory of group characters allows us to erect a real nice 
epistemic scaffolding for the process of computing the irreducible characters of a finite group G. 
With these results in hand, a competent mathematician would typically be able to work out at 
least portions of the character table for a given finite group G, provided that the cardinality of G 
is not exceedingly large.30
1. Any character is constant on the conjugacy classes of G; 
2. The number of irreducible characters of G is the number of conjugacy classes of G; 
3. The degree of any irreducible character χ divides the cardinality #G of G; 
4. ∑χ deg(χ)2 = #G, the sum on the left taken over the irreducible characters of G; 
5. The orthogonality relations for irreducible characters. 
Results 1 and 2 determine the basic structure of our epistemic scaffolding: we need to fill out an 
h-by-h array of entries where h is the number of conjugacy classes of G. The (n, m) entry is to be 
                                                 
30 See, for example, Serre, Linear Representations of Finite Groups. 
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filled with the value of the n-th irreducible character on the m-th conjugacy class of G—that is, 
by some particular complex number. Thus, we can think of the (n, m) entry as one of h2 locations 
in the scaffolding, occupied by the range of epistemically possible values of the n-th irreducible 
character on the m-th conjugacy class. This range is fully determinate and each location can be 
picked out simply by enumerating the entries as we have done. One of the interesting features of 
having this scaffolding is that before we start working on the actual contents of the entries, we 
tend to work on the scaffolding itself. For example, one might try to work out a generator for 
each of the conjugacy classes of G and, typically, at least some of the degrees of the as of yet 
unknown irreducible characters. 
Certainly the epistemically possible facts contained in the various locations exhaust the 
range of facts directly relevant to determining the irreducible characters of G: each irreducible 
character is individuated by its values on the h conjugacy classes. 
Results 3, 4 and 5 provide our scaffolding a fair bit of inferentially engageable structure. 
In particular, we can use the orthogonality relations to compute values of a character at 
conjugacy classes, given enough known values for other classes or other characters. In a sense to 
be spelled out later, Result 3 provides a good bit of guidance for the search for irreducible 
characters, especially at the stage where none or only very few of the characters have been 
found. Finally, results 4 and 5 provide further guidance throughout the search process, and 
especially towards the end: once we have discovered a few characters, we can typically rule out a 
whole range of epistemic options. Note that this fits what I required in component (3) of my 
characterization of cognitive control: scaffolding provides guidance. 
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Comments 
(1) Let us begin with a few brief clarifications concerning the five components of my 
definition of scaffolding. 
(a) To be able to pick out a location is, simply, to have a referring expression that is 
known to uniquely denote that location among the set of all locations in the scaffolding. This is 
not to require that the expression in question allows one to represent the facts covered by or 
contained in that location; it is merely to require that the range of locations is fully determinate 
and that one can distinguish the locations from one another. 
(b) The requirement that each location in an epistemic scaffolding covers a stretch of the 
target range is meant to ensure that a scaffolding is in fact a representation of the target range, 
one we can have when we do not yet know many, or even any, of the individual facts in that 
range. Unlike the organizing representation, a scaffolding is not required to be a representation of 
the target range as a whole. The idea is rather that a scaffolding is a representation of those parts 
of the target range that are known, or thought to be, directly relevant to inferring the answer to 
the question driving the epistemic process. 
(c) The requirement that each location in an epistemic scaffolding contains a determinate 
range of epistemically possible facts allows that one may not be able to explicitly specify the 
individual possible facts in that range. We saw an instance of this in our third example above: 
one typically does not know at the outset just which complex numbers could occupy a given 
entry in the h-by-h array that is the yet to be completed character table. Nevertheless, the range 
of epistemically possible facts in each location is fully determinate in the sense that each actual 
entry is known to be a complex number; there are many other constraints one can find for 
important special cases. Note, for contrast, that the requirement on one’s ability to represent the 
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contents of the locations is much less demanding than the requirement on one’s ability to 
represent the range of locations itself. This is a central part of the notion of scaffolding: even if 
we do not know many of the particular facts, we have a determinate superstructure into which we 
can plug those facts as they become available during our investigation. 
(d) The requirement that the epistemically possible facts contained in each location are 
mutually exclusive is a central part of the notion of scaffolding: we can mark out inferentially 
meaningful packages in our target range. That the facts in each location are mutually exclusive is 
one way in which a scaffolding provides an inferentially responsive framework for the epistemic 
process; I will return to this theme in paragraph (8) below. 
(e) The requirement that the epistemically possible facts contained in the scaffolding 
exhaust the range of facts directly relevant to answering the question allows, first, that some of 
the locations do not contain any such facts and, second, that the agent does not know which of 
the locations contain facts directly relevant. Indeed, it is a central part of my account of cognitive 
control that the agent may have to do a good deal of hard work in order to locate the facts 
directly relevant to answering her question—that is, to identify the locations that actually contain 
such facts. 
That the epistemically possible facts in the scaffolding exhaust the set of facts in the 
target range directly relevant to answering the question is often clear by the time one is able to 
construct a representation that satisfies the other three requirements. We saw in our second and 
third examples that the contents of the locations exhausted the range of facts directly relevant to 
answering the question almost “by construction.” This does, of course, depend on exactly what is 
meant by “directly relevant.” For now, the intuitions will have to suffice; I will take up this issue 
in Section 3.6.5(c). 
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(2) While it should be beyond serious contestation that the notion scaffolding does in fact 
apply in the foregoing examples, one might justifiably wonder just how typical it is to have a 
scaffolding in the fairly exacting sense required by my definition. Thus, let me hasten to make 
two remarks. 
First, as having cognitive control overall, having an epistemic scaffolding is a matter of 
degree. It is certainly possible to have a representation of one’s target range that has some 
features of an epistemic scaffolding but lacks others. For example, we may be able to represent 
the range of locations ‘abstractly,’ but not be able pick out many, or even any, of the individual 
locations; this would be the case, for example, with Artin’s scaffolding at the end of Stage 1, 
where we had the parameter L ranging over the finite extensions of E. 
Second, having a fully constructed scaffolding at the outset of one’s process is meant to 
be a substantial requirement and is, perhaps, not met altogether too often. One will typically have 
to have a fair bit of knowledge about high-level features of the target range in order to erect a 
fully constructed scaffolding, and typically such knowledge is not yet available at the very 
beginning of the process. 
I am happy with these two states of affairs. First, they fit my overall policy of making the 
notion of cognitive control demanding enough to bring out subtle differences in the quality of 
control over epistemic processes. There is no harm in saying that most actual agents fall a little 
short of having full control over their processes as long as we can use the notion to discern 
epistemically significant differences between them. The real danger would be in making the 
definitive criteria for having cognitive control too easy to satisfy, for then the notion would lose 
its discriminatory power. Second, even if mathematicians typically do not to have fully 
constructed scaffoldings at the beginning of their epistemic processes, we will see in our case 
 106 
study that scaffoldings are often erected during the early stages of the process, and that this is 
indeed one of the hallmarks of well-orchestrated epistemic processes. 
(3) An epistemic scaffolding is an object only in whatever sense a representation is an 
object; for to say that an agent has an epistemic scaffolding is just a compact and, so I hope, 
intuitively suggestive way of saying that she has a certain kind of representation of the target 
range. I suppose one could say that the object called “epistemic scaffolding” is the logical space 
of epistemically possible facts in the target range, organized in the manner just described; 
however, this kind of talk should be seen as nothing more than an informal device adopted for 
convenience. I don’t know what a logical space is anyway. 
(4) The notion of scaffolding allows us to appreciate the crucial importance of knowing at 
least a few general, high-level facts at the outset of one’s epistemic process. For as our case 
study will strongly suggest, epistemic scaffoldings in mathematics are typically erected by highly 
conceptually articulated representations of ranges of high-level facts about the target range. We 
will see this in more detail in Chapter 4. 
(4) One of the principal challenges in mathematical epistemic processes is to create 
locations one can then proceed to investigate. In particular, I will argue that concepts of objects 
and concepts of systems of objects are among the most important tools we have for creating 
locations in mathematical target ranges. In another essay, I will argue that part of the epistemic 
significance of being able to conceive the physical world as consisting of properly individuated 
objects and determinate systems of objects is that doing so is one of the basic ways we have of 
creating locations for our empirical epistemic processes and, as such, one of the basic ways of 
acquiring cognitive control over epistemic processes in empirical cognition. 
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(5) It is often convenient to consider collections of locations as ‘large-scale’ locations on 
their own right. For example, in our presentation of Artin’s scaffolding, each sequence of 
subgroups in G(E/F) was seen as a location, and the normal sequences were seen as containing a 
number of ‘smaller’ locations. 
(6) Sometimes as we move through the stages in a proof, the scaffolding keeps getting 
more and more structured as we acquire new epistemic resources. 
I think that this is one of the many different kinds of features a proof may have that 
triggers the response that the proof is understandable. A proof in which the master scaffolding 
keeps getting more and more structured might be said to stack up: the bits of knowledge are 
integrated so as to provide a single coherent, ever improving overview of the terrain of facts 
under investigation. The proofs of Abel and Artin both stack up quite nicely; at any rate, 
considered on their own terms, they stack up nicely, even if Artin still clearly comes out on top. 
(7) One of the basic features of a scaffolding is that it is inferentially responsive. There 
are at least two distinct aspects to this. On the one hand, I required in my definition that each 
location is occupied by a range of epistemically possible facts that are mutually exclusive. Thus, 
to discover one is to collapse that location in the sense that the others are thereby ruled out. On 
the other hand, we will see in Chapter 4 that there are various ways in which the locations may 
be connected. The most obvious sense in which locations may be connected is that the contents 
of one location constrain the epistemically possible contents of another. This is precisely what 
we saw in our third example: the orthogonality relations of the characters are connections in the 
scaffolding. We will see, further, that Artin’s scaffolding for his Stage 3 is more connected in an 
epistemically important way than Abel’s. My definition allows, however, that locations in a 
scaffolding may not be connected. For example, the locations in our second example are not 
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connected: the fact as to whether one sequence of intermediate fields in E/F is a radical sequence 
does not in general have any consequences about the other sequences in E/F. A highly connected 
epistemic scaffolding is a bonus, not a requirement for having control. 
(8) Having an epistemic scaffolding has two principal significances as a component of 
cognitive control. On the one hand, a scaffolding is a conceptually structured overview of the 
terrain of epistemically possible facts, one that is highly inferentially engageable. As such, it 
captures part of the idea that to have cognitive control is to have a panoptic overview of the 
epistemic terrain. On the other hand, a scaffolding provides guidance for the epistemic process; I 
will discuss the latter role of scaffoldings in Section 3.6.6. 
(9) In Section 3.5, I explored the idea that a substantial mathematical process will 
typically contain a hierarchy of multiply embedded subprocesses. This suggests that we might 
wish to require in our characterization of cognitive control that the scaffolding of a subprocess is 
connected in some ‘organic’ fashion with the scaffolding of the process in which it is embedded. 
This would be yet another way of implementing the idea that having cognitive control involves 
being able to start with an overview of the situation and ‘home in’ on the details. We will see in 
our analysis of Abel and Artin, however, that this would be too exacting a requirement. While 
the aim and, typically, the target range of a subprocess are indeed dictated by the process in 
which it is contained, we must allow that a subprocess can be autonomous in that it has its own 
organizing representation and so, a scaffolding not intrinsically connected with the scaffolding of 
the ambient process. 
(10) Finally, I need to clarify the role of epistemic scaffoldings in situations where the 
agent does know quite a few individual facts in her target range already at the outset of the 
epistemic process. 
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The notion of scaffolding is intended to capture a certain type of representational ability 
an agent may have in a situation in which she knows which terrain of facts she needs to 
investigate, but does not yet know many of the particular facts in that terrain. She will explore 
the various locations, find out which fact they actually contain and, if all goes well, she will 
eventually be able to infer an answer to her question. In this process, the organization of the 
scaffolding provides her aim and location guidance. 
We can imagine an idealized process in which the agent collapses all the locations in the 
scaffolding so as to gradually transform the scaffolding into a representation of the particular 
facts in the target range. Most actual mathematical processes do not, however, involve collapsing 
all the locations. As we noted above, in real-life mathematical research the target range tends to 
be much larger than the set of facts actually required to infer the answer, and just which ones are 
required will typically become clear somewhere in the course of the process. 
Either way, there will be a point in the process at which the scaffolding has served its 
purpose and will, in effect, be abandoned: once enough of the facts in the target range are known, 
the rest of the proof will consist of simple logical parsing together of these facts to infer the 
answer. At this stage, the agent no longer needs to reach into her background of epistemic 
resources for new bits of knowledge; she does not need to apply any new concepts to articulate 
new facts or demarcate new locations; she does not need to “go out” and look for new bits of 
knowledge. Everything she needs to infer the answer is already at hand. This is what the very 
final stage in long proofs will typically look like. 
Now consider a situation in which the agent is already in this situation at the outset of her 
epistemic process. This is what often happens in subproofs embedded deep in the structure of a 
long proof: with all the setting up that has taken place in the subproofs leading up to the one in 
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question, the epistemic process may consist of little more than applying a few rules of inference 
to the bits of knowledge at hand. 
In such a situation, one natural thing to say is that the process has no scaffolding: the 
known facts are already sufficient for reaching the aim, and the agent either knows or has good 
justification for thinking that this is so. Thus, the set of sentences articulating those facts can be 
thought of as taking over the role of a scaffolding: it is already an explicit representation of a 
target range—a set of facts sufficient for inferring the answer. 
But there is a fairly natural way to apply the notion of scaffolding to describe this kind of 
epistemic standing. In the situation the basic notion of scaffolding is intended to capture, the 
scaffolding is typically a set of locations organized by concepts of objects; thus, we might speak 
of an ontic scaffolding. In the kind of situation under consideration here, we might speak of an 
inferential scaffolding. The locations are demarcated by the available rules of correct inference 
directly applicable to the facts explicitly articulated. 
For example, in a formal derivation of the kind that might be given as an exercise to a 
beginning logic student, we have a set of explicitly articulated premises along with the desired 
conclusion, and the student is asked to apply the rules of inference in some specific system of 
deduction to produce a derivation of the conclusion from the given premises. In a situation like 
this, the locations are demarcated by the rules of inference of the system: we can think of each 
location as containing all the epistemically possible derivations that begin with the application of 
the corresponding rule of inference. If a given rule does not apply to the premises, then the 
location, once collapsed, would be empty. If a given rule does apply, one can explore that 
location further by pursuing an inferential path that begins by applying the corresponding rule. 
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Thus, locations in an inferential scaffolding will typically have locations embedded in them in 
the sense discussed in paragraph (6) above. 
The point of applying the notion of scaffolding in this way is that we can still make sense 
of the idea of the scaffolding providing guidance. Location guidance might be enjoyed, for 
example, in virtue of having enough experience with the rules of inference to know which rules 
are likely to be useful in deriving a certain kind of conclusion from a certain kind of set of 
premises; this is just the sort of epistemic mastery we want our students to acquire in an 
introductory course on formal logic. Aim guidance can be acquired in various ways; I will 
discuss this in the section on guidance. 
The notion of scaffolding and, in particular, the contrast between ontic and inferential 
scaffoldings gives me the occasion to make an actual philosophical point about the epistemic 
character of mathematical research as a human conceptual enterprise. One of the things the 
notion of cognitive control is meant to bring out is that real-life mathematical research is not in 
the first instance an activity of drawing logically valid inferences. It is an activity of making 
rational choices about how to proceed: choices as to which terrain of facts one should examine; 
choices as to how to conceptually represent the terrain one has chosen to examine; choices as to 
how to organize one’s representation of the as of yet unknown facts in that terrain; choices as to 
which particular piece of knowledge to pursue at a given juncture in the process; which 
particular locations to examine, which manipulational devices to apply. The sort of epistemic 
activity that is happily described simply as drawing logically valid inferences constitutes only a 
small fragment of the overall range of epistemic activities in mathematical epistemic processes, 
and tends to happen at the very end at that. We will see this quite concretely in our analysis of 
the processes of Abel and Artin in Chapter 4. 
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The temptation, if it is one, to think that mathematical epistemic activity can be happily 
described simply as an activity of drawing logically valid inferences is no doubt due to focusing 
on completed proofs ready to be ‘archived.’ But even in the course of reading a proof, the real 
epistemic task is not in following the individual inferential moves. It is in having a view of the 
choices, and the range of possible choices, of the sort just described. And when such choices are 
in view, I will say, the agent has cognitive control over the process of reading the proof. Now of 
course it is possible in one sense to ‘read’ a proof without having any of this in view; but, as we 
discussed in Section 3.3, that is just the sort of reading that mathematicians routinely characterize 
as reading without understanding. 
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3.6.5 Locating and Extracting Features Directly Relevant to the Question 
Recall the fourth component of our characterization of cognitive control: 
Given the epistemic guidance provided by her scaffolding and her overall epistemic 
resources, the agent is able to locate and extract features of the target range that are directly 
relevant to answering the question Q driving the process by using her devices for manipulating 
representations. 
In my experience, when working mathematicians are called upon to reflect on the proofs 
of Abel and Artin, what they usually single out as the most striking difference is that Abel does 
not manage to make explicit any features directly relevant to the solvability by radicals of p5(x) = 
0, whereas Artin does manage to do so. Abel merely rules out case by case the existence of the 
radicals that would have to exist in order for there to be a solution by radicals, whereas Artin 
shows that all of this comes into focus in the fact that the Galois group of p5(x) is not solvable: 
the facts directly relevant to solvability are certain facts about the organization of the system of 
subgroups and quotient groups of the Galois group. Thus, one might say, Artin manages to locate 
the crucial facts in the organization of the system of subgroups of G(E/F), while Abel does not 
manage to locate anything in this sense. 
Such, anyhow, are the ordinary mathematician’s intuitions. Obviously there is an 
imposing philosophical task here: what sense can we make of the ideas of making explicit a 
feature of the target range, a feature’s being directly relevant to answering a question, and 
locating a feature in some system of facts or objects? The purpose of this section is to make 
some initial headway on these issues. 
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One remark before we proceed. I want to acknowledge from the start that, much as with 
the notion of target range, there is an obvious and tempting approach to analyzing the differences 
between Abel and Artin at issue in this section: one might say that Abel does not see the 
‘metaphysically right’ features of the set of permutations, whereas Artin does—something like, 
the features that ‘produce’ the facts about solvability by radicals. However, keeping with my 
anti-metaphysical orientation, I will try to analyze the differences in what Abel and Artin 
accomplish epistemically without appealing to ontological or metaphysical notions. Hence, I will 
try to analyze ideas such as “directness of relevance” in epistemic terms. I will not try to produce 
sustained arguments against the metaphysical order of explanation: I take it that no such 
explanation now exists, but should a candidate emerge, I would be happy to consider it. 
(a) Internal Aims of Mathematical Epistemic Processes 
In the course of his proof, Artin achieves a number of interconnected internal aims. Thus, for 
example, all the facts relevant to the solvability by radicals of p5(x) = 0 are collected in one place 
as facts about the organization of its splitting field extension of p5(x). This greatly facilitates 
looking for patterns among those facts. Further, the field and group-theoretic concepts and 
general facts about fields and groups allow Artin to locate the facts most directly relevant to 
solvability in the organization of the Galois group G(E/F) of p5(x). Finally, with further such 
concepts in hand, he can explicitly articulate those features. It is much less clear whether Abel 
achieves any of these aims: there seems to be little by way of collecting facts in one place, little 
by way of locating features directly relevant to the question of solvability, and even less by way 
of explicitly articulating those features. 
I propose, accordingly, that mathematical epistemic processes, particularly processes of 
writing and reading proofs, have three recurring internal aims: 
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(a) consolidating facts: Artin uses the splitting field extension E/F to consolidate 
arithmetic facts relevant to the question of the solvability by radicals of p(x) = 0; 
(b) locating facts: Artin uses the Galois correspondence to locate facts directly relevant to 
solvability in the system of subgroups of the Galois group; thus, a polynomial equation p(x) = 0 
is solvable by radicals if and only if the Galois group G(E/F) of its splitting field is a solvable 
group—that is, contains a normal series with abelian quotients. 
(c) extracting facts: Artin uses the group-theoretic concepts and facts to extract the facts 
directly relevant to solvability: the general polynomial equation p5(x) = 0 is not solvable by 
radicals ‘because’ its Galois group does not contain a normal sequence with abelian quotients. 
These are engineering aims in the sense in which it is an engineering aim to make sure 
that the foundation of a building does not sink, or that a particular load-bearing wall can support 
the required weight, and so on; they are intermediate aims in the service of the final aim of 
erecting a structure that is comfortable and safe to inhabit. The idea is that the success of a 
mathematical epistemic process often depends on the extent to which we are able to extract at 
least some facts directly relevant to the question we are trying to answer; this, in turn, often 
depends on the extent to which we are able first to locate those facts; finally, this often depends 
on the extent to which we have managed to consolidate our target range. 
It is certainly possible to complete a mathematical epistemic process successfully without 
being particularly successful in pursuing these three internal aims, however. In fact, reaching 
them has exactly the same status as having the first two components of cognitive control: while 
not necessary for successfully completing the process, reaching them amounts to having a 
specific kind of epistemic mastery over the process. 
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The requirements that one can consolidate one’s target range, locate the features directly 
relevant to the question driving the process and, finally, extract those features fit my overall 
ideology about cognitive control: to have cognitive control is, in part, to occupy an epistemic 
standing wherein one begins with a panoptic overview of the epistemic terrain and, in virtue of 
having the appropriate concepts and bits of knowledge, one can home in on the critical features 
of that terrain. 
I do not regard consolidating to be as essential as locating and extracting; in turn, I do not 
regard locating to be as essential as extracting. After all, from the point of view of reaching the 
final aim of the process, extracting the critical features is clearly the prime requirement, whereas 
locating and consolidating are in a sense ‘merely’ preparation for it. Consolidating is particularly 
problematic in the sense that, as we will presently see, it is an epistemic accomplishment that has 
an expressly ontological aspect. As such, I refrain from including it in my characterization of 
cognitive control, thus keeping with my anti-metaphysical orientation. In any case, the bottom 
line for the task at hand is that all three accomplishments mark out epistemically significant 
differences between what Abel and Artin achieve in their respective proofs. Whether 
consolidating, or even locating, should be considered a part of the very notion of cognitive 
control or merely particular ways of acquiring cognitive control is of no great consequence here. 
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(b) Consolidating Facts 
To consolidate a set of facts is to adopt a mode of representation that justifies treating those 
facts as facts about a single object or a coherent system of objects. 
In order to avoid an obvious trivialization, we must further require that one be able to 
refer to the consolidating object in a way that does not depend on referring to the facts to be 
consolidated or the act of consolidating itself. Thus, given a set S of facts, we cannot consolidate 
them just by saying: let x be the object the facts in S are about. 
Consolidating a set of facts can have a number of different epistemic significances 
depending on the specific context in which it takes place. Here, however, I will only be 
interested in consolidation as preparation for locating and extracting features. Before we go on to 
consider this significance of consolidating, let us note the following two distinctions. 
Single Object and System of Objects 
There are two epistemically different basic types of consolidation: one in which a set of facts is 
consolidated by a single object, and we examine the overall features of that object, another in 
which a set of facts is consolidated by a system of distinct objects, and we examine the 
mathematical relations of those objects. 
In Galois’ original approach to solvability by radicals, there are instances of both kinds of 
consolidating critical to the approach as a whole. First, Galois appears to have been the first 
mathematician to regard the set of permutations of the roots as a single, coherent object on its 
own right. It is not that the mathematicians before him could not use expressions such as “the 
permutations of the roots,” but they did not employ in their reasoning the idea that the totality of 
the permutations can itself be meaningfully regarded as an object. Second, Galois considered 
certain subsets of the group of permutations and, in particular, the ways in which those sets got 
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mapped to one another under certain operations on the group as a whole. He noticed that the way 
in which the group of permutations splits up into subsets under those operations is relevant to the 
issue of solvability by radicals. He did not quite take the next step where those subsets are 
regarded as elements in yet another consolidating object, however. Those subsets would now be 
thought of as the cosets of a normal subgroup N in G(E/F), and the consolidating object would 
be the quotient group G/N. 
It is of course essential to Artin’s approach that the F-automorphisms of E form a group, 
the Galois group G(E/F), and further, that they can also be regarded as consolidated into a system 
of objects with determinate relations among them, namely the subgroups of G(E/F) and their 
relations of (normal) containment. 
Combination and Ontological Innovation 
There are two principal ways of effecting consolidation: we combine a number of previously 
recognized objects into a single object broadly of the same sort, and we come to recognize an 
entirely new type of object. 
Perhaps the most pervasive example of the first way of effecting consolidation is the use 
of homomorphisms to embed a number of distinct structures in a single more encompassing 
structure. Thus, we form the direct sum of algebraic structures; we consider the regular 
representation of a group G that consolidates all the distinct non-isomorphic irreducible 
representations of G; we consider the p-adic numbers. Aside from these more specialized modes 
of employing embeddings, the general technique of putting a number of structures inside a larger 
one fairly permeates modern mathematics. 
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Perhaps the most pervasive example of the second way of effecting consolidation is the 
recognition of various sets of objects as objects on their own right, as “completed totalities.” In 
our case study, we saw multiple levels of this way of effecting consolidation in Artin’s approach, 
and just now noted that consolidation of this kind was crucial to Galois’ approach.31
Epistemic Significance of Consolidating 
As far as my notion of cognitive control is concerned, I only need to examine one of the no doubt 
numerous epistemic functions of consolidating: to consolidate a set of facts is one way of setting 
the stage for locating and extracting. 
Let us first of all focus on organizing representations that consolidate a target range for 
the process and, in particular, on consolidation by a system of objects. We have already seen, and 
will see in more detail in Chapter 4, that having such a representation has two principal epistemic 
significances. 
                                                 
31 Among the mathematicians of the late 19th century, Richard Dedekind was the most forceful 
and certainly the most successful advocate of the intellectual power of consolidation. His theory 
of ideals, now part of the foundation of modern mathematics, is a superb example of a theory 
that essentially involves consolidation on multiple levels. Dedekind also pushed the idea of 
treating the various number systems as objects on their own right. See Avigad, “Methodology 
and metaphysics in the development of Dedekind’s theory of ideals” for a representative sample 
of quotes from Dedekind. The primary source here is Dedekind’s epoch-making 1877 treatise 
Sur la théorie des nombres entiers algébrique, translated by John Stillwell as Theory of 
Algebraic Integers. 
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First, this kind of consolidation allows one to erect an ontic scaffolding, one in which the 
locations are demarcated by objects in the consolidating system. This is exactly the sort of 
scaffolding Artin has for his process, while Abel does not: Abel does not have a representation 
that could effect consolidation by a system of objects. The set of permutations of the roots of 
p5(x) might be thought capable of playing this role, but in fact it is not: Abel does not have the 
group-theoretic concepts, such as group, subgroup or quotient group, that are required for the set 
of permutations to function as a consolidating system. Again, it was Galois’ pivotal contribution 
to introduce these concepts, at least in an embryonic form. The epistemic significance of an ontic 
scaffolding, in turn, is that it often facilitates locating the features crucial to the process. 
Second, this kind of consolidation makes it possible to recognize and articulate large-
scale patterns in one’s target range—essentially, facts about collections of facts. The epistemic 
significance of such large-scale patterns is that often they are just the facts directly relevant to 
answering the question driving the epistemic process; we will come back to this in the next 
section. The basic idea is, simply, that the features of the consolidating system of objects are, so 
to speak, sensitive to patterns among the facts that system consolidates. 
This is exactly what we see in Artin’s epistemic process. For example, that a given set of 
permutations is a subgroup of G(E/F) is in a very natural sense a pattern in the facts about the 
arithmetic relations of the permutations: the product of all permutations in that set is again a 
permutation in that set, and so on. Thus, Artin can articulate facts such as the group of 
automorphisms of the splitting field extension of p5(x) = 0 is not a solvable group. This fact 
cannot even in principle be articulated until multiple levels of consolidation have taken place. 
First, we need to have consolidated the rational expressions of the roots into the splitting field, 
and learned to recognize intermediate fields in it; second, we need to have consolidated the 
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automorphisms of this field into to the Galois group, and learned to recognize subgroups in it; 
third, we need to have consolidated cosets of normal subgroups into quotient groups. Abel is 
clearly not in a position even to begin articulating such large-scale patterns. 
I will not attempt to give a formal analysis of the notion of large-scale pattern, given that 
the intuitive notion exemplified here is quite sufficient for the purposes of this essay. Again, a  
large-scale pattern is essentially a fact about a set of facts or, as it is often more intuitive to think, 
a fact about the consolidating object or system of objects. 
(c) Locating an Answer 
Artin locates facts directly relevant to the solvability by radicals of p(x) = 0 in the system of 
intermediate fields of the splitting field extension E/F of p(x) and, later on, he locates further 
facts even more directly relevant in the system of normal subgroups of the Galois group G(E/F) 
of the splitting field extension. It is not clear that Abel locates anything in this sense; at any rate, 
it does not seem that he locates anything very well. 
To have located an answer to the question Q in a location L in one’s epistemic 
scaffolding is to know or have substantial justification for believing that the facts that are 
directly relevant to inferring an answer to Q are contained in L. 
Thus, to simplify just a little, to locate an answer is to come to know the location of the 
facts directly relevant to inferring that answer. I am here using “location” in the sense introduced 
in our discussion of scaffoldings—a location is a well-individuated range of epistemically 
possible facts. Hence, locating can be thought of as a more high-grade form of identifying a 
target range of facts for the process. 
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Directness of Relevance 
Artin infers the fact that p5(x) = 0 is not solvable by radicals from the fact that the Galois group 
G(E/F) of the splitting field extension E/F of p5(x) is not a solvable group. But finite groups can 
instantiate the property being solvable in arbitrarily many different ways; for there are arbitrarily 
many different normal series with abelian quotients a finite group can have. 
The intuition, then, is that the property of the Galois group of being solvable (or not) is 
more directly relevant to the solvability by radicals of the polynomial than the particular facts 
about the sequences of subgroups, and the latter are more directly relevant to the solvability of 
the polynomial than the particular facts about the arithmetic relations of the individual elements 
in the group. The thought is that what matters for the solvability are not the particular 
configurations of facts about the subgroups or individual elements, but rather the large-scale 
pattern that there is a normal series with abelian quotients in the group. For there are many 
different such configurations that would have the consequence that p(x) is solvable, but the 
Galois group of any solvable p(x) must have a normal sequence. 
These observations suggest that we try to capture the idea of directness of relevance with 
something like the following definition. If S is a sentence, let M(S) be the class of models of S.  
 
Let A, B and C be sentences. Then B is more directly relevant than A to C just in case  
 
M(A) ⊂ M(B) ⊆ M(C). 
 
That is, any model of A is a model of B and any model of B is a model of C, but there are 
models of B that are not models of A. 
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For example, suppose that A is the conjunction of some sentences specifying the relations 
of elements in some particular solvable group A, and suppose that B is the sentence G contains a 
normal sequence; finally, suppose that C is the sentence any polynomial whose Galois group is 
G is solvable by radicals. Certainly any model of A is a model of B, and any model of B is a 
model of C; finally, there are a great many models of B that are not models of A, namely all the 
various solvable groups other than A. Thus, according to the foregoing definition, B would be 
more directly relevant to C than A. Likewise, suppose that A is a conjunction of some sentences 
describing some particular normal sequence S in some particular group A, and suppose that B 
and C are as before. Again, any model of A is a model of B, and any model of B is a model of C, 
while there are again many models of B that are not models of C. Thus, B would again be more 
directly relevant to C than A. 
Now I think that the foregoing definition captures an aspect of our intuitions pertaining to 
directness of relevance. After all, the sentence B in each of the two cases may be thought of as 
articulating the ‘pattern’ directly relevant to the solvability by radicals of p(x), while in each case 
the sentence A is, intuitively, the ‘underlying’ configuration of particular facts that ‘instantiates’ 
this pattern. It is not surprising that it might be possible to capture this intuition about patterns in 
terms of generality—after all, a pattern is a kind of configuration of facts that may be instantiated 
in a number of different ways. Further, there is a healthy intuition to the effect that, in the 
situation of the definition, the sentence B is more directly relevant to C than A simply in virtue 
of the fact that, against a suitable background theory, C can be inferred both from B and A, but 
from B ‘more directly’ in the sense that B can be inferred from A but not vice versa. 
There is a problem, however: it is very difficult to see how this definition should be 
applied when comparing two sets of sentences and, in particular, two proofs. For suppose we 
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took A to be the conjunction of the sentences in one of the proofs and B the conjunction of the 
sentences in the other. In many cases, the two conjunctions will have the same models. This is a 
problem because there are situations in our case study where there is a strong intuition to the 
effect that Artin’s approach manages to identify the relevant pattern while Abel’s does not and 
yet, both proofs deal with the same structure from the start. 
This is the case, for example, with their respective proofs of Theorem 6. This theorem 
states that any rational function in five independent variables with 5 distinct values under the 
permutations of those variables can be expressed in a certain canonical form. I will consider the 
two proofs in detail in Chapter 4, but the essentials are as follows: 
Abel 
1. Let v1, ..., v5 ∈ E be the five distinct conjugates of v = v1, and let v1, ..., vη be the conjugates of 
v1 one obtains by applying all the permutations that fix x1; call the set of such permutations ℑ1. 
Then the expression 
v1 + v2 + ... + vη  (*) 
 
is clearly invariant under the permutations in ℑ1, since ℑ1 just permutes the v1, ..., vη among 
themselves. So we can apply Theorem 6a which says that any such expression is a polynomial 
in x1 with symmetric coefficients, which is what we needed; call this expression ϕ(x1). So we 
now want to show that v itself has this form. 
2. There are five possibilities: ϕ(x1) = v1, ϕ(x1) = v1 + v2, ϕ(x1) = v1 + v2 + v3, ϕ(x1) = v1 + v2 + v3 
+ v4, and ϕ(x1) = v1 + v2 + v3 + v4 + v5. Abel’s proof proceeds by considering each one in turn. In 
the first case, the result is, as such, established; in the third case, Abel shows that the expression 
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at hand yields the desired one; finally, Abel rules out cases 2, 4 and 5 by appealing to elementary 
combinatorial considerations. 
Artin 
1. The Galois group G(E/F) is the symmetric group S5 on five letters. 
2. The five inertia groups ℑμ of the five solutions are the only subgroups of S5 of index 5. 
3. By the Main Theorem of Galois Theory it follows at once that the 5 fields F(xμ) are the only 
extension fields of F of degree 5. 
4. It is (just about) immediate from the definitions that any element v in E with five distinct 
conjugates generates an extension field F(v) of F of degree 5. 
5. Thus, F(v) = F(xμ) for some xμ. Hence, any v with five distinct conjugates can be expressed as 
a polynomial in xμ with coefficients in F, as required. 
If we simply took as our A and B the conjunctions of the sentences in the two proofs, the 
only model of each one would be the splitting field extension of E/F of p5(x). 
The intuition here is that Abel’s proof does not manage to bring out the ‘pattern’ directly 
relevant to deriving the desired expression whereas Artin’s does: the pattern articulated by the 
statement that F(xμ) = F(v) for any of the roots xμ of p5(x). In contrast, it is intuitively clear that 
no one of the results reached in the five individual cases Abel considers in his proof amounts to 
an articulation of this ‘pattern’. Finally, at least in this case, it seems clear that the conjunction of 
those five statements does not amount to such an articulation, either. Yet, the conjunction of the 
five statements in Abel’s proof has the same set of models as Artin’s statement that F(xj) = F(v), 
namely just the splitting field extension E/F. Finally, there does not appear to be any natural way 
to pick a subset of sentences from either proof for comparison. 
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This suggests that our initial intuitions about directness of relevance are not adequately 
captured by the foregoing model-theoretic notion of ‘relative generality’ after all. For what has 
emerged is that directness of relevance seems to pertain to the nature of conceptual articulation 
of facts: the field-theoretic concepts allow Artin to articulate the fact that F(xμ) = F(v); Abel does 
not have these concepts in play and, hence, is not able to articulate this fact. So it seems likely 
that it is not possible to capture our intuitions about directness of relevance just by appealing to 
formal notions such as the notion of semantic consequence. 
In our case study, the facts more directly relevant to the central results in the two proofs 
are virtually always facts about the ‘large-scale’ organization of algebraic structures. As such, 
articulating such facts tends to require various concepts that are not required in the articulation of 
the facts less directly relevant, such as combinatorial relations of permutations or roots. We see 
this in the two the proofs of the unsolvability as a whole: Artin determines that a polynomial 
equation p(x) = 0 is solvable by radicals if and only if the Galois group G(E/F) of the splitting 
field extension E/F of p(x) is solvable; Artin does not have the concepts for articulating this 
property of groups nor, indeed, the concepts for discussing groups as such. 
 Thus, let us consider the following idea: a set of sentences B is directly relevant to C to 
the extent to which B involves the same level of conceptual articulation as C. For example, the 
sentence G contains a normal series with abelian quotients is more directly relevant to p(x) is 
solvable by radicals than a conjunction of sentences articulating individual facts about relations 
of elements in G. The former is articulated at the same ‘level’ as p(x) is solvable by radicals 
whereas the latter is articulated at a ‘lower’ level. 
The first thing to sort out here is what sense we might be able to make of the idea of 
levels of conceptual articulation. We have seen in our examples that the sentences that should 
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count as being at a ‘lower’ level are ones articulated in terms of concepts pertaining to relations 
of individual elements in various algebraic systems, while the sentences at a ‘higher’ level are 
ones the articulation of which requires concepts that are defined in terms of the ‘lower’ level 
concepts. For example, the conditions of application of the concept group are articulated in terms 
concepts that pertaining to relations of individual elements in some system of objects. 
I propose to capture this idea as follows. Recall my suggestion in Section 3.4 that a 
mathematical concept is a certain kind of constellation of norms that governs the propriety of 
producing symbolic artifacts. Thus, if α is a concept, let Γ(α) be the set of norms that constitutes 
this concept. I will say that a concept β is at a higher level relative to α just in case the set of 
norms that constitutes α is a proper subset of the norms that constitutes β, Γ(α) ⊂ Γ(β). Two 
concepts are comparable only if either Γ(α) ⊆ Γ(β) or Γ(β) ⊆ Γ(α). 
For example, the concept group is at a higher level relative to the concepts set, element, 
composition of elements, equality, and so on. This definition has the obvious consequence that if 
we have an explicit definition of a concept α, then α is at a higher level relative to all the concept 
employed in its definition. As I emphasized in Section 3.4, however, we can rarely give a 
complete, fully explicit definition of a concept: the sets of norms that constitute even the simplest 
mathematical concepts are incredibly complex, and the explicit definitions should be seen as 
summaries of the concepts themselves. 
There are two obvious ways to extend this notion to sentences. Let S be a sentence, and 
let C(S) be the set of concepts required to articulate S. We can define Γ(S) to be the union of the 
sets Γ(σ), where σ ranges over all of C(S). Thus, the simple way of extending the notion of 
levels would be to say that a sentence B is at a higher level than A just in case Γ(A) ⊂ Γ(B). The 
more exacting way would be to say that B is at a higher level than A just in case  
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(a) for any concept β required to articulate B, either there is some concept α 
required to articulate A such that Γ(α) ⊆ Γ(β) or else β is not comparable with any α; and 
(b) for some β and α, Γ(α) ⊂ Γ(β). 
I think that the latter is more faithful to the intuitions engendered by our case study, and so it is 
the one I shall adopt for now; I will write A < B to denote that B is at a higher level than A. 
Finally, there is an obvious way to extend this notion to sets of sentences. We will say 
that {A} is at a higher level relative to {B} just in case 
(a) for every B in {B}, either there is some A in {A} such that A ≤ B or else 
B is not comparable with any A; and 
(b) for some A and B, A < B. 
This proposal is, no doubt, very rough. I would like to think, however, that it is rough in 
the right sort of way: there is a number of immediately visible avenues for refining it, perhaps 
into a number of different proposals, ones that might be able to capture different aspects of our 
intuitions about directness of relevance. For example, one refinement of my rudimentary notion 
might involve requiring that β is at a higher level relative to α just in case the norms in β that 
specify the circumstances of application of β contain the ones in α that specify the circumstances 
of application of α. But this is not the place to explore these epistemic options. 
We can now apply this notion in an obvious fashion to analyze the notion of directness of 
relevance. Let Γ(A) denote the set of concepts required to articulate a set of sentences A, and let 
M(A) denote the class of models of A. 
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 Let {A}, {B} and {C} be sets of sentences. Then {B} is more directly relevant  
than {A} to {C} just in case 
 (a) M(A) ⊆ M(B) (model-theoretic generality); 
(b) Γ(A) < Γ(B) (conceptual generality); and, 
(c) M(B) ⊆ M(C) (inferential relevance). 
 
The motivation for condition (b) is as follows. We might expect that the condition should be  
 
Γ(A) < Γ(B)  ≤ Γ(C). 
 
This condition has an obvious intuitive appeal. However, there are situations in our case study in 
which the intuitively more directly relevant set of sentences {B} overshoots the set {C} in its 
level of conceptual articulation. We saw this in considering Theorem 6 above: the statement of 
the theorem is articulated at a lower level than the crucial sentences in Artin’s proof of that 
theorem. It seems to me that the intuitions here are stable and strong enough to warrant allowing 
overshooting of this type. Indeed, parts (a) and (b) can be seen as capturing two distinct senses in 
which a set of sentences {B} is directly relevant to {C}, both constrained by part (c): on the one 
hand, (a) {B} is as model-theoretically general as possible while (c) still allowing us to infer 
{C}; on the other hand, (b) {B} is as conceptually general as possible while (c) still allowing us 
to infer {C}. Thus, (a) and (b) can be seen as complementary ways of capturing the idea with 
which we began this section: a fact is directly relevant to the extent it isolates what really matters 
for the conclusion and, in so doing, abstracts away from the irrelevant details. 
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It is clear that we can now discriminate the two proofs of Theorem 6. For it is easy to see 
that the concepts Artin uses to articulate sentences such as the crucial F(xμ) = F(v) are at a higher 
level than the sentences Abel uses to articulate the various combinatorial facts, and it seems clear 
that each sentence in Artin’s proof is either at a higher level than some (usually many) sentences 
in Abel’s proof or else, is not comparable. 
Comments 
(1) Strictly speaking, I only endorse a relative notion of directness of relevance. Yet, 
sometimes it is intuitively suggestive to say that {B} is directly relevant to {C} provided that 
M(B) = M(C) and Γ(B) = Γ(C). For when this happens, no set can be more directly relevant to 
{C} than {B}. 
(2) We have spoken of relative level of conceptual articulation of sentences. But recall 
now that I am taking it that the articulation of facts can be as fine-grained as our concepts allow. 
Thus, it is clear that the foregoing definitions can be translated into definitions for facts. 
(3) My notion of directness of relevance is decidedly non-formal. For as I emphasized in 
Section 3.5, it is not a formal issue as to which norms should be considered to belong to a given 
concept. Thus, while my notion of directness has a vaguely formalistic casting, the actual 
assessments of relative directness of relevance will depend on potentially complicated non-
formal considerations. For example, such assessments will typically be sensitive to the overall 
intellectual context in which the sentences at issue are employed. It is clear that there is much 
work to be done here. 
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(d) Extracting Facts 
Artin shows that a polynomial equation p(x) = 0 is solvable by radicals if and only if the splitting 
field extension E/F of p(x) is contained in a radical extension. And not only does he prove this 
fact; given his conceptual resources, he can articulate it in the fully ‘direct’ and ‘explicit’ way we 
have done here. Given that Abel does not have the requisite field-theoretic concepts, he cannot 
articulate this fact in this kind of way. Yet, there is a very real sense in which he is responsive to 
it in his reasoning. For example, Theorem 2 can be understood as ‘implicitly’ saying that if a 
polynomial equation is solvable by radicals, then (given the assumptions noted above) not only is 
the splitting field extension contained in a radical extension, but it is itself a radical extension. 
Indeed, all the results at Stage 2 in Abel’s approach are ‘indirectly’ or ‘implicitly’ facts about the 
organization of the system of intermediate fields of the splitting field extension E/F. 
 I propose that we consider the following notion. 
To have extracted a fact α is to know that α obtains and to have articulated α in such a 
way that one is able to directly respond to α in one’s reasoning aimed at answering the question 
Q driving one’s epistemic process. 
Much as with locating, my definition of extracting has a trivial component and a tricky 
component. On the one hand, to extract a fact α is to acquire the piece of knowledge that α is the 
case; in mathematics, this amounts to proving α. On the other hand, to extract α is to articulate α 
in a particular kind of way—in a way that allows one to directly respond to α in the 
mathematical context at hand. 
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Responding Directly and Responding Indirectly 
While Abel is in a sense responding to high-level features of the splitting field extension, such as 
the fact that it is generated by the roots of the polynomial, he is not responding to those features 
directly. He is responding to them through features of individual elements in that extension, 
namely the rational functions of the roots, and of course, the number of distinct values such 
functions take under the permutations of the roots. 
Thus, we want a definition of what it is to “respond” to a mathematical fact and a stable 
distinction between responding “directly” and “indirectly.” Again, we must keep firmly in mind 
that we are trying to capture epistemically significant differences between what Abel and Artin 
accomplish in their respective proofs: we want to be able to say that Artin does, while Abel does 
not, manage to extract the features of the set of permutations of the roots that are directly 
relevant to the solvability by radicals of p5(x). 
First, minimally, responsiveness has to involve responding differentially: we will react 
differently to the presence or absence of that feature, once recognized. 
Second, I will take it that the responses at issue are correct or incorrect in view of the 
constitutive norms of the conceptual setting in which one is operating; so I am only considering 
responses governed by determinate norms. 
Third, there is no loss of generality in focusing on responsiveness to facts; for it is clear 
that responsiveness to objects or properties in any case means responsiveness to the way in 
which objects instantiate properties—that is, facts. 
Fourth, however, it seems clear that in the practice of pure mathematics, the items 
creatures like us can ‘directly’ respond to are constellations of symbolic artifacts. Thus, it seems 
natural and innocuous to say that to be responsive to a mathematical fact is to be responsive to 
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some constellation of symbolic artifacts that represents that fact. So I will take it that in order to 
be able to be respond to a mathematical fact, one must have the conceptual resources to represent 
that fact—and I mean that fact and not some fact merely logically equivalent with it; again, I am 
insisting on the fine-grained individuation of contents and facts (see Section 3.4). 
In view of these considerations, it seems to me that a natural way to characterize 
responses to mathematical facts within the overall structure of my story is through the notion of 
manipulating conceptually constituted representations in the following sense: 
To manipulate a set S of conceptually constituted representations is to apply some 
concept, method or rule to the representations in S so as to justify producing a representation r 
not contained in S. 
For example, to apply a valid rule of inference to a set of sentences so as to derive a new 
sentence is a paradigmatic case of manipulating representations. In the next section we will turn 
to considering the various modes of manipulating representations that make it possible to reach 
the various internal aims of mathematical epistemic processes. There I will defend the foregoing 
definition of manipulating. But for now taking this definition as established and justified, let us 
consider the following two applications: 
To directly respond to a fact α is to manipulate a set S of conceptually constituted 
representations containing a sentence p representing α so as to (1) produce a representation r 
not contained in S such that (2) without p, the representation r could not be correctly produced 
from the set S. 
To indirectly respond to a fact α is to manipulate a set S of conceptually constituted 
representations such that (1) S does not contain a representation of α and (2) S has a sentence p 
representing α as a logical consequence. 
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Given these definitions, to have extracted a fact α is to know that α obtains and to have a 
representation of α one can manipulate in pursuing the answer to one’s question. This should 
seem like a welcome convergence: extracting is an aim of manipulating representations which, 
once achieved, facilitates further representational manipulation. And indeed: part of what it is to 
have cognitive control over an epistemic process is to be able to put oneself in a position to push 
that process further towards completion. 
Let us first consider two simple illustrations. 
(a) Let the set S be {p, p → q}; given modus ponens, one can correctly infer q from S, 
but not from S \ {p} = {p → q}. Thus, making this inference is a case of manipulating 
representations and in particular, a case of directly responding to p. 
(b) If N is a normal subgroup of a group G, I know that I can correctly form the quotient 
group G/N; if N is not normal, I know that this construction is not available. Thus, I am in my 
reasoning differentially responsive to the presence or absence of a certain property, in a way that 
respects certain norms in abstract group theory. In particular, when I form the quotient G/N, I am 
directly responding to the property that N is normal in G. 
But suppose now that I consider a representation of some particular group and carry out 
symbolic computations that show that this group splits up into a number of sets disjoint from a 
certain subset N and from one another (while noting certain features of these sets we need not 
make explicit here). In so doing, I am indirectly responding to the fact that these sets are the 
cosets of the subgroup N. There are further computations I can carry out on the elements 
belonging to these sets (which we again need not make explicit here) that would amount to 
indirectly responding to the fact that N is normal in G. As it happens, this is exactly what Galois 
did in his early investigations on solvability. 
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These definitions allow us to articulate the difference we see between Abel and Artin. 
Abel examines many sets of facts that would have as a logical consequence some fact about the 
structure of the splitting field extension; again, Theorem 2 may serve as an example. What he is 
directly responsive to therein, however, are various combinatorial facts about rational functions 
of the five roots of p5(x). 
Comments 
(1) The definitions make it clear that an act of manipulating cannot count both as directly 
and as indirectly responding to α. 
(2) We need to distinguish articulating a fact from directly responding to that fact. It 
seems obviously right that being able to articulate a fact is a necessary condition for being able to 
directly respond to that fact; clearly my definition has this consequence. However, it is not 
sufficient. For example, there is the following minimal sense in which someone might have the 
concepts group and subgroup: one knows the definitions but no facts, general or particular, about 
groups. In such an epistemic predicament, one cannot actually inferentially engage any general 
group theoretic statements except by explicitly appealing to the definitions. Thus, even though 
one is able to articulate, say, the fact that the order of a subgroup divides the order of the ambient 
group, one cannot respond to it directly—one can only engage it through the definitions. 
This means, in particular, that even if one is able to articulate some fact directly relevant 
to answering the question driving one’s epistemic process, one need not thereby be able to 
directly respond to that fact in a way that would allow one to pursue the aim. This occasions a 
note of caution about my definition of extracting: even if one has extracted a fact, so that she can 
respond to it directly, it is typically a further challenge to find the particular ways of utilizing that 
fact in the pursuit of one’s overall epistemic aim. This is, I think, as it should be: it does not seem 
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in the least realistic to think that there is some sort of general analysis to be given about the 
innumerable ways in which we finally manage to reach the aims we want to reach in our 
mathematical reasoning. The notion of cognitive control is meant to identify broad patterns of 
epistemic mastery that put us in a position to reach such aims, not the particular ways in which 
we reach them. 
(e) Manipulating Representations 
Having representations of facts in or about the target range is, in and of itself, of no use in trying 
to answer the question driving the epistemic process: we need to be able to do something with 
those representations and typically doing something with them amounts to doing something to 
them. This, then, is what I am calling manipulating: all the various things one can do, correctly 
or incorrectly, to a conceptually constituted representation in the setting in which one is 
operating. 
I will only consider acts of manipulating that are correct or incorrect according to the 
norms of the ambient conceptual setting. Thus, again, 
To manipulate a set S of conceptually constituted representations is to apply some 
concept, method or rule to the representations in S so as to justify producing a representation r 
not contained in S. 
For example, to apply a valid rule of inference to a set of sentences so as to justify 
writing down a further sentence is to manipulate those sentences; to carry out a numerical 
computation in accordance with the rules governing base 10 notation is to manipulate the given 
numerals; to add a line segment to a geometric diagram in accordance with the norms 
constitutive of the Euclidean geometric practice is to manipulate that diagram. In contrast, to use 
a yellow crayon to fill in a circle in a diagram so as to produce a drawing of the sun is not an act 
 137 
of manipulating in the Euclidean practice because to do so is neither correct nor incorrect 
according to the norms of that practice. 
Devices for and Modes of Manipulating 
An ordinary mathematical proof, such as the proofs of Abel and Artin we have presented, can be 
thought of as a sequence of instructions: if you make these inferential moves, filling in some 
gaps here and there, you will have justified asserting the theorem. Thus, the epistemic process of 
reading a proof consists of taking in such a sequence of instructions and making the inferential 
moves indicated; the cognitive agent reading the proof may or may not actually make all the 
moves she is instructed to make, depending on how attentive and conscientious she is. 
But this point of view is not compulsory. We could with equal justification view a proof 
as a sequence of instructions for manipulating conceptually constituted representations. If a 
proof is viewed merely as a sequence of instructions as to which valid inferences one should 
make at a given juncture, we are not going to see much by way of epistemically interesting 
patterns in that proof. If, on the other hand, we allow the initially more generic point of view 
where the steps in a proof are viewed as instructions for manipulating representations, we can 
begin to see patterns other than ones of valid inference. 
For example, Artin repeatedly considers the fixed field of some given group; he considers 
the minimal polynomial of an element in an extension; he considers the effect of the Galois group 
on an element in an extension. Abel reduces his considerations of the radicals to the prime-order 
case; in his computations, he groups terms of the same degree together; he considers the number 
of distinct values an expression can take under the permutations of the variables. These are all 
stable and recurring modes of manipulating conceptually constituted representations some of 
which are sentential while others, such as the expressions for the radicals, are non-sentential. 
 138 
This point of view is liberating: it provides us a new avenue for theorizing about the 
relative epistemic power of different approaches. For it is prima facie plausible that the range of 
ways of manipulating representations available in an approach is going to have a direct bearing 
on the character of cognitive control available in that approach. 
I will identify a number of recurring modes of manipulating representations and a number 
of devices for manipulating that make those modes available. From the point of view of my 
analysis of cognitive control, the crucial point here is that different devices and modes tend to 
have different epistemic roles in the mathematical practice overall. In particular, some modes of 
manipulating may be particularly well or ill suited for effecting consolidating, others locating, 
yet others extracting. Hence, an obvious but analytically fruitful thought emerges: the character 
and extent of cognitive control in principle available in a conceptual setting depends, at least in 
part, on the availability of devices and modes that are well-suited for pursuing each one of these 
three internal aims. In Chapter 4, I will try to make it visible that in Artin’s approach, we find 
ourselves equipped with robust ranges of devices and modes well-suited to pursuing each of the 
three internal aims, while in Abel’s approach, we do not. It is already clear that the lack of 
devices for consolidating is particularly acute in Abel, and this has the consequence that it is 
difficult to manufacture effective devices for pursuing locating and extracting, either. A proper 
examination of these issues would require much more space than I am allowed here, however.32
                                                 
32 The idea that we find in our mathematical practice devices of and modes for manipulating 
representations resembles, at least superficially, the idea explored by Marquis in his “Abstract 
Mathematical Tools and Machines for Mathematics”. 
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3.6.6 Epistemic Guidance 
(a) Characterization of Guidance 
Recall the third component of our characterization of cognitive control: 
The agent’s epistemic scaffolding, along with her overall epistemic resources, provides 
her epistemic guidance for examining the target range. 
The basic challenge facing a cognitive agent at each stage in her epistemic process is to 
make a rational decision as to what to do next. Another way of putting this is that the agent is 
faced with the challenge of determining what she should do next—determining what reason 
requires. The notion of epistemic guidance is meant to capture the intuition that when one has 
‘control’ over a process, one is at each stage able to make such a determination. 
In order to articulate the notion of epistemic guidance, I shall need the notion of space of 
epistemic options. An epistemic option at a given stage in an epistemic process is a possible way 
of correctly proceeding at that stage; the epistemic process itself consists of all the epistemic 
options the agent actually takes. In a mathematical epistemic process, a typical epistemic option 
is a possible act of correctly manipulating a conceptually constituted representation in the sense 
discussed above—applying a concept, a method, or a rule. The space of epistemic options is, in 
the first instance, the totality of all of them. 
The space of epistemic options at a given stage in an epistemic process arises from the 
interaction of the representations the agent has chosen to consider and the norms that govern the 
ways in which one could correctly manipulate those representations. This is a direct consequence 
of my conception of mathematical concepts as sets of norms, and the (just about tautologous) 
idea that mathematical methods and rules are norm-governed. Thus, once an agent working in a 
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particular conceptual setting has adopted a determinate set of representations and a determinate 
epistemic goal, it is an agent-independent fact what her space of epistemic options is. For what 
her options are is ultimately determined by the norms constitutive of that setting. 
For a simple but surprisingly representative example, let us consider a system of natural 
deduction of the kind one might learn in an introductory course on formal logic. The typical 
exercise involves writing down a derivation from a given set of premises to a given conclusion 
by using the rules of inference of that system. Writing down a derivation is obviously an 
example of a mathematical epistemic process in my sense. At each stage in this process, the 
student has available to her a determinate set of representations, namely the sentences so far 
derived, and a determinate set of rules she could correctly apply at that stage, namely the rules of 
inference that apply to those sentences. The space of epistemic options consists of all the various 
acts of writing down a new line in the derivation where that line is justified by using some rule of 
inference in the system. This space is infinite: for given any sentence p, disjunction introduction 
allows one to write down p ∨ q for any q, which already amounts to infinitely many potential 
candidates. 
Now the point of the notion of space of epistemic options is that one’s ability to make a 
rational decision as to how to proceed at a given juncture in the process is largely a function of 
the way in which one can represent the space of epistemic options and, more specifically, what 
one knows about that space. As is clear already from our simple example, an agent need not be 
able to represent her space options or, at any rate, she need not be able to represent all of it, in a 
way that allows her actually to pursue any of those options. So the student might know the rules 
(by rote, say) but not be able to apply them to the given sentences; there is a sense in which she 
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knows what the options are, but she is not able to represent them in a way that allows her to 
pursue them. 
More systematically, we may consider the following aspects of the ‘character’ of one’s 
representation of the space of epistemic options: 
(1) Given one’s overall epistemic resources, and given one’s representation of the space 
of epistemic options, one may be more or less able to pursue individual epistemic options. We 
already saw this in the foregoing example. More generally, it is common in mathematics that one 
in some sense knows what the options are, but does not have the manipulational ability to pursue 
any one of them as represented. I take it to be clear that in order to capture the intuition that one 
is in ‘control’ of the epistemic process at a given stage, we must require that one is in fact able to 
proceed somehow or other and, hence, can represent at least some of the possible ways of 
proceeding in a way that allows one actually to pursue them. 
(2) One’s representation of the space of epistemic options may be more or less complete 
in the sense that it fails to include some of the options in fact available. Having a representation 
of the various correct ways of proceeding that is as complete as possible is clearly essential to 
being able to identify the most favorable one. Thus, reason requires that one try to acquire a 
representation that is as complete as possible. 
(3) One’s representation of the space of epistemic options may include items that are not 
in fact correct ways of proceeding. This is just a particular kind of way in which one can make a 
mistake in the course of pursuing one’s epistemic aim. Since this kind of mistake is of little 
analytical interest, I will ignore it in what follows. 
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(4) One’s representation of the space of epistemic options may or may not allow one to 
rationally assess the probabilities of the various options’ leading to an answer to the question 
driving that stage in the epistemic process. The ability to assign (subjective) probabilities in a 
rational fashion to the options is clearly a fundamental aspect of being able to make a rational 
decision as to how to proceed. A minimal requirement would be that one is able to assign 
probabilities in a way that respects the probability calculus. 
(5) One’s representation of the space of epistemic options may be more or less 
surveyable in the sense that it may or may not provide a structured overview of the range of 
options and their relationships. I will consider examples presently. 
I will say that one has epistemic guidance at a given stage in an epistemic process to the 
extent one has a representation of the space of epistemic options at that stage which, along with 
one’s overall epistemic resources, gets a high score on each of the five aspects itemized above. 
Thus, one would have perfect guidance if one’s representation of the space of options is 
complete, contains no false options and is highly surveyable; and, given one’s resources, one can 
pursue any one of the options and can assign any one of them a probability of leading to success 
at that stage in the process. 
Comments 
(1) Having epistemic guidance is very much a matter of degree. It seems to me that this is 
exactly what we want: on the one hand, it fits what we will see in our case study; on the other 
hand, one’s ability to make a rational decision as to how to proceed is surely a matter of degree. 
(2) Having guidance is a multi-dimensional affair. Again, this seems to me to be what we 
want both in view of our case study as well as speaking abstractly about one’s ability to make 
rational decisions. I have not attempted, and think it would be futile to attempt, some sort of 
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system of weighting the different aspects of guidance against one another. For which aspect is 
the more important one will always depend on the particular epistemic challenges one is facing 
at a given stage in the process. I have arranged the five aspects in an order of something like 
dominance: one wants a representation that is highly surveyable, but not at the cost of having 
one that allows one to assess the relative merits of the options; but not at the cost of having one 
that is free of mistakes; but not at the cost of having one that is complete; but not at the cost of 
having that allows one actually to pursue the options. Ultimately, however, it is my inclination to 
think that there isn’t much to be said about the order of these aspects in the abstract. 
(3) I want to emphasize that the foregoing list of five aspects of guidance is meant to be 
open-ended. I make no claim to having exhaustively enumerated what might be included under 
the notion of guidance—that is, what might go into the ability to make a rational decision as to 
how to proceed at a given stage in one’s epistemic process. It does seem to me, however, that the 
five items I have selected to include are among the more important ones. 
(4) To have guidance is to be able to determine what one should rationally do at a given 
stage in one’s epistemic process. This idea might seem to be subject to the following 
trivialization: what one should do is relative to what one knows. For example, if one is aware of 
only one epistemic option, then it is rational to pursue that option. Hence, it might seem that the 
character of one’s representation of the space of epistemic options is simply irrelevant to the 
question of the rationality of one’s decision. But this attempted trivialization turns on an overtly 
narrow conception rationality. It is part of the very idea of making a rational decision that one 
has done one’s best to determine what the range of available courses of action is and one’s best 
to assess the relative merits of those courses of action. One is simply not in a position to make a 
fully rational decision regarding how to proceed until one has done one’s best to acquire a 
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representation of the space of epistemic options that scores as high as possible on the five 
dimensions of guidance. 
(5) There are two issues pertaining to one’s ability to proceed at a given stage in an 
epistemic process. On the one hand, there is the character of one’s representation of the space of 
epistemic options, what I have called guidance. On the other hand, there is the space of epistemic 
options itself. Depending on the epistemic resources available at a given stage in the process, 
there may be dramatic differences in the number of epistemic options in principle available to be 
pursued, and the character of what would be involved in pursuing those options. We see this very 
concretely in the contrast between Abel and Artin. While Abel’s space of options typically 
consist of pursuing some sequence of symbolic computations, Artin’s space of options involves 
in addition various modes of reasoning about the content of concepts such as subgroup and field 
extension. 
Obviously the space of available ways of proceeding is of great interest from the point of 
view of analyzing the epistemic accomplishments of modern mathematics. The question would 
be, what are the relevant epistemic notions for characterizing differences between epistemic 
options themselves. First of all, I take it to be clear that when we want to make comparative 
evaluations of epistemic options, what we are really interested in comparing are the epistemic 
processes that ensue from taking those options. Accordingly, my suggestion is that there is no 
further heavy lifting to be done here: we are already in the business of analyzing differences 
between epistemic processes. Thus, as from the outset, there are two principal dimensions of 
comparison: an epistemic option may lead to an epistemic process that is more or less efficient in 
answering the question at which it is aimed, and an epistemic option may lead to a process over 
which one enjoys more or less cognitive control. Thus, again setting the issue of efficiency aside, 
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my suggestion is that no further notions need be introduced to analyze the differences between 
the spaces of epistemic options themselves. 
(6) I want to ensure that we have the nature of our enterprise firmly in focus. The notion 
of cognitive control and the notion of guidance in particular are meant to identify a recurring 
pattern in our epistemic activity. As such, the articulation of these notions must come to a stop at 
some appropriate level of generality before we start hitting the various particular things 
mathematicians actually do in their epistemic activity. Now it seems to me that the five aspects 
of epistemic guidance identified above belong to that level. For there is no end to the potential 
diversity of what might be involved in making a rational decision as to which epistemic option to 
pursue, especially if we mean to include in the purview of cognitive control not only the pursuit 
of mathematics but also the pursuit of empirical science. Thus, the five aspects of guidance must 
necessarily be rather general in order to stand a chance of capturing patterns in that diversity. 
So two remarks. First, as I will presently argue in the context of our case study, there is 
much that can be done by way of identifying and categorizing the types of devices and strategies 
used to acquire the various aspects of guidance in mathematics. Indeed, I see effecting such 
identification and characterization as the principal analytical challenges in the way to coming to 
a nuanced philosophical appreciation of the epistemic character of theoretical progress in 
mathematics. 
Second, my analysis of guidance is not structurally different from the analyses of 
knowledge as justified true belief or explanation as a description of a causal mechanism. For 
there is no end to the potential diversity of what is involved in acquiring justification for one’s 
beliefs or what is involved in furnishing descriptions of causal mechanisms in the structure of the 
physical universe. 
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In sum, the real concern is whether the analysis of the range of accomplishments I am 
looking to demarcate with the notions of cognitive control and guidance has stabilized at the 
right level of generality: at a level where the recurring pattern is clearly in view, and in a way 
that allows us to home in on the particular ways in which that pattern is instantiated in particular 
epistemic processes. Much of the point of the analysis of our case study is to argue that this is 
indeed so. 
(7) I conclude our general discussion of guidance with a brief remark about what I 
consider to be the most analytically fruitful of the five aspects of guidance, the extent to which 
one’s representation renders the space of options surveyable. 
The idea is that a representation is surveyable to the extent it allows us to discern the 
epistemically relevant relations of the epistemic options. It should be clear that epistemic options 
in mathematics can be related in a great number of different ways. Perhaps the most fundamental 
type here are the various relations of dependence and independence of epistemic options. For 
example, it is common that one possible way of proceeding is a special case of some more 
general or more comprehensive approach. Thus, to pursue an option can be, as such, to pursue a 
number of options. It is not possible to give a systematic discussion of these issues here, but we 
will see a number of examples in our case study. We will see, for example, that 
parametrizations, numerical or otherwise, are key devices in making available more surveyable 
representations of ranges of options. 
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(b) Aim, Location and Manipulation Guidance 
We may distinguish three basic types of decisions one has to make regarding how one should 
proceed at a given stage in an epistemic process: which piece of knowledge one should pursue at 
that stage, which particular range of facts one should examine in order to pursue that piece of 
knowledge, and which devices and modes of manipulating one should deploy in examining it. 
Corresponding to these three basic types of decisions to be made, I recommend that we 
distinguish three types of epistemic guidance: aim, location and manipulation guidance. I will 
need to show, of course, that the foregoing five aspects of guidance are intelligible with respect 
to these particular types of decisions. 
The principal motivation for introducing these three varieties of guidance is that they 
allow us to get a tighter grip on the details of our case study than the general notion alone and, 
thereby, they allow us to give a more structured analysis of the differences between the two 
approaches to solvability. Further, distinguishing the three varieties affords us yet another way of 
implementing the intuition that when one has ‘control’ over the process, one can start with a 
panoptic overview and home in: when one enjoys guidance of all three kinds at a given context, 
one can start with a large-scale representation of the space of epistemic options for proceeding 
and home in towards the particular options. 
(a) Aim guidance. At a given stage in the process, there is usually a more or less well-
defined range of immediate epistemic aims one might adopt: aims which, if reached, would 
ultimately allow one to reach the aim driving the process overall. The notion of correctness of a 
subsidiary aim is just this: the result one would establish in reaching that aim could in fact be 
employed to pursue the aim driving the process. Thus, the space of correct subsidiary aims is 
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dictated by the overall aim of the epistemic process on the one hand, and the epistemic resources 
available at that stage, centrally including the results so far established. 
One has aim guidance at a given stage in an epistemic process provided that one has a 
representation of the range of correct aims one might adopt at that stage, a representation that 
has the five characteristics above. 
There is no difficulty in applying the five aspects of guidance to one’s grip on the range 
of potential aims one might adopt. First, clearly we can make sense of the idea that one may or 
may not be able to pursue an aim as represented; second, we can make sense of the idea that 
one’s representation of the range of aims may be more or less complete and may contain aims 
that would not in fact allow one to reach the final aim of the process; certainly it seems possible 
and right to say that when one is in control of a process, one can rationally assess the relative 
likelihood of a subsidiary aim’s leading to an answer to the question driving the process as a 
whole; indeed, this is just the sort of assessment mathematicians routinely make; finally, the 
range of aims may be represented in a way that is more or less surveyable. Of particular 
importance here would be having a clear view of the dependence or independence of the various 
aims one might adopt. 
We will see that an appropriately trained mathematician enjoys reasonably good aim 
guidance throughout the sequence of main stages in the proofs of Abel and Artin. Differences 
will begin to emerge as we consider the character of aim guidance enjoyed in the course of 
proving some of the particular results in their approaches. I will argue that Artin’s approach 
tends to afford better aim guidance when the epistemic processes are analyzed ‘locally’ in the 
sense introduced in Section 3.5. 
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What I am calling aim guidance is one of the principal items philosophically minded 
mathematicians like to draw attention to when they are out to identify epistemically crucial 
features of their trade. In the course of searching for a proof of a putative theorem we typically 
seek to identify a small number of subsidiary propositions and lemmas, which, if established, 
would (probably) allow us to establish the theorem. 
This intellectual strategy can be illustrated by using our example of searching for a 
derivation within the confines of a system of natural deduction. One effective way of acquiring 
aim guidance is to backtrack: one starts with the desired conclusion and looks for a sentence and 
a rule of inference that would allow one to derive the conclusion from that sentence and the 
premises one has. Having found such a sentence, one can repeat the procedure; in this way, one 
generates a sequence of sentences any one of which could be taken as a subsidiary aim in the 
epistemic process overall. This strategy tends to be quite effective especially when even the 
shortest possible derivation is lengthy. 
Something similar happens in Euclidean geometry when one analyzes a geometric 
construction problem. In such an analysis, the problem is diagrammatically represented as 
solved; again backtracking from the solution, one proceeds to identify a sequence of subsidiary 
construction stages, thereby establishing a sequence of subsidiary aims. While this process does 
not always provide good aim guidance, it can be very useful.33
(b) Location guidance. At any given stage in an epistemic process, there is usually a well-
defined range of locations one might choose to examine in order to pursue the aim one has 
chosen for that stage. A location is a correct location to examine just in case, given one’s overall 
                                                 
33 See Manders, “The Euclidean Diagram” (unpublished). 
 
 150 
epistemic resources, knowing the actual facts in that location makes it possible to infer a direct 
answer to one’s question. 
Thus, we have the obvious definition: 
One has location guidance at a given stage in an epistemic process provided that one 
has a representation of the range of correct locations one might examine at that stage, a 
representation that has the five characteristics discussed above. 
We will see that an appropriately trained mathematician will enjoy quite excellent 
location guidance throughout the process of reading Artin’s proof. This is because, as we have 
seen, Artin’s set of epistemic resources contains all the group and field theoretic concepts 
required to create a scaffolding with a robust range of locations pertinent to the solvability of 
polynomials by radicals. The verdict is much more ambivalent in Abel’s case, but we will see 
that he does actually enjoy pretty good location guidance towards the end of his proof; for as we 
will see, his scaffolding is not half bad, even if it takes him most of the proof to build it. Even if 
Abel arguably never manages to locate and extract any features very directly relevant to 
solvability by radicals, there is a sense in which his location guidance at the local level in the 
proof, relative to the local aims of the various subprocesses, is not bad at all. 
Comments 
(1) It is clear that the issue of location guidance cannot arise until one has chosen some 
particular aim for the stage; likewise, as will become evident presently, the issue of manipulation 
guidance cannot arise until one has chosen some particular location to examine. Thus, there is a 
sense in which the three varieties of guidance constitute an embedded sequence of epistemic 
mastery: they gradually take us closer to being able to make a rational choice for a specific 
device and mode for proceeding. 
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(2) Location guidance is in some sense the prototype for the general notion of guidance. 
It is the type of guidance most directly derived from the epistemic scaffolding: after all, the 
epistemic options in location guidance correspond to some subset of all the locations one has 
managed to demarcate in one’s scaffolding. As such, location guidance occupies a central role in 
the overall scheme of cognitive control. It is also the type of guidance that perhaps most directly 
captures the intuition that in order to have ‘control’ over an epistemic process, one must have a 
structured and surveyable overview of the terrain of facts one is investigating. 
(c) Manipulation Guidance. We identified three internal aims in mathematical epistemic 
processes: consolidating ranges of facts, locating facts that are directly relevant to answering the 
question, and extracting such facts. When one has cognitive control over the epistemic process, 
one is able to reach these aims; accordingly, it would be natural to think that when one has 
cognitive control, one enjoys epistemic guidance as to how to pursue these three aims. These 
aims are pursued by employing the various devices and modes of manipulating representations. 
This suggests that in addition to aim and location guidance, we might consider manipulation 
guidance. 
At any given stage in an epistemic process, there is usually a well-defined range of modes 
of manipulating one might choose to apply to the representations available at that stage. A mode 
of manipulating is correct if it is in fact applicable at that stage and if it is in fact possible to 
reach one’s manipulational aim in part by employing that mode. 
One has manipulation guidance at a given stage in an epistemic process provided that 
one has a representation of the range of correct modes of manipulating one might employ to 
pursue one’s current manipulational aim, a representation that has the five characteristics 
discussed above. 
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Typically manipulation guidance is enjoyed in virtue of having a comprehensive 
overview of the ‘standard’ devices and modes of manipulating available in the conceptual 
setting, and having some way to assess which of those devices and modes would likely be useful 
for the task at hand. 
We will see examples of manipulation guidance in Section 4.3. 
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4.0  COGNITIVE CONTROL IN EPISTEMIC PROCESSES OF ABEL AND ARTIN 
I will now further articulate and illustrate the notion of cognitive control by applying it to a 
number of subprocesses in the proofs of Abel and Artin. I will first show that both proofs can be 
naturally thought of as consisting of three stages, and provide a global analysis of all of them in 
the sense introduced in Section 3.5. I will then provide a semi-local analysis of two subprocesses 
falling under the second of the three stages in each proof. Finally, I will provide a local analysis 
of one characteristic sub-subprocess in each of the latter two subprocesses. 
My claim will be that the concepts, methods, and bits of knowledge that constitute the set 
of epistemic resources of Artin’s approach to solvability allow someone who has mastered those 
resources to maintain excellent cognitive control in the course of reading his proof. In contrast, 
the resources of Abel’s approach do not allow us to maintain as good a control over his proof. In 
particular, the differences in the character of control in the two proofs become more pronounced 
as we move down towards the subprocesses. 
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4.1 EPISTEMIC PROCESSES OF ABEL AND ARTIN 
Our first task is to describe the way in which the epistemic processes of Artin and Abel break 
down into stages. In so doing, we need to identify the aim and the principal result reached at each 
stage, as well as clearly display the nesting of the stages. Once the stages have been identified, 
we shall examine to what extent the individual components of cognitive control are or are not 
present at each stage. 
Each stage is individuated by the aim stated at the beginning. If a stage does not have 
subsidiary stages, it will contain one major result that amounts to reaching that aim. If a stage has 
subsidiary stages, the result that amounts to reaching the aim only comes at the end of the last 
one. Thus, the upper level need not contain anything more than the statement of the aim; the 
actual ‘details of the derivation’ will then take place at the stages subsumed under it. 
4.1.1 Artin’s Epistemic Process 
Aim. Prove that the general polynomial equation p5(x) = 0 of degree 5 is not solvable by 
radicals. 
(1) Find a criterion for solvability by radicals. 
Result. A polynomial equation p(x) = 0 is solvable by radicals if and only if the splitting field E 
is contained in a radical extension L of the ground field F. 
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(2) Find a way of showing that this criterion is not satisfied for p5(x). 
(2.1) Associate some organizationally simpler structure with the splitting field extension of an 
arbitrary polynomial p(x); we associate with E/F its Galois group G(E/F). 
(2.2) Establish a bijective correspondence between intermediate fields and subgroups in such a 
way that the property of being contained in a radical extension is reflected in the organization of 
the latter; this will be the Main Theorem of Galois Theory: there is a bijective, order-reversing 
correspondence between the intermediate fields of E/F and the subgroups of G(E/F) for any 
extension E/F that has a certain critical property. 
(2.2.1) Identify the property required by such a correspondence; this is being normal. 
(2.2.2) Prove that the association H → EH of a subgroup H of G(E/F) with its fixed field is one-
to-one; this is Lemma 1 which shows that K → G(E/K) is the inverse of H → EH. 
(2.2.3) Prove that the association K → G(E/K) of an intermediate field K of E/F with its Galois 
group is one-to-one; this is Lemma 2, Artin’s lemma, which shows that H → EH is the inverse of 
K → G(E/K). 
(2.2.4) Prove that being normal is inherited by intermediate fields; this is Lemma 3. 
(2.3) Identify the feature of the organization of G(K2/K1) that corresponds to K2/K1 being a 
radical extension; this is the property being a solvable group; that is, G(K2/K1) contains a 
normal series with abelian quotients. 
(2.4) Prove that since G(L/F) is solvable, G(E/F) is solvable also; it is. 
Result. We will try to prove that the Galois group G(E/F) of p5(x) is not a solvable group. 
 
(3) Prove that the Galois group G(E/F) of p5(x) is not a solvable group. 
(3.1) Identify the Galois group G(E/F) of p5(x); this group is the symmetric group S5. 
(3.2) Prove that the symmetric group S5 does not contain a normal series with abelian quotients; 
it does not. 
 
Result. The general polynomial equation p5(x) = 0 of degree 5 is not solvable by radicals. 
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4.1.2 Abel’s Epistemic Process 
Aim. Prove that the general polynomial equation p5(x) = 0 of degree 5 is not solvable by 
radicals. 
 
(1) Find a criterion for solvability by radicals. 
(1.1) Find an inferentially engageable representation of the general form the solution formula 
would have to have; this is the expression in Theorem 1. 
(1.2) Find an inferentially engageable representation of the structure the terms and, in 
particular, the radicals in the solution formula would have to have; this is the expression in 
Theorem 2 for the terms and the radicals as rational functions of the roots. 
Result. The terms and, in particular, the radicals in any solution formula for p(x) would be 
expressible as rational functions of its roots with certain explicitly specified structure. 
 
(2) Find a way of showing that this criterion is not satisfied for p5(x). 
(2.1) Find a more inferentially engageable representation of the rational functions whose 
number of values would allow them to be expressions for radicals in a solution formula. 
(2.1.1) Restrict the range of rational functions that could be expressions for radicals in a 
solution formula; it turns out that we have justification for restricting our attention to rational 
functions with 2 or 5 distinct values. 
(2.1.2) Find an artifactually determinate expression for a rational function v of the roots of p5(x) 
with 2 distinct values; this expression is p + ρq where p and q are symmetric and ρ is a certain 
alternating function, the square root of the discriminant of p5(x). 
(2.1.3) Find an artifactually determinate expression for a rational function v of the roots of p5(x) 
with 5 distinct values; this expression is r0 + r1 x + r2 x2 + r3 x3 + r4 x4, where r0, ..., r4 are 
symmetric functions of the roots x1, ..., x5 and x is one of the x1, ..., x5. 
Result. We will try to apply the Combinatorial Principle within the scaffolding provided by 
(2.1) to show that not enough radicals exist that have the same number of values as a radical as 
they have as a rational function of the roots. 
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(3) Prove that not enough radicals with the right number of values exist for there to be a solution 
formula by radicals for p5(x) = 0. 
(3.1) Determine for which p there are radicals of order p over the field of coefficients F; only 
radicals of order 2 can exist over F, and the field generated by any such radical is isomorphic to 
F(ρ). 
(3.2) Determine for which p radicals of order p exist over the field generated by ρ; there are 
none. 
(3.3) Prove that this is not enough radicals; but this is just about trivial. 
 
Result. The general polynomial equation p5(x) = 0 of degree 5 is not solvable by radicals. 
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4.2 GLOBAL ANALYSIS 
I will first undertake an analysis of the epistemic processes of each of the three main stages in the 
two proofs. Thus, when we assess the four components of cognitive control in what follows, we 
will be assessing them internally to the epistemic processes of Stage 1, Stage 2, and Stage 3. In 
each case, that process will be viewed globally in the sense of Section 3.5: we will treat the 
results obtained in modular subprocesses as given. 
4.2.1 Stage 1: Orienting the Process 
Aim. Find a criterion for the solvability by radicals of p(x) = 0. 
Artin’s Result.  The criterion is that a polynomial equation p(x) = 0 is solvable by radicals if and 
only if the splitting field E of p(x) is contained in a radical extension of the ground field F. 
Abel’s Result. The criterion is that the terms and, in particular, the radicals in the solution 
formula would have to be expressible as rational functions of the roots with the structure 
specified in Theorem 2. 
The principal epistemic significance of Stage 1 in both proofs is that in it we identify the 
overall target range for the rest of the proof. Concretely, this is accomplished by identifying an 
initial criterion for solvability by radicals. It should be emphasized, however, that Artin and Abel 
both refine the orientation of their processes considerably at the early substages of Stage 2 and, 
in particular, it would not be right to say that Stage 1 sets up the principal scaffolding for the rest 
of the proof. 
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(1) The agent has identified a target range 
Since this is the first stage in the process overall, the target range would be suggested, more or 
less loosely, by whatever background resources Artin and Abel have available to them. 
For Abel and Artin alike, I suppose that the epistemic resource most directly pertinent to 
finding a criterion for solvability and, thereby, to identifying a target range, is simply knowing 
the definition of what it is for a polynomial equation p(x) = 0 to be solvable by radicals. For now 
we may treat p(x) as the arbitrary polynomial. 
It is clear from the definition that the fact as to whether p(x) = 0 is solvable by radicals is 
a consequence, somehow or other, of the arithmetic relations of the roots with the coefficients; 
after all, to say that p(x) = 0 is solvable by radicals just means that it is possible to express each 
of the roots of p(x) in terms of its coefficients by using only the arithmetic operations and the 
operation of extracting roots. 
But more is clear. For there is a sense in which the arithmetic relations of the roots with 
the coefficients are always the same: the coefficients are just the elementary symmetric functions 
of the roots. Thus, we can identify a more focused target range: the arithmetic relations of the 
roots. This can be seen as follows. Let p(x) = xn + an – 1xn – 1 + ... + a1, and consider the set of all 
possible radical expressions R(a1, ..., an – 1). If p(R) = 0 for some such expression, then p(x) = 0 
is solvable by radicals; otherwise it is not. But clearly whether or not p(R) = 0 for a given R just 
depends on what the coefficients are. More specifically, it depends on the arithmetic relations of 
the coefficients: for p(x) = Rn + an – 1Rn – 1 + ... + a1 = 0 can be taken to articulate a particular 
non-trivial arithmetic relation of the a1, ..., an. But these a1, ..., an are elementary symmetric 
functions fk of the roots b1, ..., bn of p(x), so that ak = fk(b1, ..., bn) for k = 1, ..., n – 1. Thus, by 
substituting each fk for ak in p(x) = xn + an – 1xn – 1 + ... + a1, we can repeat the foregoing line of 
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thought and conclude that whether p(x) = 0 is solvable by radicals is a consequence of the way 
the roots are related to one another. This is not to say that it isn’t a non-trivial task to determine 
just how the roots must be related in order for the polynomial to be solvable by radicals. 
As it turns out, Artin can be seen as adopting the arithmetic relations of the roots with the 
coefficients as his target range: he goes on to identify a criterion of solvability in terms of a 
large-scale pattern in these relations that obtains if and only if the polynomial is solvable. Abel, 
in contrast, can be seen as adopting the arithmetic relations of the roots with the coefficients as 
his very first target range, but he goes on to identify a criterion of solvability in terms of the 
arithmetic relations of the roots themselves. 
(2) The agent has an organizing representation that allows her to erect a scaffolding 
Artin’s Organizing Representation and Scaffolding 
Artin has the concepts field and field extension, and he knows the elementary general facts about 
field extensions. Given that his target range are the arithmetic relations of the roots of p(x), the 
obvious organizing representation for him to adopt is the splitting field extension E/F of p(x), 
where p(x) may again be thought of as the arbitrary polynomial. For the splitting field E of p(x) 
is the unique smallest extension of the ground field F that contains all the roots of p(x); thus, the 
extension E/F certainly consolidates all the facts about the arithmetic relations of the roots of 
p(x) with its coefficients. 
  Since the aim of Stage 1 is to identify a criterion for solvability by radicals, one natural 
approach to erecting a scaffolding is to try to determine whether there is some field-theoretic 
feature of the splitting field extension E/F that is present if and only if p(x) = 0 is solvable by 
radicals. This is one way in which the field-theoretic concepts provide orientation for the process 
from the start. 
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 Now clearly the splitting field extension E/F consolidates a vast array of arithmetic facts, 
not all of them relevant to the issue of solvability. As an algebraic structure, however, the two 
most salient features of this extension are, first, that it contains a system of intermediate fields 
and, second, that E is generated over F by the roots of p(x). Given the second feature, it is clear 
from the outset that the field-theoretic organization of the extension E/F is intimately connected 
with the relations of the roots among themselves as well as their relations with elements of the 
ground field F. But it is facts about just these relations that ultimately govern the solvability or 
not of the equation p(x) = 0. Thus, one is justified in thinking that the fact as to whether p(x) = 0 
is solvable might be in some way reflected in the organization of the system of intermediate 
fields of E/F. As such, it is natural to think that we might be able to erect a scaffolding in which 
the locations are demarcated by the intermediate fields of E/F. 
 In order to erect our scaffolding for Stage 1, let us then suppose that p(x) = 0 is solvable 
by radicals, so that the roots of p(x) can be expressed in terms of some finite set of radicals, all of 
them contained in the algebraic closure of F. Thus, given any such set of radicals, it is immediate 
that the splitting field E is contained in a finite extension L of F generated by those radicals. 
Conversely, if E is contained in such an extension, it is easy to show that p(x) = 0 is solvable by 
radicals. Thus, we need to adjust our initial expectations somewhat: it is now more natural to 
focus on the extension L/F, rather than the extension E/F itself. Yet, in view of the foregoing 
considerations, it is still natural to consider the organization of the system of intermediate fields 
of L/F. Thus, we may regard this system as the scaffolding for Stage 1 as a whole, built around 
the organizing representation the splitting field extension E/F of p(x). What we want is to identify 
some field-theoretically salient feature of this system and, if possible, to determine in what way 
this feature might be inherited by the extension E/F. Thus, we can take the locations to be 
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demarcated by the intermediate fields of L/F, and the challenge now is to examine the relations 
of these fields. 
Abel’s Scaffolding 
Given that Abel does not have the concepts field and field extension, he needs a different way of 
approaching the arithmetic relations of the roots with the coefficients. 
The first thing to say here is that Abel does not have epistemic resources that would allow 
him to adopt an organizing representation properly speaking. Let pn(x) be the arbitrary general 
polynomial; it is clear that Abel has no means to represent the set of all arithmetic relations of the 
roots of pn(x) with its coefficients in a way that could organize his proof at this stage. Certainly 
Abel knows that the coefficients are elementary symmetric functions of the roots, and in this 
sense he can represent the relations of the roots with the coefficients. There is no obvious way to 
exploit this fact at this point, however—indeed, one way to look at what Abel accomplishes in 
the first two stages of his proof is that he finds the proper epistemic framework for exploiting 
these relations. Further, certainly Abel has available to him some expression that has the same 
meaning and referent as “the arithmetic relations of the roots of pn(x) with its coefficients.” Such 
an expression, however, would be far too conceptually barren to allow him to erect an epistemic 
scaffolding—it does not have enough inferentially engageable structure. 
Among the epistemic resources Abel has, the ones most obviously pertinent to erecting a 
scaffolding for the process of Stage 1 are, simply, knowing the expressions for the solutions of 
the general equations of degrees 2, 3 and 4, and his overall proficiency in manipulating symbolic 
expressions. Thus, he does the most obvious thing: he identifies a canonical expression for the 
general form a solution by radicals would have to have; see Pesic, pp. 171ff. This expression 
then organizes the rest of Stage 1: combined with certain general facts about relations of roots of 
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unity, it allows Abel to erect quite an effective scaffolding for Stage 1.2; we will see this in more 
detail under our discussion of guidance. 
(3) The scaffolding provides guidance 
Artin’s aim. Find a criterion for the solvability of p(x) = 0. 
Aim Guidance. Artin’s scaffolding now provides aim guidance: the most natural thing to 
do is to examine the relations of the intermediate fields in the extension L/F. 
Manipulation Guidance. With the field-theoretic concepts in place, it is very natural to 
consider the sequence of simple extensions obtained by adjoining the radicals that generate L 
over F one at a time. 
Result. It is easy to show that L/F is a radical extension—that is, L/F contains a sequence 
of simple radical extension from F up to L. 
Aim Guidance. Once we know that the splitting field E is contained in a radical extension 
L of F, the only obvious aim is to show that the converse also holds. Again, this is easy to do. 
Result. Thus, Artin’s criterion turns out to be that p(x) = 0 is solvable by radicals if and 
only if the splitting field extension E/F of p(x) is contained in a radical extension. 
It want to emphasize just how naturally the criterion falls out once the field-theoretic 
concepts are in place. Indeed, as I already noted in my exposition of Artin’s proof, the result with 
which Stage 1 culminates is little more than a rearticulation of the definition of solvability; and 
yet, as we shall now see, it is an epistemically powerful one. 
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Abel’s aim. Find a criterion for the solvability of p(x) = 0. 
Stage 1.1 
Abel does not have much by way of a scaffolding for Stage 1.1. As noted above, however, he 
does draw some degree of aim guidance from knowing the solution formulae for equations of 
degrees 2, 3, and 4: the only natural aim available to Abel is to find a useable expression for the 
form a solution by radicals would have to have. 
Result. By carrying out fairly intricate but elementary symbolic computations, Abel finds 
just such an expression: he proves that any solution by radicals of pn(x) = 0 would have to be 
expressible in the form we recorded in Theorem 1, namely 
 
y = q0 + q1r1/p + q2r(2/p) + … + qp – 1 r(p – 1/p),  
 
where p is some prime number, q0, ..., qp – 1, r are functions of the same form as y, and so on, 
until we come to rational functions of the coefficients a1, ..., an of pn(x). 
Since we are here analyzing Stage 1 globally, I will not discuss the details of Abel’s 
derivation of this expression. Suffice it to say that he does enjoy some degree of aim and 
manipulation guidance in virtue of knowing various basic strategies for manipulating symbolic 
expressions. For example, he makes judicious use of substitutions and collecting together terms 
with a suitably chosen common factor, and so on. Still, I think it would be fair to say that he has 
to make quite a few ad hoc decisions about how to proceed in the process of deriving his general 
expression for the solutions. As such, I think we would find that the quality of his guidance is 
poorer than Artin’s in the subprocesses involved in deriving his criterion of solvability. 
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Stage 1.2 
Aim Guidance. Abel now has some aim guidance for his proof as a whole: he needs to 
show that no actual solution satisfies his general expression for a solution by radicals. The trick 
is to acquire more specific aim guidance as to what to do next. 
The most structurally salient feature of the general expression is, of course, the way it is 
composed out of multiply nested radicals, with the innermost radicals being radicals over the 
ground field Q(a1, ..., an). This strongly suggests that the overall aim of the proof should be to 
show that in the case n = 5, not enough such radicals exist, for some reason or another. Indeed, it 
is clear that the other structural features of the general expression can be more or less ignored. 
Thus, Abel would be justified in thinking that he needs to examine which radicals could 
appear in a solution that satisfies his general expression, and show that not enough such radicals 
exist. This suggests a more determinate immediate aim: it seems very likely that Abel needs to 
find an inferentially engageable representation of the radicals that could appear in a solution by 
radicals. Perhaps the most obvious epistemic option would be to look for an explicit, artifactually 
determinate expression for such radicals; for given the paucity of Abel’s conceptual resources, 
his principal mode of inferential engagement is to carry out symbolic computations. Thus, we 
obtain the following 
Aim. Find an artifactually determinate expression for the radicals that could appear in a 
solution by radicals. 
Location guidance. Given how vague this aim is, it is fortunate that Abel has just the 
right kind of location guidance to complement it. For there is really only one terrain of facts for 
Abel to examine at this point, namely the facts as to which radicals could occupy the formal 
positions marked out by the terms in his general expression. This expression by itself would not 
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be enough to provide Abel any substantial amount of guidance, but his familiarity with Gauss’ 
work on cyclotomic equations and primitive roots of unity allows him to erect a more structured 
scaffolding.34 For if the order of the outmost radical r in the general expression is p, then Abel 
has p separate expressions for the solutions: 
 
y1 = q0 + r + … + qp – 1 r p – 1
y2 = q0 + αr + α2 q2 r2 + … + αp – 1 qp – 1 r p – 1
...       
yp = q0 + αp – 1 r + αp – 2 q2 r2 + … + αqp – 1 r p – 1
 
and these solutions are distinct. 
This system of expressions can be regarded as Abel’s epistemic scaffolding for Stage 1.2. 
The terms demarcate locations: each covers a range of epistemically possible expressions, and 
contains a determinate range of epistemically possible facts relevant to solvability: the term is 
occupied or it is not. This scaffolding now provides aim and location guidance: the only obvious 
aim is to find a way of representing the possible values of the terms in these expressions in a way 
that allows us to rule out enough of them to rule out the existence of a solution formula. 
The crucial feature of the situation is that the locations demarcated by the terms in the 
different expressions are not independent. In the terminology of Section 3.4, Abel’s scaffolding 
is highly connected. This is, indeed, the mathematically specific feature of the situation that 
allows him to proceed. For it is now a standard exercise to express the summands on the right-
hand side in terms of the solutions y1, ..., yp, and so Abel obtains the following 
                                                 
34 See Radloff [1998], p. 68 and Pesic, p. 159. 
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Result. Theorem 2, regarded by Abel himself as his central innovation,35 expresses the 
terms in the general expression as rational functions of the roots, centrally including the radicals 
therein: 
 
r = (1/p)(y1 + αp – 1y2 + … + αyp). 
 
This result can be regarded as having acquired mastery over the epistemically possible 
contents of the locations in the scaffolding. Note in particular that, at least in some cases, this 
expression is inferentially engageable because one can directly see what the effect of the 
permutations of the roots would be. 
All this depends organically on Abel’s understanding of the arithmetic relations of the 
primitive roots of unity 1, α, α2, ..., αp – 1 and in particular on knowing the relation 
 
1 + α + α2 + ... + αp – 1 = 0. 
 
Thus, this piece of knowledge can be regarded as structuring his scaffolding and in virtue 
of doing so, providing aim guidance for Abel’s symbolic computations. 
If we were to consider the subprocess of deriving this expression locally, we would again 
find that Abel does enjoy some degree of manipulation guidance. Still, many of the individual 
computations would have to be considered rather ad hoc. 
                                                 
35 See Pesic, p. 162. 
 168 
(4) The agent can locate and extract features directly relevant to answering the question 
The aim of Stage 1 is to identify a criterion for the solvability by radicals of polynomial 
equations or, to be fair to Abel, a criterion for the solvability of general polynomial equations. 
Thus, we can take it that the question one is trying to answer here is, Under what circumstances 
is the general polynomial equation solvable by radicals? Both Abel and Artin manage to answer 
this question, and so the only issue to address here is how to assess the comparative directness of 
relevance. Now, keeping in mind that we are analyzing the quality of cognitive control over the 
epistemic process of Stage 1 rather than the proof as a whole, the relevant question is: To what 
extent have Abel and Artin located and extracted features of their target ranges directly relevant 
to their respective criteria? I think that the answer is that they both have managed to locate and 
extract features very highly relevant: for the issue here is not how directly relevant the feature in 
terms of which they have articulated their respective criteria is to solvability; rather, the issue is 
how directly relevant their proofs in Stage 1 are to their respective criteria. The former issue—
the one in which we are ultimately interested—will arise only at Stage 3. In any case, since Abel 
and Artin articulate different criteria, it is properly speaking not possible to make a comparative 
assessment as to which one has found the features more directly relevant. Thus, as far as their 
epistemic processes in Stage 1 go, there isn’t much to be said here. 
It is worth noting that Abel does not articulate his criterion in terms of any feature that 
could be naturally construed as a property of some single object or a coherent system of objects, 
while Artin does. I do not think, however, that there is any reason at this stage to regard this as 
an epistemic shortcoming in Abel’s approach—at any rate, no reason that isn’t directly motivated 
by some a priori conception of the nature of mathematical ontology. As we will see later on, 
however, their respective criteria take them down very different epistemic paths, and many of the 
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virtues of cognitive control in Artin’s process, as well as the failures in Abel’s, can be traced 
back to the character of these criteria. It does turn out that the fact that Artin’s criterion is 
articulated in terms of a single property of a coherent system of objects allows him epistemically 
critical moves that are just not available to Abel. 
4.2.2 Stage 2: Transforming the Task 
Aim. Find a way of showing that the criterion is not satisfied for p5(x). 
Artin’s Result. We will try to prove that the Galois group G(E/F) of p5(x) is not a solvable group. 
Abel’s Result. We will try to apply the Combinatorial Principle within the scaffolding provided 
by Stage 2 to show that not enough radicals exist that have the same number of values as a 
radical as they have as a rational function of the roots. 
The principal epistemic significance of Stage 2 in both proofs is that the original task is 
transformed into one each mathematician is able to negotiate with their respective tools. 
Artin’s criterion is that a polynomial equation p(x) = 0 is solvable by radicals if and only 
if the splitting field extension E/F of p(x) is contained in a radical extension. Abel’s criterion is 
that a polynomial equation p(x) = 0 is solvable by radicals if and only if an expression for the 
roots in terms of the coefficients of a certain standard form exists. He then shows that if such an 
expression does exist, the roots of p(x) must have certain arithmetic relations, namely the ones 
articulated in Theorem 2. 
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Thus, at the beginning of Stage 2, the target range for Artin’s proof would be the set of 
all facts about the organization of the systems of intermediate fields of the various finite field 
extensions L that contain the splitting field extension E of p5(x); the target range for Abel’s proof 
would be the set of all facts about the arithmetic relations of the roots of p5(x). For clearly Artin 
needs to examine the organization of these systems and show that the particular features such a 
system would have if p5(x) = 0 were solvable by radicals are not in fact present; Abel needs to 
examine the arithmetic relations of the roots of p5(x) and show that the particular relations that 
would hold if p5(x) = 0 were solvable by radicals do not in fact hold. It is clear, indeed, that when 
one has proven a criterion for the obtaining of some property articulated in terms of some 
particular set of facts, one thereby knows that any terrain of facts that contains them is a target 
range. Thus, by my lights, Artin and Abel would count as having identified target ranges for the 
rest of their epistemic processes. 
The problem is that it is difficult to examine either one of these two target ranges directly. 
Even with Artin’s relatively rich epistemic resources, it would be very difficult to examine all the 
various extensions L of the splitting field E of p5(x) directly so as to determine whether E is 
contained in a radical extension. With Abel’s relatively meager resources, it would be very 
difficult indeed to examine the relations of the roots of p5(x) directly so as to determine whether 
they are related in the way his criterion for solvability requires; it is not even clear what doing so 
would amount to in Abel’s conceptual setting. 
Thus, the overall aim of Stage 2 becomes to identify a target range to replace the said two 
ranges and, in particular, construct an organizing representation and scaffolding that in Stage 3 
can be used to determine whether p5(x) = 0 is solvable by radicals. 
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(1) The agent has identified a target range 
In Artin’s approach, the initial target range for Stage 2 is the organization of the systems of 
intermediate fields of finite extensions L of an arbitrary finite field extension E/F; in Abel’s 
approach, it is the arithmetic relations of the roots of the general polynomial p5(x) of degree 5. 
Thus, it is here at Stage 2 where the two proofs first diverge in that Artin continues to examine 
issues pertaining to solvability quite generally, whereas Abel focuses on the case of p5(x). 
The aim of the early substages of Stage 2 in each proof is to find a different set of facts 
naturally related with the target range identified at Stage 1, one that can be adopted as the target 
range for the rest of Stage 2. In view of the overall aim of Stage 2, these new ranges should be 
ones we can examine more readily and, in particular, ones in which we can locate features that 
are directly relevant to solvability by radicals. 
At Stage 2.1, Artin adopts as his target range the facts about the compositional relations 
of the F-automorphisms of E, where E/F is the arbitrary field extension, and as his organizing 
representation the Galois group G(E/F) of E/F; it is clear that this representation consolidates his 
target range. I will examine the justification for adopting this set of facts as the target range in 
my semi-local analysis in Section 4.3. 
The facts about the compositional relations of the F-automorphisms of E, and the concept 
Galois group are such a natural fit that, to someone familiar only with the modern approach, it 
might seem contrived to say that there are two epistemically independent accomplishments here; 
at any rate, it might seem contrived to say that Artin first focuses on the facts about the relations 
of the F-automorphisms of E and then adopts the Galois group G(E/F) as the representation of 
that set of facts: if anything, it is the other way around. As the historical evolution of Galois 
theory attests, however, there are other ways of representing this range of facts. In his 1830 
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approach to solvability, Galois himself did indeed focus on the said relations but did not have an 
explicitly articulated concept of group to represent them as a whole; he certainly did not have the 
concepts subgroup, coset and quotient group to represent large-scale patterns in this group. 
These conceptual shortcomings account for the felt lack of clarity and precision in Galois’ 
treatment—as I would put it, but cannot argue here, they are responsible for the lapses of 
cognitive control in Galois’ proof of the unsolvability of p5(x). Thus, in order to appreciate the 
epistemic accomplishments of Artin’s conceptually mature approach, it is vital to distinguish the 
feat of identifying a target range from the feat of adopting a useful organizing representation of 
that range. 
Given the results he has obtained at Stage 1, Abel knows that in order to show that no 
solution formula exists for p5(x), it is sufficient to show that not enough radicals of the right 
orders exist. In particular, given Theorem 2, he is justified in thinking that this might be 
accomplished by showing that not enough radicals can be expressed as rational functions of the 
five roots of p5(x). For he knows the Combinatorial Principle: the number of distinct values of 
a radical as a radical is the same as its number of values as a rational function. As I noted in 
Chapter 3, however, for all Abel knows at this stage in his proof, there might not be enough 
constraints on the number of possible values rational expressions of the roots of p5(x) can take to 
rule out the existence of a solution by radicals. Thus, the range of facts he has chosen to examine 
is not at this point known to be sufficient to settle the issue of solvability of p5(x) = 0. As such, 
Abel does not count as having identified a target range for Stage 2 of his process. 
I need to emphasize, moreover, that Abel stands no chance of consolidating this target 
range: there is no single object or a coherent system of objects we could think of these facts as 
facts about. We will come back to this. 
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The sets of facts Artin and Abel adopt as their target ranges for Stage 2 are closely 
related, yet importantly different. While Artin is examining the structure of the Galois group 
G(E/F) itself, in modern terms, Abel is examining the effect of the action of G(E/F) on individual 
elements in the extension E/F: for the number of distinct values of a rational function of the roots 
under the permutations of those roots is, in modern terms, the number of field conjugates of an 
element in E, that is, the number of distinct images of an element under the action of G(E/F). 
As will become clear in this section, most of the epistemically crucial differences 
between the two approaches can be traced back to this difference in their target ranges and, 
specifically, the organizing representations of those ranges available to Artin and Abel. Artin is 
able to consolidate his target range, while Abel is not; as a consequence, Artin is able to extract a 
feature of his target range directly relevant to solvability; Abel is not. Artin can erect a highly 
connected epistemic scaffolding for the final stage of his proof; Abel cannot. Finally, though this 
is not an issue of cognitive control, we should keep in mind that since the splitting field of any 
polynomial, general or special, has a Galois group, Artin’s approach can in principle be used to 
examine the solvability by radicals of any polynomial; Abel’s cannot. His approach depends 
essentially on the field extension under consideration being the splitting field of the general 
polynomial of degree five. 
(2) The agent has an organizing representation that erects a scaffolding 
I will consider the epistemic contributions of the Galois group in the next section in the context 
of our semi-local analysis of the subprocesses falling under Artin’s Stage 2. I will try to make it 
visible that this representation allows Artin to erect an excellent epistemic scaffolding that 
provides him wonderful aim and location guidance throughout Stage 2. 
 174 
Abel can represent his target range only with some non-consolidating expression that has 
the same meaning and referent as the expression “the number of possible values various rational 
expressions of the roots of p5(x) can take under the permutations of those roots.” As it turns out, 
however, this failure to organize the representation of his target range ontologically does not 
hamper the quality of the scaffolding Abel erects for the later subprocesses falling under in his 
Stage 2. This should seem somewhat surprising. For it would be natural to suppose that this is 
the stage where the quality of Abel’s cognitive control begins to deteriorate significantly; for it is 
at this stage that his proof begins to diverge substantially from the modern one organized by the 
group-theoretic concepts. In particular, it would be natural to expect that this deterioration is 
occasioned by the nature of his organizing representation and the scaffolding he erects. 
We will see in our analysis of Stage 3 that in many ways these expectations are borne 
out. I want to emphasize, however, that Abel’s scaffolding for Stage 2 itself is actually quite 
excellent. This is one of the places where I want to recommend that an attentive reconstruction of 
the structure of Abel’s epistemic process allows us to see the very real strengths of his epistemic 
standing. It is after all remarkable that Abel accomplishes what he does with such a meager set of 
resources; I want to recommend that he succeeds precisely by squeezing every bit of control he 
can from the resources he has. 
Thus, I take it that the expression “the facts about the number of possible values various 
rational functions of the roots p5(x) can take under the set of all permutations of those roots” is 
the organizing representation for Abel’s Stage 2, even if he does not count as having identified a 
target range. This expression allows Abel to erect an epistemic scaffolding, as follows. (a) The 
locations Lm are parametrized by numbers between 1 and 120, inclusive: since there are 120 
different permutations of five independent variables, and since Abel is treating the roots of p5(x) 
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as independent variables, 120 is the largest number of distinct values a rational function of the 
roots can take under those permutations. (b) Each location Lm covers a determinate stretch of 
Abel’s target range, namely the epistemically possible rational functions of the roots of p5(x) 
with m distinct values, and (c) contains two epistemically possible facts: yes—some such rational 
function takes m distinct values and no—none does. Certainly (d) either one would rule out the 
other; finally, it is clear that (e) these locations contain all the epistemically relevant facts about 
Abel’s target range. 
It can be difficult to properly appreciate the tremendous epistemic importance of having a 
representation of one’s target range that is organized in this way already at the outset of one’s 
investigation. It is helpful to compare the situation Abel is in now with the situation he was in at 
the end of Stage 1: given his conceptual resources, he has cannot represent the epistemically 
possible facts about the relations of the roots of p5(x) in a way that would be at all structured and 
organized. I do not deny that having a numerical parametrization is one of the epistemically 
‘thinnest’ ways of erecting a scaffolding; indeed, we will see that such scaffoldings tend to have 
serious shortcomings. But these shortcomings are insignificant when compared with the deep, 
fundamental contributions of having a determinate range of numerically parametrized locations 
in view: Abel now has a fully determinate epistemic space to operate in, a fully determinate 
range of facts to go after. 
I want to make the relationship between Abel’s Stage 2 and Stage 3 as clear as possible, 
for there is something potentially confusing here. On the one hand, the overall aim of his Stage 2 
is, essentially, to erect a scaffolding for Stage 3. On the other hand, the scaffolding for Stage 3 is 
built on top of the one Abel erects for Stage 2 itself. The reason I am fussing over this point is 
that I want to articulate the structural parallels between the processes of Abel and Artin as clearly 
 176 
as possible so as to put us in as good a position as possible to compare the character of cognitive 
control in them. The distinction between the organizing representations and scaffoldings between 
Stage 2 and Stage 3 in Artin’s process are easier to see because his Stage 2 is still fully general, 
and it is only at Stage 3 that he focuses on the case of p5(x). Abel, in contrast, focuses on the 
case of p5(x) already at his Stage 2 and, consequently, it can be harder to see the distinction 
between the epistemic significances of Stage 2 and Stage 3 and, consequently, harder to see the 
epistemically significant parallels between Stages 2 and 3 in the two proofs. 
(3) The scaffolding provides guidance 
In the next section, I will provide a semi-local analysis of the guidance Artin and Abel enjoy in 
the subprocesses falling under Stage 2 in their respective proofs. We will see there that Artin’s 
scaffolding provides him excellent aim, location and manipulation guidance; what may be a bit 
surprising is that Abel’s scaffolding provides him excellent aim guidance, although his location 
and manipulation guidance are not very good. 
The theorems in Abel’s set of epistemic resources at the beginning of Stage 2 provide his 
scaffolding with a good bit of structure. Lagrange’s theorem tells Abel that only the locations 
for which m divides 120 can contain yes, while Ruffini’s theorem tells him that for m less than 
or equal to 5, the only locations that can contain yes are the ones for m = 1, 2 and 5. This fact is 
significant because, in the course of proving Theorem 2, it becomes clear that Abel may get 
away with only investigating radicals with p distinct values as a radical where p is a prime not 
exceeding 5. At any rate, he knows that all the radicals over the field F of coefficients of p5(x) 
that could appear in a solution formula would have p different values as radicals. 
Thus, once all the foregoing bits of knowledge are factored into his scaffolding, Abel has 
excellent aim guidance for the rest of Stage 2: it is clear that his aim should be to find 
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expressions for rational functions with 2 and 5 distinct values, expressions that are highly 
inferentially engageable in a way that would facilitate ruling out enough of the remaining options 
at Stage 3. This is just what Abel sets out to do at the later two subsidiary stages of Stage 2; we 
will consider these stages in more detail in Section (4.3) below. 
(4) The agent can locate and extract features directly relevant to answering the question 
The aim of Stage 2 is to find a way of showing that the criterion for solvability identified at 
Stage 1 is not satisfied for the general polynomial of degree 5. Thus, we can take the questions to 
be, Under what circumstances is the splitting field E of p(x) not contained in a radical extension 
of the ground field F? for Artin and, Under what circumstances does there not exist a formula 
satisfying the general expression for a solution by radicals? for Abel. Again, as in Stage 1, both 
Abel and Artin manage to find some feature of their mathematical situation they can hope to test 
in the case of the general equation of degree 5. And, again, since they are focusing on different 
criteria, it is properly speaking not possible to compare the directness of relevance of what they 
accomplish. Less formally, it seems right to say that Artin has managed to locate and exactly the 
features very highly relevant to answering his question—indeed, one wants to say, exactly the 
right features: if the Galois group G(E/F) is not solvable, then E is not contained in a radical 
extension of F. This is just the sort of conceptually articulated, ‘high-level’ feature of a target 
range my definition of directness of relevance is intended to capture. Note, in particular, that the 
concept Galois group is at a higher level relative to the concept field extension and, as such, the 
sentence The Galois group is not solvable is at a higher level of conceptual articulation than to 
The splitting field extension is not contained in a radical extension. That the Galois group is not 
solvable is just the sort of pattern in the target range these notions are meant to capture. 
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Abel’s answer, in contrast, is articulated at the same level of conceptual articulation as his 
criterion. In particular, as in Stage 1, Abel does not manage to identify any feature of his 
mathematical situation that could be naturally construed as a property of some single object or a 
coherent system of objects. Indeed, I think that here this intuition is even stronger—in Stage 1, 
we at least had the general expression for a solution as a radical as a kind of a ‘formal’ object. 
But again, there is no denying that Abel has identified a feature of the mathematical situation as a 
whole: if there aren’t enough radicals with the appropriate number of values, there is not enough 
radicals to constitute a solution formula. Thus, while it is properly speaking possible to compare 
the two proofs for directness of relevance, it seem very compelling to say that, with the obvious 
relaxation in our attitude, that Artin clearly manages to answer his question more directly than 
Abel his. 
This, then, is where the two proofs diverge decisively. Given the wonderful consolidating 
representation of his target range, the splitting field extension, Artin is able to identify a single 
coherent structure associated with it, the Galois group, and extract a property of groups that is 
directly relevant to determining whether the splitting field extension is contained in a radical 
extension: being a solvable group. Artin accomplishes this feat of locating at Stage 2.3 by 
considering the property of being a radical extension, and uses the Galois correspondence to 
locate a corresponding property in the system of normal subgroups of the Galois group; further 
work shows that the relevant property is being a solvable group. 
In sum, Artin’s epistemic standing with respect to his criterion of solvability has now 
become decisively different from Abel’s to his. Artin has a coherent system of objects he can 
investigate by using the concepts and methods of group theory. Abel, in contrast, will need to 
investigate all the possible orders individually, and rule them out one at a time. 
 179 
4.2.3 Stage 3: Answering the Question 
Artin’s Aim. Prove that the Galois group of p5(x) is not a solvable group. 
Abel’s Aim. Prove that not enough radicals with the right number of values exist for there to be a 
solution formula by radicals for p5(x) = 0. 
(1) The agent has identified a target range 
At Stage 2, Artin showed that a finite field extension K2/K1 is contained in a radical extension if 
and only if the Galois group G(K2/K1) of that extension is a solvable group. Thus, at Stage 3, he 
adopts as his target range the facts about the organization of the system of subgroups of the 
Galois group G(E/F) of the splitting field extension of p5(x). It is of course clear that Artin knows 
this is a target range, given the result from Stage 1 and Stage 2. 
Abel has managed to build an epistemic scaffolding around the possible values a rational 
function of the roots of the polynomial can take, and he has acquired an explicit expression for 
the rational functions that take 2 and 5 distinct values. He adopts as his target range the facts 
about the possible values radicals of various orders not exceeding 5 can take. The idea is now to 
apply the scaffolding constructed in Stage 3, along with the said expressions, to show that not 
enough radicals exist for there to be a solution formula for p5(x). His Stage 3 is as a reductio ad 
absurdum in which a number of independent possible classes of radicals are ruled out by 
showing that their existence would violate the Combinatorial Principle. 
I want to take this occasion to note that the Combinatorial Principle plays two different 
epistemic roles in Abel’s process. At Stage 2, it was used to structure the scaffolding being built 
for Stage 3; at Stage 3, it is used to show that the criterion for solvability from Stage 1 is not 
satisfied for p5(x) by showing that certain radicals that could appear in a solution formula do not 
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in fact exist. This is done by showing that for a given value of p, the radical of order p that could 
appear in a solution formula has a different number of values as a radical (not necessarily p, 
though) than the rational expression of the roots that represents that radical, or else, that the 
radical would have to have a number of values as a radical already prohibited at Stage 2. Thus, it 
is only at Stage 3 that the Principle should be seen as facilitating a reductio ad absurdum. I want 
to emphasize this point because Abel’s proof is usually represented as a one long reductio. As 
my analysis shows, however, this point of view is at best unhelpful since it prevents us from 
seeing the structural similarities between the proofs of Abel and Artin; at worst, it is downright 
mistaken since it misrepresents the contributions of the central elements in Abel’s set of 
epistemic resources. 
(2) The agent has adopted an organizing representation that erects scaffolding 
Certainly both Abel and Artin have an organizing representation, and certainly both have 
scaffoldings. But while Artin’s scaffolding turns out to be connected in a crucial way, the 
locations in Abel’s scaffolding are largely independent. 
At Stage 3.1, Artin’s organizing representation is the Galois group G(E/F) of the splitting 
field of p5(x); at Stage 3.2, it becomes the symmetric group S5 on five letters; for Artin proves at 
Stage 3.1 that G(E/F) ≈ S5. The scaffolding at the first stage is really just the possible 
permutations of the roots; the scaffolding at the latter is the epistemically possible normal series 
of subgroups in S5. It is the structure of this scaffolding that makes the epistemically crucial 
difference for Artin’s proof; we will consider it below. 
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At Stage 3.1, Abel’s organizing representation is again really just the expression “the 
number of values radicals of orders not exceeding 5 can take.” Much as in Stage 2, there is no 
way to construe this terrain of facts as facts about any single property or a coherent system of 
objects. 
The scaffolding for Abel’s Stage 3 will be essentially a fragment of the one constructed 
in Stage 2. The locations Lm are parametrized by the order m of the radical over the field of 
coefficients. Thus, we need to emphasize that this scaffolding contains locations for m that are 
not primes and are greater than 5. Each location contains two epistemically possible facts: yes—a 
radical of this order over F exists, and no—a radical of this order over F does not exist. It is not 
clear from the outset just which m would be large enough to contain all the epistemically 
possible orders, although it is clear that m must divide 120. 
(3) The scaffolding provides guidance 
Guidance in Artin 
I will consider the following two stages in more detail in Section (4.3). For now, I will consider 
them briefly as components of Stage 3 considered globally and, as such, I will treat the results 
obtained in them as given. 
Stage 3.1 
Aim. Identify the Galois group G(E/F) of the splitting field extension E/F of p5(x). 
Location Guidance. The coefficients a1, ..., a5 of p5(x) are just the five elementary symmetric 
functions in five letters representing the roots x1, ..., x5, hence fixed by any permutation of those 
letters. Thus, we can take Q(x1, ..., x5) as the splitting field of p5(x) and Q(a1, ..., a5) as the field 
of coefficients. So now we only need to determine the group of this extension. 
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Result. But this task is trivial: since there are no non-trivial arithmetic relations between 
the roots of p5(x), any permutation of the roots, extended by linearity to a mapping on E, is an F-
automorphism of E/F. Hence, the Galois group G(E/F) is isomorphic to the symmetric group S5. 
Thus, we come to the final local stage in Artin’s proof. As one might expect, this is where 
the epistemic differences between the two approaches really come into focus. The task in Artin’s 
Stage 3.2 is to determine whether S5 is a solvable group; the task in Abel’s Stages 3.1 and 3.2, 
which may be thought of as jointly corresponding to Stage 3.2 in Artin, is to show that there 
aren’t enough radicals for there to be a solution formula for p5(x). 
Stage 3.2 
Aim. Show that S5 does not contain a normal series with abelian quotients 
Location Guidance. Simple group-theoretic considerations show that any normal series in 
S5 must begin with the unique normal subgroup of index 2, the alternating group A5. 
Result. However, since A5 is a non-abelian simple group, the only possible normal series 
in A5 would be {1} ⊂ A5, and the quotient A5/{1} = A5 is not abelian. Thus, the group S5 is not 
solvable and hence, p5(x) = 0 is not solvable by radicals. 
Guidance in Abel 
In view of the results established at Stage 2, it is clear what Abel needs to do to collapse the 
various locations: he needs to consider them one by one, employ the explicit expressions for 
rational functions with 2 and 5 distinct values, and use the Combinatorial Principle to show 
that no radical with the given number of values exists. 
Stage 3.1 
Aim. Determine for which p there are radicals of order p over the field of coefficients F. 
This is the obvious first aim since it is here that the foregoing results apply most directly. 
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 Location Guidance. The only locations in the scaffolding we need to investigate at this 
stage are the ones parametrized by p = 2 and p = 5; for we know that when the order of the 
radical r over F is a prime, it is exactly the number of values of r as a radical. 
 Manipulation Guidance. This is clear: we need to consider the expression for a radical r 
that is assumed to appear in the solution formula, and consider the effect of the permutations of 
the roots on that expression. In the case r is assumed to have five distinct values as a radical, we 
find that the said expression would have 120 values. This violates the Combinatorial Principle. 
 Result. Thus, we find that any radical over the ground field F = Q(a1, ..., a5) must have 
order 2. From Theorem 5 we know that such a radical has the form p + ρq. In modern terms, this 
is to say that the only simple radical extension of F is isomorphic to the one generated by the 
square root ρ of the discriminant of p5(x). 
Stage 3.2 
Aim. Determine for which p radicals of order p exist over the field generated by ρ. 
Location Guidance. The task at this stage is more complicated than at Stage 3.1 because 
the order of the radical r over F(ρ) no longer equals the number of values of r as a radical, 
namely the order of the minimal polynomial of r over F. 
Manipulation Guidance. The idea is exactly the same as in Stage 3.1, except that some of 
the possible numbers of values need to be ruled out by using other means. 
The logical structure of the proof here is more complicated because the number of 
possible distinct values of such a radical could be greater than 5, and so we cannot apply 
Theorem 3 directly. Nevertheless, the final contradictions turn out to be violations of our crucial 
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Combinatorial Principle: the number of distinct values of a radical considered as a radical 
would be different from its number of values as a rational function of the roots. 
Result. We find that there are no radicals over F(ρ) that could satisfy all the constraints 
we have found. 
Thus, we see an epistemically crucial difference between the scaffoldings of Artin and 
Abel for their respective Stages 3.2. They are both out to show that their respective criterion for 
solvability is not satisfied for p5(x). On the one hand, having extracted a single property of 
groups directly relevant to solvability, all Artin needs to do is to show that S5 does not have this 
property, and given the known structure of this group, the task is trivial: there is only one 
possible normal sequence to consider. Abel, in contrast, has to rule out a whole array of 
epistemically possible primes for which a radical of the requisite form might exist. The task at 
the first level is not too bad, but already at the second level, there is a rapid multiplication of 
locations in Abel’s scaffolding he needs to examine. Artin, in contrast, can collapse his 
scaffolding by only examining one location. This is because in Artin’s approach the locations, 
the epistemically possible normal series, are all fused together at the top; in Abel’s approach, the 
locations are independent. As I emphasized in my discussion of scaffoldings in Chapter 3, this is 
one way in which the locations in a scaffolding may (Artin) or may not (Abel) be connected in a 
way that makes the scaffolding inferentially responsive. 
(4) The agent can locate and extract features directly relevant to answering the question 
Artin has certainly located and extracted features of G(E/F) that are highly directly relevant to 
showing that G(E/F) is not solvable: indeed, the fact that any normal series in S5 must begin with 
A5 is just such a feature. Abel, too, may be regarded as having located and extracted features of 
the overall mathematical situation that are quite directly relevant to showing that there aren’t 
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enough radicals for there to be a solution by radicals of the form he identified in Theorem 2. 
However, as we have already discussed, these are not features cannot be construed as properties 
of any single object or a coherent system of objects. 
 
 We have now reached the aim of the two epistemic processes as a whole: 
 
Result. The general polynomial equation p5(x) = 0 of degree 5 is not solvable by radicals. 
 
As I have noted time and again, there is a strong intuition to the effect that Artin manages to 
locate and extract just the features directly relevant to solvability by radicals, whereas Abel does 
not. Indeed, it is easy to see that my definition of directness of relevance yields this verdict. First, 
it is clear that the model-theoretic conditions are satisfied for the notion to be applicable. Second, 
it is clear that the fact in which Artin’s proof culminates, that the Galois group of p5(x) is not 
solvable, is articulated at a much conceptually higher level than any fact Abel manages to 
extract. As I have noted, it is not even clear whether we should regard Abel as having located 
any single feature at all relevant to solvability: given the paucity of his conceptual resources, the 
fact that there aren’t enough radicals for there to be a solution by radicals does not come into 
view as a property of any object or a coherent system of objects. In modern terms, of course, we 
can identify the fact to which Abel is indirectly responding: the splitting field extension of the 
general polynomial of degree 5 is not a radical extension. 
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4.3 SEMI-LOCAL ANALYSIS 
Artin’s Stage 2.1 
Aim. Associate some organizationally simpler structure with the splitting field extension E/F of a 
polynomial p(x); we associate with E/F its Galois group G(E/F). 
This stage is essentially preparation for Stages 2.2 and 2.3. While in many ways it is the 
epistemically pivotal stage in Artin’s approach, its internal organization is very simple. This is 
our first example of a subprocess where we start out with all the relevant facts already at hand, 
and the scaffolding is an inferential scaffolding in the sense introduced in Section 3.6.4. As we 
will now see, the notion of guidance applies just as it does in the case of ontic scaffoldings. 
(3) The Scaffolding Provides Guidance 
Aim. Associate some organizationally simpler structure with the splitting field extension E/F of a 
polynomial p(x). 
Aim Guidance. Given an organizationally complex structure A, it is a standard strategy in 
structural mathematics to try to associate with it a simpler one B in such a way that the large-
scale organization of A is reflected in the large-scale organization of B. 
Location Guidance. It is a standard strategy in structural mathematics to consider the 
group of automorphisms of a given algebraic structure A; indeed, we know generally that the 
organization of this group tends to reflect the organization of A itself. 
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Indeed, we know that each permutation of the roots of p(x) extends by linearity to an F-
automorphism of E and that these automorphisms form a group; this is a finite group naturally 
associated with the extension E/F. In particular, it is clear that each subgroup H of G has a fixed 
field in E, the set of all elements left fixed by all the automorphisms in H. Thus, we are justified 
in thinking that features of the organization of the lattice of subgroups of G(E/F) might reflect 
features of the organization of the lattice of intermediate fields of E/F. 
Finally, we are justified in thinking that the organization of the lattice of subgroups of the 
Galois group G(E/F) might have features relevant to solvability by radicals of p(x) = 0. For it is 
clear at this stage that the orbit of a root x of p(x) under the action of G(E/F) consists of all the 
roots of an irreducible factor of p(x), namely the minimal polynomial of x. Thus, we are justified 
in thinking that the organization of G(E/F) might reflect the relations of the roots in some way 
and the latter, we have noted, is what ultimately governs the solvability or not of p(x) = 0. 
Result. We will consider the group G(E/F) of F-automorphisms of E. 
Artin’s Stage 2.2: The Galois Correspondence 
Aim. Thus, we want to establish a correspondence between the intermediate fields of the splitting 
field extension E/F of p(x) and the subgroups of G(E/F) in such a way that some feature of the 
organization of the latter system reflects those features of the former that are directly relevant to 
solvability—namely, being contained a radical extension should have a tractable group-theoretic 
counterpart. 
Aim Guidance. Again, the obvious way to start is to consider a radical extension L/F, 
rather than E/F itself, and try to set up a correspondence between the system of intermediate 
fields of L/F and the system of the subgroup G(L/F) and then proceed to consider what this 
might tell us about the organization of the group G(E/F). 
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In order for the correspondence to track the property of being a radical extension, it 
needs to track the relationship of being a simple radical extension between intermediate fields of 
L/F. It seems likely that in order for this to happen, the correspondence needs to be bijective; for 
in general an intermediate field K in a radical extension L/F will have some extensions in L/F 
that are simple radical extensions and others that are not. 
Aim Guidance. We already have a way of associating a subgroup H of the Galois group 
G(L/F) with its fixed field LH. In the reverse direction, the most obvious thing to do would be to 
associate an intermediate field K in L/F with its Galois group G(L/K). For it is trivial that G(L/K) 
is a subgroup of G(L/F). If we can show that the two associations are mutually inverse, we will 
have shown they are both one-to-one and onto, and hence, we have our bijective correspondence. 
For it is trivial that if any map α: A → B has an inverse β: B → A, then α is one-to-one; if α is 
the inverse of β, β is one-to-one also and, in particular, both α and β are onto. 
I will consider the epistemic process in Stage 2.2 in greater detail by considering the 
individual subprocesses falling under it; thus, the following brief remarks are meant to be about 
Stage 2.2 as a whole, not so much about those subprocesses themselves. Note in particular that 
we are not here considering these processes locally—that is, we are still regarding many of the 
particular inferential moves in them as black boxes. 
Stage 2.2.1 
Aim. Identify the property required for a bijective correspondence. 
This is another central example of a subprocess where the relevant facts are already at hand, and 
the scaffolding is an inferential scaffolding. 
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(3) Scaffolding provides guidance 
The aim guidance is provided by the very characterizing properties of the field extensions we are 
dealing with: the splitting field extension E/F is characterized by the fact that some polynomial 
with coefficients in F splits in E. Now we know that this means that the field E contains all the 
field conjugates of each of the roots of that polynomial, for those conjugates are just the other 
roots. Thus, this suggests at once that the crucial property might be that the field E contains all 
the field conjugates of each of its elements. 
(4) The agent can locate and extract features directly relevant to answering the question 
As it turns out, this property, called normality, is just the property directly relevant to there being 
a bijective correspondence. In focusing on the orbits of elements of E, we have located that 
property in our inferential scaffolding, and the extraction amounts to noting the required 
completeness property of these orbits. Now of course we do not know that this property actually 
works until we have completed Stage 2.2—again, when a stage has substages embedded in it, the 
actual result only comes at the end. 
Our aim guidance for Stage 2.2 as a whole now dictates two obvious immediate aims: 
show that the mapping H → EH is the inverse of K → G(E/K) and that the mapping K → G(E/K) 
is the inverse of  H → EH, where it is assumed that the ambient extension E/F is normal. 
Stage 2.2.2 
Aim. Show that the mapping H → EH is the inverse of K → G(E/K). 
Result. This was our Lemma 1: if E/F is a normal extension, then F is the fixed field of 
G(E/F). Thus, given a normal extension E/F, we can apply this to any intermediate field K for 
which E/K is a normal extension. 
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Clearly this suggests that we should show that when an extension E/F is normal, then so 
is E/K for any intermediate field K of E/F. But let us first consider 
Stage 2.2.3 
Aim.  Show that the mapping K → G(E/K) is the inverse of  H → EH. 
Result. This was our Lemma 2, Artin’s lemma: if H is any subgroup of G(E/F), then the 
Galois group G(E/EH) of the fixed field of H is precisely the group H itself. 
Stage 2.2.4 
Aim. Show that if E/F is a normal extension, then so is E/K for any K contained in E/F. 
Result. This was our Lemma 3. 
 
Thus, when considered semi-locally, the central epistemic process of Artin’s entire proof, 
Stage 2.2, has an inferential scaffolding—there is no mathematically heavy lifting to do. The 
subprocesses in Stage 2.2, considered semi-locally, constitute a very natural sequence, and there 
is absolutely no uncertainty at any point as to what the next aim should be. This is one way of 
bringing out the remarkable epistemic character of Artin’s proof: by having made just the right 
choice about how to focus the investigation at the outset, the actual ‘work’ in the meaty middle 
part of the proof is quite easy. And there is more: if we considered the subprocesses in Stages 
2.2.2, 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 locally, we would see that Artin has excellent scaffolding for each one. For 
in Stage 2.2.2 it is trivial that H is contained in G(E/EH); in Stage 2.2.3 it is trivial that K is 
contained in the fixed field of G(E/K). Thus, in each case, the aim is to show that the reverse 
containment also holds. Further, as we will see in Section 4.4.1, in Stage 2.2.4 there is also 
excellent location and manipulation guidance, enjoyed in virtue of the scaffolding within which 
Stage 2.2 overall takes place. 
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Artin’s Stage 2.3 
Aim. Identify the feature of the system of subgroups of the Galois group G(L/F) that  
corresponds to L/F being a radical extension. 
This is the only natural aim, given the Galois correspondence and the fact that a 
polynomial equation p(x) = 0 is solvable by radicals if and only if the splitting field extension of 
p(x) is contained a radical extension. This is yet another subprocess in Artin’s proof that has an 
inferential scaffolding, one that is erected by the foregoing two facts and our overall group-
theoretic competence. 
(3) Scaffolding provides guidance 
Aim Guidance. Since a radical extension L/F is characterized by the fact that it contains a radical 
sequence from F up to L, the natural aim would be to consider the image of such a sequence in 
G(L/F) under the Galois correspondence. As we noted in Chapter 2, however, there are certain 
technical issues here that need to be handled with care. Again, first, we need to make sure that 
extension L/F can be taken to be normal; indeed, this is the first obvious subsidiary aim. Second, 
we cannot in general consider the simple radical extensions in L/F directly since they need not be 
normal. There are, however, several readily available ways around this problem. What is to be 
emphasized here is that we know from the start what the issue is: we simply need to make sure 
that we consider intermediate extensions that contain the requisite roots of unity; indeed, this 
may be considered a bit of aim guidance. The upshot is that we will consider a sequence of 
intermediate extensions in L/F that is closely related with the given radical sequence in L/F. 
(4) The agent can locate and extract features directly relevant to answering the question 
The image in G(L/F) of the appropriate kind of sequence of intermediate fields in L/F turns out 
to be a sequence of embedded subgroups of the sort that characterizes solvable groups. 
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Artin’s Stage 2.4 
Aim Guidance. Only one obvious aim remains: to determine whether G(E/F) is itself a solvable 
group, given that G(L/F) is. 
Result. It is, by an easy group-theoretic argument; see Section 2.3.1. 
 
Thus, the following result amounts to reaching the aim of Stage 2 as a whole: 
 
Result. If E/F is contained in a radical extension, then G(E/F) is a solvable group. 
 
The implication holds in the other direction also, but it is irrelevant here, since we are looking for 
a way of showing that our criterion of solvability by radicals is not satisfied for the general 
polynomial equation of degree 5. Thus, in Stage 3, we will try to show that the Galois group of 
p5(x) is not a solvable group. 
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Abel’s Stage 2.1 
Aim Guidance. Find a more inferentially engageable representation of the rational functions 
whose number of values would allow them to appear in a solution by radicals. 
This is the aim for Stage 2.1 dictated by the overall aim of Stage 2: the radicals that 
could appear in a solution formula can be expressed as rational functions of the five roots of 
p5(x) and in order to rule out enough radicals, Abel’s epistemic resources force him to reason 
directly about explicit expressions for the rational functions. 
Stage 2.1.1  Aim Guidance. Restrict the range of rational functions that could be expressions for 
radicals in a solution formula. 
This is the only obvious aim, given that we will need to rule out enough such functions 
somehow or other. There is a specific bit of Abel’s mathematical background that suggests that 
such a restriction might be a realistic aim: 
 
Theorem 3   The number of distinct values a rational function f(x1, ..., xn) in n  
independent variables x1, ..., xn can take under the permutations of the variables  
divides the product n! = n × (n – 1) × ... × 2 × 1, the so-called factorial n! of n. 
 
On the one hand, Abel knows that the radicals can be expressed as rational functions in 
five independent variables, namely the roots of p5(x), and here we have a result that puts a 
constraint on the number of values such an expression can take under the permutations of the 
roots. On the other hand, it is clear from the outset that a p-th order radical itself will take some 
number of distinct values “as a radical”—this was just the number of solutions of the minimal 
polynomial of the radical r over Q(a1, ..., a5). 
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As we emphasized, Abel realizes that these two numbers must be equal—this was his 
crucial Combinatorial Principle (or else, Theorem 7). 
Accordingly, the obvious aim now is to show that there aren’t enough radicals out of 
which to build the solution by radicals for p5(x) by showing that there aren’t enough primes p for 
which a radical of that order could exist, given that the two numbers of values are not equal. 
Thus, in particular, the obvious aim would be to find independent epistemic access to these two 
numbers for those specific p that could otherwise appear in the solution formula, and show that 
they are not equal. Indeed, it is just such an investigation that Abel’s representation of the 
radicals might be hoped to support. 
Given only Lagrange’s theorem, it seems that we might have to rule out quite a large 
range of possible orders of radicals. However, Abel knows from the start that the order of the 
radicals in the solution formula can be taken to be a prime. Thus, if we knew that the number of 
distinct values as a radical of any radicals in the solution formula is equal to its order, we would 
be justified in focusing on radicals of orders 2, 3, and 5, these being the only prime divisors of 
the factorial of 5. As we saw in our exposition of Abel’s proof, this is not actually quite the case, 
but Abel does know that this equality will hold for any radicals over the field of coefficients. 
Recall also that by the end of proving Theorem 2, Abel knows that the prime p cannot exceed 5, 
for else there would be too many distinct solutions for p5(x) = 0. Thus, Abel has a strong reason 
for thinking that the place to focus on at this stage in the proof is the number of distinct values 
rational expressions in five independent variables can take, where the number of values is a 
prime and does not exceed five. Since we are trying to rule out as many radicals as possible, the 
natural immediate aim is to find further constraints on the number of values. 
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Result. As it turns out, the tradition of attacks on the solvability of the general equation of 
degree 5 had made available a result that contributes to just this aim: 
 
Theorem 4 (Ruffini) A rational function f(x1, ..., xn) cannot have 3 or 4 distinct values  
under the permutations of the variables for n greater than 4. 
 
Thus, under the assumption that f(x1, ..., x5) has a prime number of distinct values, and that that 
prime divides 5!, now there are only two possibilities : 2 and 5. 
Stage 2.1.2 Aim. Find an artifactually determinate expression for a rational function in five 
variables with 2 distinct values. 
This aim is very naturally suggested by Abel’s epistemic scaffolding and the overall aim 
of his epistemic process; thus, this counts as aim guidance. 
Result. It turns out that the square root of a quantity known as the discriminant of the 
general polynomial has just this feature: 
 
Theorem 5 A rational function f(x1, ..., x5) in E with exactly two distinct values under  
the permutations of the variables x1, ..., x5 is of the form p + ρq, where p and q  
are symmetric functions in x1, ..., x5, and ρ2 is the discriminant of p5(x). 
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Stage 2.1.3  Aim. Find an artifactually determinate expression for a rational function in five 
variables with 5 distinct values. 
Result. It turns out that the most obvious thing works: 
 
Theorem 6 A rational function f(x1, ..., x5) with five distinct values under the  
 permutations of the variables x1, ..., x5 is of the form 
 
r0 + r1 x + r2 x2 + r3 x3 + r4 x4, 
 
 where r0, ..., r4 are symmetric functions of x1, ..., x5 and x is one of the x1, ..., x5. 
 
As I have already hinted, I regard Stage 2.1 as Abel’s finest hour in his entire proof. Abel has an 
excellent scaffolding provided by the numerical parametrization and structured by Theorems 3 
and 4. In virtue of this scaffolding, Abel enjoys good aim and location guidance throughout 
Stage 2.1: he knows just for which p he needs to find an explicit expression for the rational 
functions with p values.  
 
 In order to assess whether Abel has located and extracted features directly relevant to 
finding the specific expressions, however, we would have to consider the proofs of Theorem 5 
and Theorem 6; see the next section for the latter. 
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4.4 LOCAL ANALYSIS 
4.4.1 Artin’s Stage 2.2.3 
As its name might well suggest, in many ways Stage 2.2.3, the proof of Artin’s Lemma, is the 
heart of Artin’s approach. I aim to show that the resources of modern algebra allow us to 
maintain excellent cognitive control over the epistemic process of reading the standard proof 
and, indeed, would allow us to maintain good control also over the process of searching for it. To 
hark back to a theme I introduced in Chapter 3, I hope to show just how ‘easy’ the proof of even 
a substantial, crucially important result can be when we have concepts that allow us to properly 
orient the process from the start. 
 In my exposition so far, I have ignored a component of Artin’s lemma, namely the claim 
that the fixed field extension E/EG is separable. Since its proof provides a nice illustration of 
certain techniques characteristic of Artin’s approach, I will now bring this additional component 
into play. 
 
Lemma (Artin) Let G be a group of automorphisms of E, and let F denote the fixed field 
EG of G. Then 
(a) the fixed field extension E/F is normal and separable, and  
(b) G is the Galois group G(E/F) of this extension. 
 
In order to make the exposition more efficient, I will present the proof in a way that 
already makes explicit the kinds of guidance we enjoy in the course of reading it; I will comment 
on the other components of control once the proof is fully laid out. 
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(a) Aim. Show that the fixed field extension E/F is normal and separable. 
1. Aim Guidance. In structural mathematics, and in modern mathematics generally, we typically 
seek to have multiple logically equivalent articulations of theoretically important properties. The 
epistemic worth of having such multiple articulations is that it often facilitates finding proofs: 
where one way of characterizing a property fails to find application, a different one may well 
fare better. What I hope to illustrate below is that this multiplicity of articulations can be a 
resource for acquiring epistemic guidance. 
Thus, we have multiple articulations of normality and separability: 
 
Lemma 1  Let E/F be a field extension and let A be an algebraic closure of F.  
The following are equivalent. 
(a) E/F is normal: every F-homomorphism E → A is an automorphism of E; 
(b) For all a in E, E contains all the solutions in A of the minimal polynomial of a; 
(c) E is the splitting field of some polynomial f(x) in F[x]; 
(d) If f(x) is an irreducible polynomial in F[x] that has at least one root in E,  
then f(x) splits in E. 
 
This lemma puts us in a position to acquire excellent aim guidance by allowing us to choose the 
characterization that is appropriate to our current task. Here we are given a field E and group G 
that specifies the field F; thus, perhaps the most natural thing to try would be to go with (c) and 
construct a polynomial f(x) that has coefficients stable under the action of G and splits in E[x]. 
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Lemma 2 Let E/F be a field extension and let A be an algebraic closure of F. 
The following are equivalent. 
(a) E/F is separable: every homomorphism F → A extends to a homomorphism E → A  
in exactly [E : F] different ways; 
(b) The number of F-automorphisms of E is [E : F]; E; that is, #(G(E/F)) = [E : F]; 
(c) Every element a of E is separable over F: a is a solution of some polynomial  
in F[x], and if the degree of the minimal polynomial ma(x) of a over F is n, then ma(x)  
has n distinct roots in E. 
 
Part (c) of Lemma 2, along with part (c) of Lemma 1, strongly suggests that we should pick an 
arbitrary element a in E and try to construct a polynomial f(x) in F[x] with distinct roots in E 
such that f(a) = 0. For it is an elementary fact, already known to Abel, that the minimal 
polynomial of a will be a factor of any f(x) such that f(a) = 0. Thus, it is trivial that if f(x) has 
distinct roots in E, then so does the minimal polynomial. 
2. Location Guidance. If S = {s1, ..., sn} is any set of elements in E stable under the action of a 
group G, then the coefficients of the polynomial (x – s1)(x – s2) ... (x – sn) are symmetric 
functions of the elements in S and, hence, fixed by the action of G; that is, they are in F = EG as 
required. But which set S should we choose? Since it is the group G that is given to us, and since 
we would like the construction to work for any a in E, there is really just one natural choice: pick 
any element a in E and let O(a) = {a, a2, …, ar} be the orbit of a under the action of G, with 
repetitions ignored. Thus, the number of elements r is less than or equal to #(G). Clearly this set 
is stable under the action of G: all the images of a under the action of G are already in it. 
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3. Manipulation Guidance. We are now more or less done: let us consider the polynomial fa(x) 
defined by the elements of O(a): 
 
    fa(x) = (x − a1) … (x − ar) ∈ E[x]. 
 
By construction, this polynomial has all of its roots in E and coefficients in F. For again, the 
coefficients are symmetric functions in a, a2, …, ar and this set is stable under G. 
4. Result. But fa(x) is by construction a polynomial in F[x] that splits into linear factors (x − aj) in 
the ring E[x]; thus, E/F is a normal extension by the characterization (c) of normal extensions. 
5. Result. The element a of E is by construction a root of fa(x) and so the minimal polynomial 
ma(x) of a over F divides fa(x). Thus, since fa(x) is a product of distinct linear factors in E[x], the 
minimal polynomial of a over F is also a product of distinct linear factors, and as such, separable. 
But our choice of a was arbitrary, so this works for any a in E; thus, E/F is a separable extension 
by the characterization (c) of separable extensions. 
 
The epistemic structure of this proof is so simple that there is a sense in which the 
components of cognitive control aside from guidance are just about trivial. Indeed, one could 
justifiably say that the two lemmas set up an inferential scaffolding in the sense discussed in 
Section 3.6.4. However, we can bring out the epistemic excellence of this proof in a more 
nuanced way if we take it that the scaffolding is ontic, as follows. 
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(a) The agent has identified a target range 
The target range is the facts about the effect of automorphisms in G on the elements of E. 
(b) The agent has adopted an organizing representation that erects scaffolding 
The organizing representation is the set of all G-orbits x1, ..., xn of the elements x of E. The 
locations in the scaffolding are all the sets S in E such that it is epistemically possible that S is 
stable under the action of G. Given what we know about group actions in general, a set S is 
stable under G if and only if it is a (disjoint) union of complete G-orbits O(aj) for some elements 
aj of E. Thus, the locations are parametrized by the individual elements of E. While this is of 
course a very thin sense of parametrization, it is nevertheless just the epistemic handle we need 
on these sets. 
(c) The scaffolding provides guidance 
As we saw above, the scaffolding provides us excellent location guidance: the only thing it is 
even halfway rational to focus on is the G-orbit of an arbitrary element a of E. 
(d) The agent can locate and extract features directly relevant to answering the question 
Each of the characterizations in Lemma 1 marks out a fact directly relevant to inferring that E/F 
is a normal extension. But in view of the characterization (c), we only need to construct a 
polynomial with coefficients in F that splits in E, and the G-orbit of an arbitrary element a is just 
the location we needed: the polynomial naturally associated with this location does the trick. 
 
 I think it is fair to say that in the first part of the proof, we enjoyed excellent aim, location 
and manipulation guidance. Now we will see that even though the second part of the proof has a 
very different character, we enjoy excellent guidance there also. 
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(b) Aim. Show that G(E/F) = G. 
1. Aim Guidance. Every automorphism of E contained in G fixes every element in F = EG by 
definition, so G is contained in G(E/F), the group of all automorphisms of E that fix F. The only 
issue is that prima facie there could be automorphisms of E that are not contained in G but fix F. 
Thus, we need to show that G is all of G(E/F). 
2. Aim Guidance. Perhaps the most obvious point to make to start with is that since G is 
contained in G(E/F), we have #(G) ≤ #(G(E/F)). This strongly suggests that we should show that 
#(G(E/F)) ≤ #(G), so as to conclude that #(G) = #(G(E/F)). 
The other obvious strategy would be to pick an arbitrary element ρ of G(E/F) and show 
that ρ is in G. However, we do not have an inferentially engageable representation of the 
arbitrary element in G(E/F), and so this epistemic option is not really open for us to pursue. 
Location Guidance. Aside from the cardinalities of the two groups, there is only one 
other cardinality in view we can engage inferentially, namely the degree of the field extension E 
over F, denoted [E : F]: since E/F is separable, we know by part (b) of Lemma 2 above that 
#(G(E/F)) = [E : F]. 
Aim Guidance. Thus, we will try to show that [E : F] ≤ #(G). 
3. Aim Guidance. We need a way of relating the degree [E : F] to the cardinality #(G). 
Now we do know one number in the context of our proof that is at most #(G): the 
polynomials fa(x) considered above all have degree at most #(G). Thus, the minimal polynomial 
over F of any element in E has degree at most #(G). So we need to find an element c in E such 
that either [E : F] ≤ deg(mc(x)) or [E : F] ≤ deg(fc(x)). 
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Location Guidance. It is an elementary property of a finite extension E/F that there is 
some element b in E, called a primitive element, such that E = F(b); that is, the element b 
generates E as a vector space over F. In particular, the dimension of this space, that is, the degree 
[E : F], is exactly the degree of the minimal polynomial over F of b. 
Result. Thus, we are done: [E : F] = deg(mb(x)) ≤ #(G), as required. 
 
Again, this proof could justifiably be considered to have an inferential scaffolding set up 
by our lemmas and, indeed, the proof of the first part of the theorem. But let us again consider 
how we might see this proof also as having an ontic scaffolding. 
(1) The agent has identified a target range 
We can take the target range to be either the group-theoretic relations of elements of G(E/F) or 
the arithmetic relations of the elements of E/F. 
(2) The agent has adopted an organizing representation that erects a scaffolding 
The organizing representation is just the group of automorphisms G, conceived as a subgroup of 
the Galois group G(E/F). It is not actually clear what we could think of as the scaffolding until 
we come to Step 2: the locations are demarcated by the epistemically possible outcomes of our 
investigation: #(G) < #(G(E/F)) and #(G) = #(G(E/F)). We now need to examine these locations 
by associating some further numbers with #(G). 
(3) The scaffolding provides guidance 
I think it is fair to say that the aim, location and manipulation guidance are excellent. Note, in 
particular, that there are clearly only two possible avenues of inquiry: we could either consider 
the groups G and G(E/F) directly, or we can revert back to the extension E/F; as it turns out, only 
the latter option is approachable. 
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(4) The agent can locate and extract features directly relevant to answering the question 
Clearly the fact that #G(E/F) = [E : F] < #(G) (along with #(G) < #(G(E/F)) is highly directly 
relevant to showing that G = G(E/F). Again, almost too easy. 
 One might argue that the fact that the cardinality consideration is highly directly relevant 
to inferring that G is all of G(E/F) shows that my notion does not capture the intuitive idea that 
features ‘directly relevant’ to inferring an answer should explain that answer. For one might 
argue that the cardinality consideration does not explain why G is all of G(E/F); the thought is 
that an explanatory proof should start by considering an arbitrary element ρ of G(E/F) and show 
that it is in G. I have two things to say about this intuition. First, this is actually just what I want: 
the whole point of avoiding a metaphysically front-loaded notion of cognitive control is to leave 
room for the possibility that explanatoriness is a feature of the internal organization of our 
epistemic process. Having control does not require that one has identified some ‘metaphysically 
privileged’ feature of the situation, and it strikes me that the foregoing intuition would have to be 
understood as being metaphysically grounded in order for it to have any force at all. The idea is 
something like: the cardinality consideration does not show the ‘mechanism’ internal to G(E/F) 
that ‘forces’ the arbitrary element into G. It is not the task of my notion of cognitive control to 
try to respect intuitions of this kind. Second, I do not think that the foregoing intuition is correct 
anyway: the cardinality of G determines the dimension of E over F, and the dimension of E over 
F governs the cardinality of the Galois group G(E/F). All we are really doing in Step 3 is 
reminding ourselves just how the field F was constructed in the first place. The degree of the 
minimum polynomial of a primitive element is just a way of representing the degree of the field 
extension. 
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4.4.2 Abel’s Stage 2.1.3 
Aim. Find an artifactually determinate expression for a rational function v of the roots of p5(x) 
with 5 distinct values under the permutations of the roots. 
Result. The expression is r0 + r1 x + r2 x2 + r3 x3 + r4 x4, where r0, ..., r4 are symmetric functions of 
the roots x1, ..., x5 and x is one of the x1, ..., x5. 
This expression is crucial to obtaining some of the final contradictions at Stage 3. What 
makes Stage 2.1.3 interesting to us, however, is that it is at this stage where Abel comes closest 
to making statements about the structure of the splitting field E/F of p5(x). Indeed, much of the 
reasoning at this stage consists of making inferential moves wherein Abel is indirectly 
responding to the effect of the action of certain subgroups of the Galois group G(E/F) on the 
generators of the extension E/F, namely the roots of p5(x); as we will see, these are just the 
features that are directly relevant to proving the foregoing expression. He does not, however, 
manage to articulate those features explicitly and, as such, he is not in a position to directly 
respond to them in his reasoning. Thus, what I hope to argue below is that while Abel has a fairly 
decent scaffolding and fairly decent guidance in the sense that there is at all times visible to him 
a determinate range of aims and ways of pursuing them, he does not enjoy very good cognitive 
control: he does not have the conceptual resources to locate or extract features directly relevant 
to proving the foregoing expression. To be more careful, my claim is that while Abel does indeed 
enjoy some measure of control here, we enjoy much better control over the modern, conceptually 
articulated proof. 
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I take this occasion to emphasize that having cognitive control over an epistemic process 
is not, so to speak, merely an internal affair: it is not enough that one has some kind of a 
scaffolding and some kind of guidance that steers one towards an answer to the question driving 
the process. It is an essential part of my characterization of cognitive control that the scaffolding 
provides aim, location and manipulation guidance, and that in virtue of having such guidance, 
one is able to locate and extract features of the situation directly relevant to answering the 
question; the more directly relevant the features extracted are, the better one’s cognitive control. 
This is part of the idea that to have cognitive control involves being able to ‘see’ clearly what the 
essential features of the mathematical situation are and, in virtue of having that vision, navigate 
oneself towards an answer to the question. 
Abel’s proof of the foregoing expression can be naturally divided into two parts; I will 
call them Theorem 6a and Theorem 6. Let S be the set of all permutations of the roots. 
 
Theorem 6a For a given root xμ of p5(x), let ℑμ be the set of all permutations of the roots that  
fix xμ. If a rational function v of the roots is invariant under the permutations in ℑμ, then 
v is a polynomial in xμ with symmetric coefficients of the roots. Any v of this form either 
has 5 distinct values under the permutations in S, or else is symmetric. 
 
I will give the cleanest proof I can by using Abel’s epistemic resources, and then discuss 
the character of cognitive control we have over the process of reading this proof. 
1. Without loss of generality, we may take xμ = x1. 
2. Suppose that v is invariant under the permutations in ℑ1. It is trivial that v is a 
symmetric function of the roots x2, …, x5. 
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3. By the Main Theorem on Symmetric Functions, such v can be expressed as a 
polynomial in x1 whose coefficients are symmetric functions in the x2, …, x5. But the latter can 
be expressed as polynomials in x1 whose coefficients are symmetric functions in the x1, …, x5. 
For example, x2 + … + x4 = a1 – x1; one would explicitly verify the other cases in the same 
manner. This proves the first part of the claim. 
4. Suppose that v = v(x1) is a polynomial in x1 whose coefficients are symmetric functions 
in the x1, …, x5. 
5. Suppose that v(x1) has fewer than five distinct values under the permutations in S, and 
let v(x1), ..., v(x5) be these values; that is, the v(x1), ..., v(x5) only differ in that the variable is 
different in each. 
6. Since there are fewer than 5 distinct values, we have v(x1) = v(xm) for some m, and so, 
without loss of generality, we may suppose that v(x2) = v(x1). 
7. Now apply the four transpositions (x2, xμ) in S that exchange (x2, xμ), μ = 2, ..., 5, to 
v(x1). Since these transpositions do not affect x1 and since the coefficients are symmetric, we 
obtain v(x2) = v(x1) = v(x3) = v(x4) = v(x5). That is, v is symmetric. 
 
Not too bad, you will think. Certainly it seems fair to say that Abel has identified a target 
range, namely facts about the possible values of polynomials in the five roots under the 
permutations in S; the proof can be thought of as a small-scale investigation of certain aspects of 
this set of facts; any expression that picks out these facts may be considered an organizing 
representation. Step 2 can be regarded as erecting scaffolding for the first part, and Step 5 for the 
second; the scaffolding for the first part is structured by the Main Theorem of Symmetric 
Functions and the known expressions for the elementary symmetric functions; the one for the 
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second is structured simply by the fact that v(x1) = v(xm) for some m. And certainly there is 
guidance: the aim at each step is perfectly clear, and that there is little doubt about what location 
one should examine. As for manipulation guidance, the only even remotely non-trivial move is to 
apply the transpositions at Step 7, but then again, given that our aim is to show that v(x1) = v(x2) 
= v(x3) = v(x4) = v(x5), even this should seem like the only real option. 
Thus, my first conclusion is that we enjoy cognitive control over the process of reading 
the foregoing proof and, indeed, over the process of finding that a proof. But how good is this 
control? Let us now consider the modern proof of Theorem 6a: 
 
 By the Main Theorem of Galois Theory, G(E/F(xμ)) = ℑμ and hence, K(xμ) = K[xμ] is 
the fixed field of ℑμ. The elements of K[xμ] have the required form by definition. 
 
 While the Abel-style proof was not too bad, the difference is still pretty striking. Now 
clearly we must moderate our reaction somewhat: after all, the modern proof depends on our 
having available to us the Main Theorem, a highly non-trivial result; it is not as if the modern 
proof is acquired just by introducing the field- and group-theoretic concepts. Yet, perhaps the 
comparison here is not entirely inapt. For the epistemic location in Abel’s process where 
Theorem 6a and Theorem 6 are proved corresponds, in a way that I have labored to make 
explicit, to the epistemic location in Artin’s process where the Main Theorem has just become 
available. In any case, we can always imagine the proof of the latter inserted into the proof of 
Theorem 6a. What results is a longer proof but, as I have tried argue, one over which we enjoy 
excellent control. 
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 Let us now consider the second part of Stage 2.1.3. 
 
Theorem 6 A rational function v = f(x1, ..., x5) in E with exactly five distinct values under the 
permutations of the variables x1, ..., x5 is of the form 
 
r0 + r1 x + r2 x2 + r3 x3 + r4 x4, 
 
where r0, ..., r4 are symmetric functions of x1, ..., x5 and x is one of the x1, ..., x5. 
 
The following proof is adopted from Radloff’s discussion; Abel’s original proof is a great deal 
messier, involving as it does a number of lengthy symbolic computations. I suppose that the 
verdict regarding the quality of control in that proof would be less charitable than the one for this 
one will be. Recall, however, that our object of interest here is not what this or that particular 
individual has in fact accomplished, but rather, what can in principle be accomplished with a 
given set of epistemic resources. Thus, we should always look for the best available proof and I 
think that the following is it for Abel’s resources. 
 
Proof. Let v1, ..., v5 ∈ E be the five distinct conjugates of v = v1, and let v1, ..., vη be the 
conjugates of v1 one obtains by applying all the permutations in S that fix x1, call it ℑ1. Then the 
expression 
v1 + v2 + ... + vη  (*) 
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is clearly invariant under the permutations in ℑ1, since ℑ1 just permutes the v1, ..., vη among 
themselves. So we can apply Theorem 6a which says that any such expression is a polynomial 
in x1 with symmetric coefficients, which is what we want; call this expression ϕ(x1). So we want 
to show that v itself has this form. The proof now proceeds by considering each of the five 
options one at a time. 
η = 1. In this case, v1 = ϕ(x1), as required. 
η = 2. Abel rules out this case by solving a system of equations by considering a large 
number of subcases. But, as Radloff observes, “this case can also be handled more easily by 
using Abel’s own methods.”36 To begin with, there is at least one permutation S in S of order 5, 
so that after suitably renaming them, 
 
v1,      v2 = Sv1,      v3 = S2v1,      v4 = S3v1,      v5 = S4v1
 
are precisely the 5 distinct conjugates of v1, for otherwise it would follow as in the proof of 
Theorem 3, that v1 is either alternating or symmetric. 
Now Abel knows from Cauchy that such a permutation S is 5-cycle. Hence, one can 
show that xν+1 = Sνx1, for ν = 1, ..., 4. By applying S to each side of (*) in the present case, η = 2, 
one obtains 
v1 + v2 = ϕ(x1) 
                                                 
36 See Radloff [1998], p. 137. 
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v2 + v3 = ϕ(x2) 
v3 + v4 = ϕ(x3) 
v4 + v5 = ϕ(x4) 
v5 + v1 = ϕ(x5). 
 
That is, at each step S pushes all indexes up by 1, at 5 “wrapping around” back to 1. 
Keeping in mind that we are looking for an expression for v1, we may eliminate v2, ..., v5 
in this system, so as to obtain 
 
v1 = ∑ –  ϕ(x2) – ϕ(x4),  (**) 
 
where 2∑ = sum over all ϕ(xv). As a symmetric function, ∑ is in K, the field of coefficients of 
p5(x). The right-hand side must have two values. 
Now ϕ(x2) cannot be symmetric, for then ϕ(x4) would also be symmetric and hence, 
finally, v1, which is by assumption not the case. But, according to Theorem 6a, an expression 
like ϕ(x2) is either symmetric or has 5 conjugates, and so the latter is the case. 
By applying a suitable transposition, one shows that the right-hand side of (**) would 
have to have more than two conjugates under the permutations from ℑ1. However, in this case 
the left-hand side is assumed to have precisely 2 conjugates under the action of the group ℑ1. 
Hence, η = 2 does not occur. 
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η = 3. In this case ϕ(x1) + v4 + v5 = v1 + v2 + ... + v4 + v5 is symmetric since these just are 
all the distinct conjugates of v1. Thus, ϕ(x1) + v4 + v5 = b for some constant in K, so that v4 + v5 = 
b – ϕ(x1)  is a polynomial in x1 with symmetric coefficients, call it ψ(x1). Now replacing v4 with 
v1 and v5 with v2, one obtains a contradiction in a manner analogous with case 2. 
η = 4. In this case, we are ‘close enough’ to having the right kind of expression for v1 that 
we can just “manufacture” it. For ϕ(x1) + v5 = v1 + v2 + ... + v4 + v5 is symmetric since these just 
are all the distinct conjugates of v1. Thus ϕ(x1) + v5 = b for some constant b in K, so that v5 = b – 
ϕ(x1)  is a polynomial in x1 with symmetric coefficients. Finally, we get the required expression 
for v1 by applying any permutation S that takes v5 to v1 to both sides of this equation, so that v1 = 
b – ϕ(Sx1). That is, the only thing that changes on the right is the particular variable, the 
symmetric coefficients remaining the same. 
5. η = 5. Pick m large enough so that none of the polynomials v1, ..., v5 is divisible by the 
powers x1m, ..., x5m. The polynomial x1mv1 ∈ E can have at most 25 distinct conjugates. Given that 
η = 5, if one applies all the permutations from ℑ1 on x1mv1, one obtains the polynomials 
 
x1mv1,     x1mv2,     x1mv3,     x1mv4,     x1mv5. 
 
If one now applies to these polynomials the five transpositions Tμ = (x1, xμ) for μ = 1, ..., 5, given 
the bijectivity of Tμ, one obtains the 25 polynomials xμmvν, with ν = 1, ..., 5, which, given the 
choice of m, are pairwise distinct. Thus x1mv1 has 25 distinct conjugates, which is impossible by 
Theorem 2. So, η = 5 cannot occur. 
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So that hurt a little bit more, but it should be intuitively clear by now that we can make 
Abel out as having a perfectly respectable target range, organizing representation, scaffolding 
and, indeed, perfectly respectable guidance. Here one could obviously make the case that there 
are lapses in his manipulation guidance, but aim guidance seems to be as tight as ever: the 
numerically parametrized epistemic scaffolding leaves little uncertainty as to which tasks need to 
be carried out in order to prove the result. Indeed, Abel’s proof typifies nicely the sort of 
scaffoldings and guidance we tend to enjoy in 19th century mathematics: we have a parametrized 
space of locations, one we know to be completely represented by the parametrization, and we 
proceed to examine each of the epistemic locations individually; thus, the scaffolding provides us 
location guidance. As it often happens, there is no uniform method for treating all or even most 
of the options, although there may indeed be some overlap in the methods required by the 
various cases. This is precisely what we see here. Note, indeed, that much as in Stage 3, the 
locations are not connected, and need to be examined individually. 
But let us again consider the modern proof: 
If n ≠ 6, the n inertia groups ℑμ of the n solutions are the only subgroups of Sn of index n. 
From the Main Theorem of Galois Theory it follows that if n ≠ 6, the n fields K(xμ) are the 
only extension fields of K of degree n. Thus, K(v) = K(xμ). 
Again, while Abel maintains fairly good cognitive control ‘internally’ in his process, the 
modern proof helps us see just how far he really is from getting at features directly relevant to 
proving the desired expression. What is more, it seems pretty certain that without the Galois 
correspondence or, at any rate, without the group- and field-theoretic concepts, it is simply not 
possible to be more directly responsive to features more directly relevant than Abel is—his proof 
is as good as it gets without the modern resources. 
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Analysis 
I want to argue is that the resources of Artin’s approach allow us to extract high-level features of 
the splitting field extension E/F that are much more directly relevant to proving the two theorems 
than what the resources of Abel’s approach allow. 
The modern proof of Theorem 6a turned on the following two high-level features of the 
extension E/F: 
(1) There is a bijective correspondence between subgroups of G(E/F) and  
the intermediate fields of E/F; 
(2) G(E/F(xμ)) = ℑμ. 
These are excellent examples of high-level features of the splitting field extension E/F. Again, I 
am taking it that since the Galois group G(E/F) is the group of F-automorphisms of E, ultimately 
the facts about the identity and relations of the elements in this group can be viewed as high-
level features of the organization of the extension E/F itself; for the identity and relations of the 
automorphisms in G(E/F) are governed by the identity and relations of the elements in E/F. 
Nothing really depends on this, however: we could just as well talk about high-level features of 
the extension E/F and high-level features of its Galois group G(E/F). 
The modern proof of Theorem 6 turned on the following two high-level features of the 
extension E/F: 
(1) There is a bijective correspondence between the subgroups of G(E/F) and the 
intermediate fields of E/F; 
(2) The only subgroups of G(E/F) of index 5 are the inertia groups ℑμ of the x1, …, x5. 
 
In each case, the conclusion can be inferred directly from the two facts noted. 
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Let us compare the two proofs of the first part of Theorem 6a: 
Abel 
1. Without loss of generality, we may take xμ = x1. 
2. Suppose that v is invariant under the permutations in ℑ1. It is trivial that v is symmetric 
function of the roots x2, …, x5. 
3. By the Main Theorem on Symmetric Functions, such v can be expressed as a 
polynomial in x1 whose coefficients are symmetric functions in the x2, …, x5. 
4. But the latter can be expressed as polynomials in x1 whose coefficients are symmetric 
functions in the x1, …, x5. For example, x2 + … + x4 = a1 – x1; one would explicitly verify the 
other cases in the same manner. 
Artin 
1. There is a bijective correspondence between the subgroups of G(E/F) and the 
intermediate fields of E/F by the Main Theorem of Galois Theory. 
2. It is immediate from the definitions that G(E/F(xμ)) = ℑμ. 
3. By (1) and (2), it follows at once that F(xμ) is the unique fixed field of ℑμ in E. 
4. By definition, any element of E that is invariant under all the automorphisms in ℑμ is 
in the fixed field of ℑμ, namely F(xμ). 
5. But the elements of the field F(xμ) are, by definition, polynomials in the root xμ with 
coefficients in F. 
 216 
I think the most immediate intuition here is that the modern proof identifies the proper 
context for thinking about the rational functions under consideration: with the conceptual 
resources of Artin’s approach in hand, we can ‘see’ ‘what’ they ‘really’ are—they are just the 
elements in the fixed field of the inertia group ℑμ; after this, the result is immediate. In 
particular, it is striking that no symbolic computations are required. 
Thus, the high-level feature most directly relevant here is the fact that F(xμ) is the unique 
fixed field of ℑμ in E. Once this fact is established, the rest of the proof consists of two trivial 
applications of the definitions constitutive of Artin’s approach. This crucial fact, in turn, is a 
direct consequence of the Main Theorem and the definition of Galois group. Thus, we may now 
say, the ‘point’ is not that there are certain relations between the symmetric functions (noted in 
Step 4 in Abel’s proof), but the fact that any v in E with the stipulated property is in the fixed 
field of the group ℑμ. 
Let us now compare the two proofs of the second part of Theorem 6a: 
Abel 
4. Suppose that v = v(x1) is a polynomial in x1 whose coefficients are symmetric functions 
in the x1, …, x5. 
5. Suppose that v(x1) has fewer than five distinct values under the permutations in S, and 
let v(x1), ..., v(x5) be these values; that is, the v(x1), ..., v(x5) only differ in that the variable is 
different in each. 
6. Since there are fewer than 5 distinct values, we have v(x1) = v(xm) for some m, and so, 
without loss of generality, we may suppose that v(x2) = v(x1). 
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7. Now apply the four transpositions (x2, xμ) in S that exchange (x2, xμ), μ = 2, ..., 5, to 
v(x1). Since these transpositions do not affect x1 and since the coefficients are symmetric, we 
obtain v(x2) = v(x1) = v(x3) = v(x4) = v(x5). That is, v is symmetric. 
Artin 
6. Any element v of E of this form belongs to the field F(xμ). There are two options only: 
if the element v is in F, it is (by definition) fixed by G(E/F); if the element v is not in F, the root 
xμ appears in it and hence, it has 5 distinct conjugates under the action of G(E/F). 
The same remarks can be made about the difference between the second parts of the 
proofs as about the first: the ‘point’ is not that the transpositions have a certain effect on v but 
rather that the structure of the extension E/F has certain high-level features. The essential 
features here are that any element v of E of the required form is in the field F(xμ) and that we 
know how the Galois group acts on this field: the images of any one root are just the other roots; 
this determines how the Galois group acts on any element of F(xμ). 
Let us now compare the two proofs of Theorem 6. 
Abel 
1. Let v1, ..., v5 ∈ E be the five distinct conjugates of v = v1, and let v1, ..., vη be the conjugates of 
v1 one obtains by applying all the permutations in S that fix x1, call it ℑ1. Then the expression 
 
v1 + v2 + ... + vη  (*) 
 
is clearly invariant under the permutations in ℑ1, since ℑ1 just permutes the v1, ..., vη among 
themselves. So we can apply Theorem 6a which says that any such expression is a polynomial 
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in x1 with symmetric coefficients, which is what we want; call this expression ϕ(x1). So we want 
to show that v itself has this form. 
2. The proof now proceeds by considering each of the five options one at a time. Some of 
the options lead to a contradiction, in others we can show that v has the required form. 
Artin 
1. The Galois group G(E/F) is the symmetric group S5 on five letters. 
2. The five inertia groups ℑμ of the five solutions are the only subgroups of S5 of index 5. 
3. By the Main Theorem of Galois Theory it follows at once that the 5 fields F(xμ) are 
the only extension fields of F of degree 5. 
4. It is (just about) immediate from the definitions that any element v in E with five 
distinct conjugates generates an extension field F(v) of F of degree 5. 
5. Thus, F(v) = F(xμ) for some xμ. Hence, any v with five distinct conjugates can be 
expressed as a polynomial in xμ with coefficients in F, as required. 
Here the intuitions felt already in the case of Theorem 6a are even stronger: Abel does 
not manage to extract any feature that would be as directly relevant to inferring the required 
expression as the one in which Artin’s proof culminates, namely the fact that F(v) = F(xμ). Here 
we see very concretely what kind of a difference the availability of the field- and group-theoretic 
concepts makes: we just cannot articulate the said essential fact, never mind prove it, without 
those concepts; hence, we are forced to consider each of the individual possibilities for the 
‘explicit’ expression for v the way Abel does. Given that my definition of directness of relevance 
was tailored to accommodate this very example, this is just the verdict it yields. 
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Comments 
(1) Note that it is irrelevant from the point of view of my analysis that we would have to 
carry out further group-theoretic arguments, ones involving symbolic computations, in order to 
establish the claim in Artin’s Step 2. The point is that there is a way to ‘summarize’ the result of 
those arguments in a way that can be fed directly into the conceptual framework of the proof as a 
whole. 
(2) While I cannot argue for this here, I think it is clear that the differences we have seen 
between the two proofs of Theorem 6a and Theorem 6 are just the sort of differences 
mathematicians would regard as differences in the degree to which the proofs ‘get at’ the 
‘essential’ features of the mathematical situation. 
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4.5 SUMMARY 
We have seen that Artin’s resources allow him to maintain excellent cognitive control at all three 
levels on which we have considered his proof, including the local level. We have seen that there 
are five basic types of failures in the control Abel’s resources allow over his proof. First, it is not 
clear whether Abel has actually managed to identify a target range for the process as a whole. 
Second, Abel’s conceptual resources do not, for the most part, allow him to adopt a proper 
organizing representation in the sense required by my definition; hence, the representations that 
play the role of epistemic scaffoldings are not erected around organizing representations. Third, 
Abel’s epistemic scaffolding in Stage 3 is much less connected than Artin’s. Fourth, there is 
little manipulation guidance, particularly when the proof is considered at the local level. Finally, 
Abel is much less successful than Artin in extracting features directly relevant to the aims that 
arise in the course of his process, most strikingly including the aim of the proof as a whole. 
Nevertheless, Abel’s control over his proof of the unsolvability of the quintic is hardly a 
total failure. We would do well to remind ourselves, accordingly, that Abel’s epistemic resources 
do not afford him control over any of the processes that one might naturally want to pursue in 
this same vicinity. One obvious failure of this kind is that Abel has nothing to say about the 
solvability of special polynomials—his resources are simply not suited to reasoning about their 
solvability at all. It is a consequence of this that he has nothing to say about the various 
geometrical construction problems that Galois can address quite easily. And, of course, if we 
allow ourselves to look beyond issues having directly to do with polynomials and solvability, it 
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is clear that the resources in Artin’s approach afford us control over vast stretches of theory 
whereas Abel’s resources really only provide control over the one proof we have examined here. 
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5.0  CONCLUSION 
I started with the idea that there is a substantial analytical challenge pertaining to the character of 
modern mathematics: to explicate just what the remarkable success of modern mathematics as a 
science consists in. I contended that we do not currently have the philosophical resources for 
tackling this challenge; in particular, it does not seem realistic to think that this success could 
consist simply in the acquisition of more mathematical knowledge. I took it that the best way to 
come up with such resources is to conduct mathematical case studies. Since mathematicians feel 
that 20th century mathematics has been much more successful as a science than 19th century 
mathematics, the obvious strategy was to compare two prima facie successful approaches to the 
same mathematical problem: one approach characteristic of 20th century mathematics, another 
characteristic of 19th century mathematics. If both approaches can solve the problem, we can set 
aside the issue of acquiring more knowledge, and hope to be able to isolate other features of the 
20th century approach that render it epistemically superior to the 19th century one. 
 In my case study, I compared two approaches to what used to be a central problem in one 
of the central areas of mathematics, the solvability of polynomial equations by radicals; the 19th 
century approach was due to Abel, the 20th century one to Artin. The resources in each approach 
allowed us to prove that there is no general formula for a solution by radicals for equations of 
degree 5 or higher. I broke each proof down to three stages. The principal task of the first stage 
in each one was to identify a general criterion for solvability by radicals; that of the second was 
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to develop theoretical tools for determining whether a given general polynomial satisfies that 
criterion; and, finally, the principal task of the third stage was to employ those tools to show that 
the general equation of degree 5 does not satisfy the criterion for solvability by radicals. 
My analysis of the epistemic difference between the two proofs began by distinguishing 
epistemic resources and epistemic processes. Agent’s epistemic resources were the ambient 
background of concepts, methods of acquiring knowledge, and bits of knowledge with which she 
will pursue particular epistemic aims. An epistemic process, then, was a sequence of applying 
those resources in order to pursue some such aim. The two paradigmatic types of epistemic 
processes in mathematics were, of course, searching for a proof of a putative theorem and 
reading a proof of an established theorem. The basic idea was that the character of one’s 
epistemic standing with respect to an epistemic process depends on the epistemic resources one 
has at the outset of the process and, indeed, on the resources one manages to acquire in the 
course of that process. 
My basic suggestion was that there is a particular kind of epistemic standing that deserves 
to be singled out in our philosophical analysis of the nature of the scientific success of modern 
mathematics: cognitive control. I motivated my characterization of cognitive control by noting 
that there are three basic types of epistemic challenges we need to be able to negotiate in typical 
mathematical epistemic processes: identify a terrain of facts to be examined, find a theoretically 
productive way of representing that terrain, and examine the appropriate locations in that terrain 
so as to extract features thereof that are directly relevant to answering the question driving the 
process. The basic idea was that, depending on one’s epistemic resources, one may or may not be 
able to negotiate these challenges in a rationally orchestrated manner. 
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Thus, I proposed a characterization of cognitive control that comprised four interrelated 
components: an agent has cognitive control over an epistemic process to the extent to which she 
has managed to identify a target range, construct an organizing representation of her target 
range, erect an epistemic scaffolding for representing epistemically possible facts in that range; 
and the extent to which, in virtue of having those representations, she enjoys aim, location, and 
manipulation guidance in the course of locating and extracting features of the target range that 
are directly relevant to answering her question. I emphasized that when an agent has cognitive 
control, her epistemic standing has two central features: on the one hand, she can start with a 
panoptic overview of the epistemic terrain relevant to her aim and, given that overview, she is 
able to gradually home in on the appropriate features of that terrain. On the other hand, she is 
able to approach the question driving the process in an organized manner: she has a determinate 
scaffolding of facts into which she can plug further facts as they are discovered, and in virtue of 
that scaffolding, she enjoys guidance at each stage in the process. 
I emphasized, further, that when an agent has cognitive control, she achieves the 
epistemic accomplishment required by each of the four components, at least in part, in virtue of 
having achieved the accomplishments required by the earlier components in the characterization; 
thus, the four components constitute a cumulative sequence. I argued, indeed, that even though 
the components are heterogeneous among themselves, they constitute a unitary kind of epistemic 
standing with respect to the epistemic process. 
 I went on to discuss the four components of cognitive control in the context of our 
mathematical case study. I argued that each one allows us to capture an important aspect of the 
pre-theoretically felt difference in the epistemic power of the two approaches to solvability by 
radicals. I argued, in particular, that we enjoy significantly better cognitive control over the 
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process of reading Artin’s proof of the unsolvability of the quintic than we do over the process of 
reading Abel’s proof. 
The two most significant differences between the processes of Abel and Artin turned out 
to be, first, that Artin can construct a more theoretically useful organizing representation and 
more theoretically useful epistemic scaffolding for his proof overall, the third stage in particular, 
and, second, that Artin is much more successful in locating and extracting features directly 
relevant to addressing the issue of solvability by radicals. As our pre-philosophical intuitions 
would have us expect, these differences stem from the fact that Artin has available to him a much 
richer stock of concepts than Abel. In particular, we saw that the modern field- and group-
theoretic concepts played a central role in making possible the acquisition of cognitive control in 
Artin’s epistemic process. Abel, in contrast, was forced to work mostly with explicit symbolic 
expressions for things like roots of polynomials and, in particular, rational functions of the roots 
of the general polynomial of degree 5. The principal failures of cognitive control in Abel’s 
process can be traced back to the fact that there are certain ranges of facts and objects of which 
he simply cannot construct conceptually constituted representations. Thus, we found that he is 
often forced to respond to theoretically crucial facts indirectly, whereas Artin is able to articulate 
those facts explicitly and respond to them directly. 
We saw, nevertheless, that the resources of Abel’s approach make it possible to enjoy 
fairly good cognitive control over the process of reading his proof. Thus, we noted on a number 
of occasions that Artin’s resources make it possible to acquire excellent cognitive control over 
wide ranges of mathematical epistemic processes, whereas Abel’s resources do not. 
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It seems very likely that it would not be possible to characterize the difference in the 
epistemic standing we enjoy over the two proofs without some notion like cognitive control. For 
it is hard to see how we could characterize the epistemic accomplishments that mark the two 
approaches apart without appealing to something like target ranges, organizing representations, 
epistemic scaffoldings, guidance, and directness of relevance. What makes Artin’s approach 
epistemically superior to Abel’s is not just that he has more and more ‘appropriate’ concepts than 
Abel; it is not just that he is able to construct representations of more and more ‘relevant’ ranges 
of facts and objects; it is not just that he is in a better position to make rational decisions about 
how to proceed at each stage in the epistemic process; I think that the analysis of our case study 
shows as much. Further, it is hard to see how we could properly characterize the epistemic 
superiority of Artin’s approach without recognizing that the accomplishments that constitute his 
proof are related in an intimate way. Indeed, what makes Artin’s epistemic standing superior to 
Abel’s is not just that he has all the various individual components of cognitive control in play. 
The superiority of his epistemic standing consists, first and foremost, in the circumstance that his 
epistemic resources, especially conceptual resources, allow him to orient his epistemic process 
from the start in such a way that the process as a whole constitutes an organic progression in 
which the components of cognitive control emerge each in its appropriate time and place from 
the ones preceding it. 
I would like to suggest that we can apply the theoretical tools developed in this essay to 
analyze the epistemic accomplishments of modern mathematics quite generally. Of course I am 
not in a position to argue for this here, but further case studies strongly suggest that the epistemic 
significance of many of the principal accomplishments of modern mathematics is that they make 
it possible to acquire and maintain cognitive control over wide ranges of epistemic processes. 
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The project of this essay has been to propose an analysis of what the epistemic success of 
modern mathematics consists in. There is now an obvious sequel to this project: we would like to 
identify some of the principal types of epistemic resources that make improvements in cognitive 
control possible, and a philosophically illuminating explanation of how they do it. We have seen 
that a central part of this further project will have to be a diagnosis of the cognitive contribution 
of mathematical concepts. This is hardly surprising: perhaps the most common pre-theoretical 
intuition about modern mathematics is that its epistemic power derives, somehow or other, from 
the power of its concepts. Now one of the central features of much of modern mathematics is the 
pervasive employment of concepts of relational structures and of morphisms between such 
structures. I have not had the occasion to explore this theme here, but it seems to me that this 
emphasis on structure makes deep and wide-ranging contributions to the availability of cognitive 
control in mathematical reasoning. Thus, in future work I intend to focus on the contributions 
concepts of relational structures, and concepts associated with them, make to the availability of 
cognitive control. 
The principal intra-theoretical challenge for my future work will be to refine the 
characterizations of the individual components of cognitive control. It seems to me that target 
range, organizing representation and scaffolding are about right; it seems likely that guidance is 
about right, though no doubt more work is needed here as well. Thus, extracting features directly 
relevant and directness of relevance itself seem to be the ones most in need of refinement. This 
refinement will have to involve a careful analysis of the notion of high-level feature of a range of 
mathematical facts. For the contribution of concepts of relational structures often appears to be 
that they make it possible to articulate epistemically crucial high-level features of our target 
ranges. Hence, an analysis of the notion of high-level feature, and an explanation of how 
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concepts of relational structures make high-level features cognitively available to us, will both be 
central to understanding the epistemic contributions of the structural concepts and, as such, the 
epistemic power of modern mathematics. 
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APPENDIX A 
DEFINITIONS OF GROUP, RING, FIELD AND VECTOR SPACE 
Definition A group (G, ×) is a nonempty set G, together with a binary operation × on G,  
which satisfies the following conditions: 
(1) (Associativity) For any x, y, z in G, x × (y × z) = (x × y) × z.  
(2) (Identity) There is an element e in G such that x × e = e × x = x for all x in G. 
(3) (Inverses) For any x in G, there is y in G such that x × y = y × x = e. 
 
Definition An abelian group (A, +) is a group such that for any x, y in A, x + y = y + x. 
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Definition A ring (R, +, ×) is a nonempty set R, together with binary operations + and ×,  
which satisfy the following conditions: 
  (1) (R, +) is an abelian group. 
  (2) The operation × is associative. 
(3) There is an element e in R such that s × e = e × s = s for all s in R. 
  (4) The operation × distributes over +; for any r, s, t in R, 
 
r × (s + t) = (r × s) + (r × t) and (s + t) × r = (s × r) + (t × r) 
 
Definition A field is a ring (F, +, ×) that satisfies the following conditions: 
  (1) For any r, s in F, r × s = s × r. 
  (2) For any s in F with s ≠ 0, there is an element t in F such that s × t = t × s = e, 
  where t ≠ 0, and 0 is the identity element for + in F. 
 
Definition A vector space V over a field K is an abelian group, together with a map 
 
(x, v) → xv 
 
of K × V → V which satisfies the following conditions: 
  (1) If e is the identity element for × in K, then ev = v for all v in V. 
  (2) For any c in K and v, w in V, c(v + w) = cv + cw. 
  (3) For any x, y in K and v in V, (x + y)v = xv + yv. 
  (4) For any x, y in K and v in V, (x × y)v = x(yv). 
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APPENDIX B 
TRANSLATION OF RADLOFF [1998] 
ABEL’S IMPOSSIBILITY PROOF IN LIGHT OF MODERN GALOIS THEORY 
Ivo Radloff 
Bayreuth 
 
In 1826 N. H. Abel published Proof of the Impossibility of an Algebraic Solution of the General 
Equation Whose Degree is Greater than Four in the first volume of Crelle’s Journal. He begins 
with the words 
 
...if I am not mistaken, then the question: Is it possible in general to solve equations 
whose degree is greater than four, has not yet been answered in a fully satisfactory 
manner. The aim of this treatise is to settle this question. 
 
Up until now there has been no discussion in the literature as to whether Abel’s proof, which 
Gauss called “an atrocity,” is in fact conclusive. 
In the following paper, we shall reformulate Abel’s proof, which is nowadays understood 
only with a great difficulty, in modern terminology on the one hand, and reconstruct his heavily 
computational way of proceeding in the context of modern Galois theory on the other. In the end 
we will be able to determine whether Abel’s proof is correct with its mode of presentation taken 
into consideration. 
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I 
 
Abel called the first section “Concerning the General Form of Algebraic Functions.” Here he is 
dealing with elementary properties of ring and field extensions of Q. Abel begins with the fact 
that C is algebraically closed, which Gauss had proved in his 1799 doctoral dissertation, without 
further comment. 
In what follows, let K be an extension field of Q. Given a solution r of the equation 
 
xp – A, 
 
Abel gives a proof analogous to the modern one of the fact that each v in K(r) can be written in 
the form 
 
v = q0 + q1 r + … + qp – 1 rp – 1   (1) 
 
for some q0, …, qp – 1 in K—that is, K[r] = K(r). He later goes on to note the consequence that 
each v in K(r) – K can be written in the form 
 
v = q0 + r + … + qp – 1.rp – 1   (2) 
 
That is, one can take q1 = 1.  If v is not in K, then at least one qμ with 0 < μ < p in (1) is nonzero. 
One only needs to define r’ = qμ rμ, so we have K[r] = K[r’], and r’ is a zero of the equation xp – 
qμp Aμ in K[x]. A simple calculation shows that v itself can in fact be expressed as in (2). 
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II 
 
The most important part of this section, called Properties of Algebraic Functions that satisfy a 
given equation, is Theorem 1. 
In the opening of A Treatise on… ([2], pp. 29-54), Abel defines the concept irreducible 
equation over a given field K and proves the well-known fact that 
 
if a polynomial is irreducible over a given K and has a common solution with a  
polynomial in K[x], then it is a factor of that polynomial. 
 
It follows that each polynomial in K[x] can be expressed uniquely as a product of finitely many 
irreducible factors. While Abel does not state either of these facts explicitly here, he uses them in 
several places. 
 
Proposition 1  If K contains any primitive p-th root of unity (and hence all), then the equation 
 
xp – A ∈ K[x]    (3) 
 
is either irreducible over K, or else all of its roots lie in K. 
 
Proof. Suppose that r is a solution of (3) that does not lie in K. Let m(x) in K[x] be the minimal 
polynomial of r over K, of degree μ, so that 0 < μ < p + 1 and 
 
m(x) divides xp – A.   (4) 
 
Since r is not in K, μ > 1; hence, there is another root of (3) that is a solution of m(x). Each such 
root is known to be of the form αr, with α a primitive p-th root of unity in K. But if r and αr are 
both solutions of m(x), then the polynomial 
 
m(αx) – αμm(x) ∈ K[x] 
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of degree μ – 1 has r as a solution and hence, given the irreducibility of m(x), must be the zero 
polynomial (because of degree considerations). Thus, m(0) – αμm(0) = 0. But since m(x) is 
irreducible over K, m(0) must be different from zero, so that αμ = 1. But this is not the case for μ 
< p. Thus we have μ = p and (3) is the minimal polynomial of r over K. QED 
 
“If a polynomial equation is algebraically solvable, then one can always express the 
solution in such a form that all the algebraic functions, out of which it is composed, can 
be expressed as rational functions of the solutions of the given equation.” 
 
Theorem 1  Let L be a radical extension of K, so that K contains a primitive root of unity from  
L/K for each exponent.37 If f(x) is a polynomial in K[x] whose splitting field E  
is contained in L, then E itself is a radical extension of K. 
 
Proof. The splitting field E of f(x) is contained in the radical extension L/K, so that 
 
K = K0 ⊂ K1 ⊂ ... ⊂ Kη – 1 ⊂ Kη = L (5) 
 
and each Kμ+1, μ = 0, ..., η – 1 is obtained by adjoining to Kμ a root rμ of the polynomial 
 
x^(pμ) – Aμ ∈ Kμ[x],   (6) 
 
with rμ not in Kμ for some prime pμ. By assumption, each polynomial in (6) is irreducible over 
Kμ. Abel now shows that for any μ, E ∩ Kμ+1 is a radical extension of E ∩ Kμ of degree pμ, or 
else is equal to E ∩ Kμ: 
In case the two fields are not equal, pick any v in E ∩ Kμ+1 that is not in E ∩ Kμ. As Abel 
shows by using elementary methods, v is algebraic over K, and all the zeroes of the minimal 
polynomial ϕ(x) of v over K are contained in E (since E/K is Galois). 
                                                 
37 When L/K is defined as in (5), the exponent of L/K is the degree of the pure equation (6). 
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For short, let r = rμ, A = Aμ, and p = pμ. Since v ∈ E ∩ Kμ+1 – E ∩ Kμ, by (2), there is a 
polynomial 
 
ψ(x) = q0 + x + q2.x2 + ... + qp – 1.xp – 1 ∈ Kμ[x],  (7) 
 
so that v = y1 = ψ(r). 
 
Abel next shows that r and each qν are contained in E: given a primitive p-th root of unity 
α ∈ K and let yν = ψ(αν–1r) for ν = 1, ..., p. Then r, αr, ..., αp–1r are all the solutions of (6) and 
since ϕ(y1) = 0 (y1 = v), r is a solution of ϕ(ψ(x)) ∈ Kμ[x] and (6). Given the irreducibility of (6) 
over Kμ, we have ϕ(ψ(ανr)) = ϕ(yν) = 0 for all ανr (ν = 1, ..., p); that is, all the yν are zeroes of 
ϕ(x), and hence contained in E. Since the sum of all p-th roots of unity is zero, an easy 
calculation shows that, 
 
qν.rν = 1/p (y1 + α–ν y2 + α–2ν y3 + ... + α–(p – 1)ν yp)  ∈ E,  (q1 = 1) (8) 
 
 
For ν = 1, it follows that r ∈ E. Since r ≠ 0, it follows that qν ∈ E for each ν. 
Since A = r p ∈ E, (6) is a polynomial in (E ∩ Kμ)[x], and is obviously irreducible. Thus, 
(E ∩ Kμ)(r) is a radical extension of E ∩ Kμ. Now, ψ(x) ∈ (E ∩ Kμ)[x] (since qν ∈ E), that is v = 
ψ(r) ∈ (E ∩ Kμ)(r). Since the choice of v was arbitrary, it follows that 
 
(E ∩ Kμ+1) ⊆ (E ∩ Kμ)(r).38
 
Conversely, certainly (E ∩ Kμ)(r) ⊆ E(r) = E and Kμ(r) ⊆ Kμ+1. Thus, we have 
 
E ∩ Kμ+1 = (E ∩ Kμ)(r) and  rp ∈ E ∩ Kμ. 
 
                                                 
38 If K, K’ are subfields of C, and if M ⊆ C, then in general (K ∩ K’)(M) ≠ K(M) ∩ K’(M). 
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What this shows is that, when the equality is not strict, E ∩ Kμ+1 is a radical extension of E ∩ Kμ 
of degree p = pμ. Since we have 
 
K = K0 ⊂ (K1 ∩ E) ⊂ ... ⊂ (Kη – 1 ∩ E) ⊂ (Kη ∩ E) = E, 
 
we have shown that E is a radical extension of K. QED 
 
The following Lemma follows from the proof of Theorem 1: if in the situation of 
Proposition 1, x p – A is irreducible over K and v ∈ K(r) – K, the minimal polynomial of v over 
K has p distinct solutions y1, …, yp, so that 
 
r = (1/p)(y1 + αp – 1y2 + … + αyp)  (9) 
 
The fact that the solutions are distinct follows from the irreducibility of xp – A. 
 
Regarding Theorem 1. Since the normal closure of L over K is a radical extension of K of the 
same exponent, L/K is a Galois extension. For each Kμ in (5) we set Nμ = Gal(L/Kμ), so that Nμ+1 
is a normal subgroup of Nμ, and 
 
Nμ/Nμ+1 ≈ Gal(Kμ+1/Kμ) 
 
is a cyclic group of prime order pμ; that is, G(L/K) is solvable. Let 
 
π: Gal(L/K) → Gal(E/K) 
 
be the surjective restriction homomorphism. For each Kμ, L/Kμ is Galois, that is, the fixed field 
of Nμ in L is Kμ. If we now put Hμ = πNμ, then Hμ+1 is normal in Hμ and the fixed field of Hμ in 
E is E ∩ Kμ, whence Hμ = Gal(E/E∩Kμ). Further, we have the induced surjective 
homomorphism 
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πμ: Nμ/Nμ+1 → Hμ/Hμ+1. 
 
Accordingly, Hμ/Hμ+1 is either a cyclic group of order p, or else 1. Since Hμ+1 is normal in Hμ, 
the extension E ∩ Kμ+1/E ∩ Kμ is Galois and 
 
Hμ/Hμ+1 ≈ Gal(E ∩ Kμ+1/E ∩ Kμ). 
 
That is, E ∩ Kμ+1/E ∩ Kμ is either a cyclic extension of degree pμ, or else it is trivial. 
 
III 
 
The title of this paragraph Concerning the number of distinct values a function of several 
quantities can take when the quantities are permuted among themselves is word-for-word 
translation from French of the title an article by Cauchy which Abel himself cites. 
In modern terms, in this paragraph Abel studied the intermediate fields of the splitting 
field of the general 5-th degree polynomial. While Abel formulated Theorem 2 and Theorem 6 
for an arbitrary degree n, we will concentrate on the case n = 5. 
The context makes it clear that Abel understood the notion of general polynomial as 
follows: 
 
Definition 1  Let k be a subfield of C and E = k(x1, …, x5) the field of rational functions in five 
variables. Further, let a1, …, a5 be the elementary symmetric polynomials in these variables, so 
that E is the splitting field of the polynomial 
 
f(X) = X5 + a1 X4 + a2 X3 + a3 X2+ a4 X + a5 ∈ K[X] 
 
where K = k(a1, …, a5). Then we will call f(x) the general 5-th degree polynomial. The 
symmetric group S5 can be identified with the permutation group of x1, …, x5. 
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As Abel shows in two particular cases, E = K[x1, …, x5]. In what follows, the elements of 
E will be viewed as polynomials in x1, …, x5 with coefficients in K. 
In the modern definition of the general polynomial of 5th degree, the a1, …, a5 are defined 
as variables over k, and one then shows that the situation in Definition 1 obtains. The extension 
E/K is Galois, and we have 
 
Gal(E/K) ≈ S5.   (11) 
 
These groups will be identified in what follows. Abel, too, treats the permutations in S5 as if they 
were K-automorphisms of E without further comment.39 If one polynomial in E is mapped to 
another by a permutation in S5, they are called conjugates (over K). The minimal polynomial of 
such a polynomial means minimal polynomial over K. 
If a polynomial is invariant under all permutations in S5, it is called symmetric. A 
polynomial that is invariant under (at least) all permutations in A5 is called alternating. In what 
follows, Abel makes frequent use of The Main Theorem of Symmetric Functions (MSF), 
which Waring had proved already in 1762. 
 
“The number of distinct values a polynomial in n quantities can take under all  
the possible permutations of these quantities is a factor in the product 1.2. … n.” 
 
This Theorem, which Abel describes as “well-known,” goes by the name Lagrange’s Theorem, 
for one finds it already in Article 97 of Lagrange’s Reflections… from the year 1771: 
 
Theorem 2 (Lagrange)  The number of conjugates of a polynomial v in E is a factor of  
                                                 
39 Abel makes a definite distinction between what used to be called permutations and 
substitutions. 
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the order of S5 = 5!. 
 
In its group-theoretic formulation, Theorem 2 says that the order of any subgroup of S5 divides 
the order of the group itself. The Main Theorem of Galois Theory implies that the number of 
conjugates of v is equal to the index of Gal(E/K(v)) in S5. The proof of Theorem 2 is elementary 
and will not be reproduced here. 
 
“It is […] impossible to find a function in 5 quantities that has 3 or 4 distinct values. The 
proof of this Theorem is contained in a treatise by Cauchy…” 
 
Cauchy notes in his article that this Theorem is a generalization of a result due to Ruffini 
from 1804. Abel proves a more general version of Theorem 3 which we will, for the sake of 
clarity, only consider in the special case n = 5. The proof we will present, however, does come 
directly from Abel. 
 
Theorem 3 (Ruffini)  A polynomial in E with fewer than 5 conjugates is either alternating  
or symmetric. 
 
Modern Proof. One knows from Bertrand’s Theorem that for n ≠ 4, the group Sn has no 
subgroup with index 2 < m < 5. But the number of conjugates of v in E is precisely the index of 
Gal(E/K(v)) in Sn. 
 
Proof. Let v in E be a polynomial with m conjugates with m < 5. Thus, v is invariant under any 
permutation S of degree 5. For, since m < 5, at least two of the polynomials 
 
v,   Sv,   S2v,   S3v,   S4v  (12) 
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 are equal, with Sμv = Sμ’v with μ ≠ μ’ mod 5. Thus, v is invariant under Sμ – μ’ and any power 
thereof. Since 5 is a prime, there is some ν such that ν(μ – μ’) ≡ 1 mod 5. Hence, v is in fact 
invariant under S = Sν(μ – μ’), as claimed. 
 A straightforward calculation shows that any 3-cycle in S5 can be expressed as a product 
of two permutations of degree 5. Hence, v is invariant under any 3-cycle. But it is well-known 
that the 3-cycles generate the alternating group A5. Thus, v is alternating. It follows that v is 
alternating or symmetric. QED 
 
In light of Theorem 3, Abel now investigates polynomials v ∈ E with 2 or 5 conjugates. 
It turns out that the splitting fields K(v) are already known in these cases. 
 
“Each function in five quantities that has exactly two distinct values 
can be expressed in the form p + qρ, where p and q are symmetric functions  
and ρ = (x1 – x2)(x1 – x3) … (x4 – x5).” 
 
Theorem 4  Each polynomial with fewer than five distinct conjugates is contained  
in K[ρ], where ρ2 denotes the discriminant of f(x). 
 
Modern Proof. In its group-theoretic formulation, Theorem 4 states that A5 is the unique 
subgroup of S5 with index 2. The Main Theorem of Galois Theory then implies that the fixed 
field of A5 is the unique subfield of E with degree = 2 over K, and since ρ is alternating but not 
symmetric, the fixed field in E of A5 is K[ρ]. 
 
Proof. Since the solutions of f(x) are distinct, we have ρ ≠ 0. Clearly, ρ is alternating and ρ2 is 
symmetric. Given Theorem 3, a polynomial v1 in E with fewer than 5 conjugates is either 
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alternating or symmetric. In the symmetric case, certainly v1 is in K[ρ]. In the alternating case, 
let v2 be the distinct conjugate of v1. Then both t = v1 + v2 and t1 = ρ(v1 – v2) are symmetric and 
hence, by MSF, belong to K. Thus, v1 is in K[ρ], since 
 
v1 = p + qρ with p = t/2, q = t1/2ρ2 ∈ K. 
 
QED 
 
Theorem 5  For a given zero xμ of f(x), let ℑμ be the group of all permutations in S5 that fix xμ.  
 A polynomial v in E is invariant under all permutations in ℑμ precisely when v belongs to 
 K[xμ]. Further, any v in K[xμ] either has 5 conjugates or else is symmetric. 
 
Modern Proof. By the Main Theorem of Galois Theory, Gal(E/K[xμ]) = ℑμ, and therefore 
K[xμ] is the fixed field of ℑμ. 
 
Proof. Without loss of generality, let xμ = x1. Each polynomial v in E invariant under the 
permutations in ℑ1 is symmetric in the zeroes x2, …, x5 and, by the MSF, such v can be 
expressed as a polynomial in x1 over K and in the symmetric polynomials in x2, …, x5. The latter, 
however, are contained in K[x1] (for example, x2 + … + x4 = a1 – x1). Thus, v is in K[x1]. The 
verification is trivial. 
 Let now v = v(x1) ∈ K[x1]. Then v(x1), ..., v(x5) are the conjugates of v(x1), and suppose, 
WLOG, that v(x2) = v(x1), so one obtains by applying the four transpositions (x2, xμ), μ = 2, ..., 5, 
that v is symmetric. QED 
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“Each rational function of five quantities that has five distinct values, is of the form 
 
r0 + r1 x + r2 x2 + r3 x3 + r4 x4, 
 
 where r0, ..., r4 are symmetric functions and x is any one of the five quantities.” 
 
Theorem 6  If a polynomial v ∈ E has exactly five distinct conjugates, then K(v) = K(xμ) for  
 any solution xμ of f(x). 
 
Modern Proof. If n ≠ 6, the n subgroups ℑμ are the only subgroups of Sn of index n. From the 
Main Theorem of Galois Theory it follows that if n ≠ 6, the n fields K[xμ] are the only 
extension fields of K of degree n. Thus, K(v) = K(xμ). 
 
Proof. Let v1, ..., v5 ∈ E be the five distinct conjugates of v = v1, and let v1, ..., vμ be the 
conjugates one obtains by applying all the permutations from ℑ1. Then by Theorem 5, 
 
v1 + v2 + ... + vη = ϕ(x1) ∈ K[x1]  (13) 
 
for some ϕ(x) ∈ K[x]. Consider the possible values η can take: 
 
1. η = 5. Pick m large enough so that none of the polynomials v1, ..., vη is divisible by the powers 
x1m, ..., x5m. The polynomial x1mv1 ∈ E can have at most 25 distinct conjugates. Given that η = 5, 
if one applies all the permutations from ℑ1 on x1mv1, one obtains the polynomials 
 
x1mv1,     x1mv2,     x1mv3,     x1mv4,     x1mv5. 
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 If one now applies to these polynomials the five transpositions Tμ = (x1, xμ) for μ = 1, ..., 5, given 
the bijectivity of Tμ, one obtains the 25 polynomials xμmvν, with ν = 1, ..., 5, which, given the 
choice of m, are pairwise distinct. Thus x1mv1 has 25 distinct conjugates, which is impossible by 
Theorem 2. So, η = 5 cannot occur. 
 
2. η = 1. In this case, v1 = ϕ(x1) ∈ K[x1] and the Theorem follows. 
 
3. η = 4. In this case, v5 + ϕ(x1) is symmetric and hence in K. Hence, v5 ∈ K[x1] and so one 
obtains v1 from v5 by applying some permutation, whence v1 ∈ K[xν] for some xν. 
 
4. η = 2. Abel rules out this case by solving a system of equations by considering a large number 
of subcases. But this case can also be handled more easily by using Abel’s own methods: to 
begin with, there is at least one S ∈ S5 of order 5, so that after suitably renaming them, 
 
v1,      v2 = Sv1,      v3 = S2v1,      v4 = S3v1,      v5 = S4v1
 
are precisely the 5 distinct conjugates of v1, for otherwise it would follow as in the proof of 
Theorem 3, that v1 is either alternating or symmetric.40 As Cauchy shows in Sur le Nombre des 
Valeurs…, S is 5-cycle. One can thereby further show that xν+1 = Sνx1, for ν = 1, ..., 4. By 
applying S to (13), one obtains 
 
v1 + v2 = ϕ(x1) 
v2 + v3 = ϕ(x2) 
                                                 
40 v2 is fixed by (13).  
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    ...    (14) 
v5 + v1 = ϕ(x5) 
 
By eliminating v2, ..., v5 in this system, one obtains 
 
v1 = ∑ –  ϕ(x2) – ϕ(x4),  (15) 
 
where 2∑ = sum over all ϕ(xv). As a symmetric function, ∑ is in K. Now ϕ(x2) cannot be 
symmetric, for otherwise ϕ(x4) would also be symmetric and hence, finally, v1, which is not the 
case. Thus, by Theorem 5, ϕ(x2) has 5 conjugates. But then, by applying a suitable transposition, 
one shows that the right-hand side of (15) would have to have more than two conjugates under 
the permutations from ℑ1. Hence, η = 2 does not occur. 
 
5. η = 3. In this case ∑ = the symmetric sum over all the vν. Thus, ∑ = v4 + v5 + ϕ(x1); hence, v4 
+ v5 = ψ(x1) for some ψ(x) ∈ K[x]. By replacing v4 with v1 and v5 with v2, one obtains a 
contradiction in a manner analogous with case 4. 
In sum, v ∈ K(xμ) for some zero xμ of f(x). If v is not symmetric and since a field 
extension of prime degree cannot contain a proper intermediate field, we actually have K(v) = 
K(xμ) (Abel proves this last step by using elementary methods). QED 
 
“If a function of several quantities has m distinct values, one can always 
 find an equation of degree m whose coefficients are symmetric functions, 
 and have these values as solutions; it is, however, impossible to find an 
 equation of this form, but of lower degree, that has one or more of these 
 values as solution.” 
 
Theorem 7  Two polynomials in E are conjugates if and only if they are solutions of the same  
minimal polynomial. Thus, the number of conjugates of a polynomial is the number  
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of solutions of its minimal polynomial. 
 
The proof is analogous to the modern one and will not be presented here. 
 
IV 
 
Abel’s treatise concludes with this paragraph and the Proof of the Impossibility of the general 
Solution of the Fifth Degree Equation: 
 
Theorem 8  The general polynomial of fifth degree is not solvable by radicals. 
 
Modern Proof. In group theoretic terms, Theorem 8 says that S5 is not solvable. In order to 
present Abel’s reasoning more clearly, in this paragraph we will present his proof also in group-
theoretic terms, so that the modern translations of the results in the previous paragraph may be 
employed more easily. 
Abel’s proof can be divided into two auxiliary propositions. 
 
Proposition 2  If K contains a primitive p-th root of unity α for a prime p, and if r ∈ E is  
a solution of the equation 
 
xp – A ∈ K[x],  (16) 
 
but not symmetric, then p = 2 and K(r) = K[ρ]. Thus, K[ρ] is the only radical extension  
of K contained in E. 
 
This Proposition says, strengthening Theorem 4, that A5 is the only normal subgroup of S5 with 
prime index. 
 
Proof. By Proposition 1, the polynomial xp – A is irreducible over K. By Theorem 7, the p is 
the number of conjugates of r, and so by Theorem 2, p divides 5!. 
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By Theorem 3, either p = 2 or p = 5. But if p = 5, we then have K(x1) = K(r) by 
Theorem 6. By (9) we would further have 
 
r = 1/5(x1 + α4 x2 + α3 x3 + α2 x2 + α x5). 
 
The right-hand side has 120 = 5! distinct conjugates, a contradiction. Hence, p = 2 and by 
Theorem 4, K(r) = K[ρ]. QED 
 
Group Theoretic. Since S5 has no subgroup of index 2 < m < 5 by Bertrand’s Theorem, the index 
of a normal subgroup N of S5 with a prime index would have to be = 2 or = 5. The isotropy 
group ℑμ from Theorem 5 is the only subgroup of S5 of index 5, but it is not normal. Hence, p = 
2. On the other hand, since A5 is the only normal subgroup of S5 of index 2, we must have N = 
A5. 
 
Proposition 3  If  K contains a primitive root of unity for each prime p, then there is no proper  
radical extension of K[ρ] contained in E. 
 
In modern terms, this says that A5 has no normal subgroup of prime index and as such, is not 
solvable. 
 
Proof. Suppose that L(r) ≠ L = K[ρ] is a radical extension, so that r is a solution of 
 
xp – A ∈ L[x]  (17) 
 
with p a prime. Then r is not in L, and by Proposition 2, (17) is irreducible over L. On the other 
hand, A is not in K, for otherwise by Proposition 2 we would have L(r) = K(r) = L. Hence, A is 
alternating but not symmetric. 
Abel now shows that the polynomial 
 
(x p – A)(x p – A’) ∈ K[x] 
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which is contained in K[x] by MSF, is the minimal polynomial of r over K, so that A’ is the 
unique conjugate of A. The proof is elementary, and will not be reproduced here. Thus, by 
Theorem 7, r has 2p distinct conjugates. Hence, by Theorem 3, p ≠ 2. 
 
Now consider the case p = 5. If r’ is a solution of x p – A’ ∈ L[x], then r’ is a conjugate of 
r, so r’ ∈ E. Hence, the polynomial x p – A.A’ ∈ K[x] is not irreducible over K, with r.r’ ∈ E a 
solution, for by Proposition 2 we would have 2p = 2, a contradiction. So, by Proposition 1, x p – 
A splits into linear factors over K, and in particular we have 
 
γ = r.r’ ∈ K. 
 
Now let μ = 1, ..., p and let α be a primitive p-th root of unity α 
 
vμ = αμ.r + α–μ.r’ = αμ.r + γ/αμ.r ∈ K(r)  (18) 
 
By applying Newton’s Formula one obtains easily 
 
ϕ(x) = (x – v1)(x – v2)...(x – vp) ∈ K[x]. 
 
By the irreducibility of (17) over K and by the irreducibility of the p-th [...]polynomial over Q 
(proved by Gauss in 341 of the Discquisitiones) it follows that ϕ(x) is irreducible over K 
(obviously v1, ..., vp is a complete system in E of conjugate over K). 
If ϕ(x) is irreducible over K, by Theorem 7, v1 has p distinct conjugates, so that by 
Theorem 2, p divides 5!. By Theorem 3, p = 3 cannot occur and since we have just excluded p 
= 2, we must have p = 5. 
Hence, by Theorem 6, K(v1) = K(x1) for the solution x1 of f(x). Since v1 ∈ K(r), x1 ∈ 
K[ρ](r). If x1 has more than two conjugates, x1 is not in K[ρ]. Hence by (9), we have 
 
r = 1/5(x1 + α4 x2 + α3 x3 + α2 x4 + α x5) 
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Hence, r has 5! = 120 conjugates (that is, r is a primitive element of E/K). But, above we saw 
that r must have 2.p = 10 conjugates. Hence, p ≠ 5. QED 
 
Group Theoretic. If N is a normal subgroup of A5 of prime index p, then [S5 : N] = 2.p. Since S5 
contains no subgroup of index 2 < m < 5 (by the remark following Theorem 3), we have p ≠ 2. 
Now ..., then each 3-cycle can be written as a product of two such permutations. Hence, there is 
at least one S in A5 of order 2 with S not in N. If H is a the subgroup generated by S, then N.H is 
a subgroup of A5 of order 2.[N], that is, 
 
[S5 : N.H] = p divides [S5]. 
 
Since p = 3 cannot occur by Bertrand’s theorem, p = 5. But then N.H = ℑμ for some xμ. But since 
ℑμ is not contained in A5, p = 5 cannot occur. Hence, A5 is not solvable. 
 
Proof of Theorem 8  Suppose that the general equation of 5th degree is solvable by radicals. 
Then it is also solvable over the extension of K one obtains by adjoining all the roots of unity in 
K. Hence, we can suppose that K contains all the roots of unity. By Theorem 1, E is therefore 
itself a radical extension of K of the form 
 
K = K0 ⊂ K1 ⊂ ... ⊂ Kη–1 ⊂ Kη = E, 
 
where Kμ+1 for μ = 0, ..., η – 1 is obtained by adjoining a solution of xp – A ∈ Kμ[x] to Kμ for 
some A, some p. 
Since f(x) is by Theorem 7 irreducible over K, then K ≠ E, and hence η ≠ 0. By 
Proposition 2, K1 = K[ρ]. Since each element of K[ρ] has just two conjugates, we cannot have E 
= K1. Hence, η > 1. By Proposition 3, E contains no proper radical extension of K[ρ] and hence, 
f(x) is not solvable. QED 
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Abel’s proof of Theorem 8 is entirely conclusive, once some critical places in the 
extensive proofs of Theorems 1 and 6 and Proposition 2, are filled in. The problem with these 
proofs stems principally from the fact that Abel sets out to investigate the statements (concerning 
the degrees of minimal polynomials) only relative to the ground field K and not also relative to 
extension fields L of K. 
Abel published two further treatises on the question of solvability of polynomials; from 
neither one does one get the impression that Abel would have been moving towards the sort of 
general theory which Galois obtained a few years later. 
 [Section omitted.] 
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